Market cap $2.20 T −3.96 % over 24 hours24h volume $73.16 BBTC dominance 58.1 %ETH 10.0 %Fear & Greed 10 Extreme fearCoins 21,490

Project · Arbitrum Avalanche Base BNB Chain Infrastructure

Safe (SAFE): the multisig standard behind $57 billion, and why its add-on modules make it risky

Active Risk 3/5

About the project

Safe, known until 2022 as Gnosis Safe, is the smart-contract account that most DAO treasuries, funds and crypto companies use as their multisig wallet: money moves only when enough of the account’s owners sign. The Safe Ecosystem Foundation counted $57.64 billion held in Safe accounts on 30 September 2026. The contracts at the centre of that system have not been broken. The losses have come from what sits around them: the web app in the $1.5 billion Bybit theft of February 2025, and add-on modules in a string of drains in 2026.

The latest came on 16 November 2026, when a Safe on Ethereum lost about $6.4 million through a Zodiac Roles module, with no owner signature involved. Zodiac’s co-founder blamed a probably stolen operator key and a role that allowed too much. On 17 November the wallet’s owner was still unidentified and Safe had not commented. Around the contracts sit a Swiss foundation whose governance an early investor is contesting, a business that earns a few million dollars a year, and a SAFE token that carries votes and staking but no share of that revenue.

How a Gnosis Safe multisig works: owners, threshold, modules

A Safe is not a key. It is a smart contract deployed on Ethereum or another EVM chain, and it holds the assets itself. The contract keeps a list of owner addresses and a threshold, for example two of four or three of six. To move funds, someone proposes a transaction, owners sign it with their own wallets (a hardware wallet, a browser wallet, another Safe), and once the threshold is reached anyone can submit it for execution. Safe holds none of those keys. One stolen key is therefore not enough to empty the account.

Three parts are easy to confuse. The Safe Smart Account is the contract code, open source and published on GitHub, where the latest tagged release is version 1.5.0. Safe{Wallet}, at app.safe.global, is the web and mobile interface most owners use to build, sign and track transactions, together with the back-end service that stores pending signatures. The third part is everything owners add on top. The interface can be replaced, since other front ends talk to the same contracts. The contract cannot be talked out of its rules. The add-ons are where the rules can be changed.

Modules: the exception to “enough owners must sign”

A module is a separate contract that the owners switch on once, with a normal threshold-signed transaction. From then on the module can make the Safe execute transactions with no further owner signature. That is how daily spending allowances, recurring payments, social recovery and delegated trading work. Safe’s own documentation is blunt about the price: “A malicious module can take over a Safe.” It tells owners to add only modules that are trusted and audited.

Guards are the opposite tool. Introduced with version 1.3.0 of the contracts, a guard runs checks before and after a transaction and can block it, for example to refuse transfers to unknown addresses. The documentation warns that a broken guard can cause a denial of service for a Safe, because it has the power to block every transaction.

The best-known module for delegation is Zodiac Roles, part of the Zodiac toolkit that Gnosis Guild developed; the Zodiac website now carries the name of a company called Zodiac Labs GmbH. With Roles, the owners give an outside address, a trading bot or a treasury manager, a “role”: a list of contracts, functions and parameters it may call from the Safe. The safety of the arrangement rests on how tightly that list is written and on who holds the key of the address that has the role. None of that code belongs to Safe’s core contracts, and Safe’s audits do not cover it.

A group of people beside a padlock and a turning gear
A Safe opens when enough owners sign; a module, once enabled, can act without them.

The 16 November drain: about $6.4 million through a Zodiac Roles module

At 11:35:23 UTC on Monday 16 November 2026, one transaction on Ethereum took 4,387,188 USDC and 1,717,919 syrupUSDC, Maple Finance’s yield-bearing dollar token, out of a Safe that requires two of its four owners to sign. The call did not come from an owner. It was sent to the Roles module enabled on that Safe by an address that had been calling the same module since July 2024, most recently on 31 October. The module passed the instruction on, the Safe redeemed its shares in a Morpho vault for USDC, and both tokens went to another address. Coindaro’s report on the Zodiac Roles drain follows the money step by step and values the loss at about $6.44 million.

The on-chain investigator Specter flagged the transfer on Telegram at 13:33 UTC, wrote that a Safe “may have been compromised”, put the loss at $6.45 million and said $1.2 million had been converted to Monero. The Safe’s signers reacted 43 minutes after the drain: at 12:18 UTC they replaced one owner, and between 12:26 and 12:38 UTC fourteen transactions moved the remaining positions, which their contracts valued at about $6.6 million in dollar-pegged tokens when read again on 17 November, to a different Safe.

That is what the chain shows. It does not show why the call was possible, and three explanations fit the same transaction: a role written too loosely, so that it allowed a payment to an outside address; a stolen or misused key for the address that held the role; or a flaw in the module. The address that sent the call was the module’s regular operator, with hundreds of earlier calls.

Zodiac’s side rules out the third. Johannes Moormann, co-founder of Zodiac, told Cointelegraph, in an article published at 17:49 UTC on 16 November, that his team had reviewed the transaction. “There is no vulnerability in the module. The contracts worked correctly,” he said. The call came from the key of a long-standing role member, which was “most likely compromised”, and the wallet’s own permissions policy let the transfer through, almost certainly without its authors meaning it to. Moormann added that the wallet’s operators held their keys and wrote their permissions, that Zodiac had no part in the setup, and that it had not been in contact with them.

That is one party’s account, and it comes from the team whose module the money passed through. The wallet’s operators have said nothing in public, and the owner is not publicly known. Cointelegraph wrote that it had asked Safe and Gnosis Guild for comment and had no reply when it published. At 19:20 UTC on 17 November 2026, Safe’s blog (most recent post 27 October), its governance forum and its help centre carried nothing on the drain, and Zodiac’s own website and blog did not mention it. Security firms have published on the money, not on the cause: PeckShield said the attacker spent about $813,000 buying XMR on Hyperliquid, and Bitquery traced funds to five Hyperliquid accounts that bought about $1 million of a Monero-linked token, both as reported by Cointelegraph.

The owners did act on the chain. At 08:23:59 UTC on 17 November, almost 21 hours after the drain, a transaction carrying two owner signatures removed the Roles module from the Safe. At 19:18 UTC that day the contract no longer listed the module as enabled, and the account was still a two-of-four on version 1.3.0. The USDC contract did not show the three addresses named by Specter as blacklisted by Circle. The third of them, which held about 130 ETH on the evening of 16 November according to Coindaro’s report, had less than 0.01 ETH left.

On the question that matters most for other users, core contract or add-on, the evidence points one way. The Safe contract did what it is built to do: it executed an instruction from a module its owners had enabled. No source has reported a flaw in Safe’s own contracts in this case, and Zodiac says its module also worked as written. If that account holds, the weakness lay in how this role was written and in the custody of one key, both in the hands of the wallet’s operators. They have not confirmed it.

Safe does keep an advisory on a Zodiac module vulnerability, last updated on 3 June 2026 and unchanged on 17 November. It covers Roles Modifier versions 2.1.0 and 2.1.1 and Delay Modifier 1.1.0, lists Roles v1 as unaffected, and states: “this is an issue in third-party Zodiac modules, not in Safe.” No source ties the 16 November drain to that advisory. What the block explorer shows about the module used that day is this: it is a proxy that points to a contract named Roles, deployed on 23 November 2022, whose verified source code identifies roles by number, as the first version of Roles does.

Five module incidents in 2026, none in Safe’s own contracts

The 16 November loss is at least the fifth this year in which funds left Safe accounts through code that was not Safe’s, and the second largest of the five.

DateWhat happenedAmountSource
25 May 2026At least 86 Safes on Ethereum and Base drained through a third-party module named SquidRouterModule; Squid said the contract shared its name, not its codeabout $3.2 millionCointelegraph
1 June 2026Flaw in Zodiac’s Delay and Roles modules used by the Gnosis Pay card; 5,281 wallets affected, Gnosis covered usersabout $1.8 million affected, about $1.5 million takenGnosis Pay post-mortem
15 September 2026One Safe drained of about 2,900 rsETH through a custom Uniswap v4 liquidity module; a trading bot front-ran the attacker and took most of the tokensabout $7.8 millionUnchained
1 October 2026Two Safes drained through FlashLoopAdapter, a third-party module for leveraged Aave v3 positionsup to $310,000Crypto Briefing
16 November 2026One Safe drained through its Zodiac Roles module; Zodiac points to a compromised operator key and a loose role, the owner is unidentifiedabout $6.4 millionBlockscout, Specter, Cointelegraph

The Gnosis Pay case is the best documented, with a full post-mortem from the company. The card, a product of Gnosis, the group Safe was spun out of, gives each user a Safe with Zodiac modules attached. According to that post-mortem, a signature check added to Zodiac in October 2023 accepted calls that had failed; ChainSecurity completed its review of the fix on 4 June and new modules were deployed from 4 to 7 June.

With no module enabled, a Safe is exposed to its owners’ keys and to what those owners agree to sign. A Safe with a module is also exposed to that module’s code, to its configuration and to every key allowed to call it, which is one of the access risks described in our map of DeFi risks. Owners can see what is enabled under Settings, then Modules, in Safe{Wallet}.

Bybit, February 2025: the app was compromised, not the contract

One of the largest thefts in crypto also ran through a Safe. On 21 February 2025 the exchange Bybit lost about $1.5 billion, mostly in ether, from a cold wallet that was a Safe multisig. The FBI attributed the theft to North Korea on 26 February 2025, under the name TraderTraitor.

Here too the contract behaved as written. In a statement of 28 February 2025, the Safe Ecosystem Foundation said the attack was “achieved through a compromised Safe{Wallet} developer machine” and that the forensic review had found no vulnerability in the smart contracts or in the source code of the front end and services. The investigation by the security firm Sygnia describes the method: a developer’s macOS workstation was compromised on 4 February, the attackers used the developer’s cloud credentials from the next day, and on 19 February they altered JavaScript served by the app so that it acted only on transactions from a short list of addresses that included Bybit’s cold wallet. Bybit’s signers then approved what the Foundation called a “disguised malicious transaction”, and more than 400,000 ETH left the wallet. The malicious code was removed about two minutes later.

For a user, the Bybit case and the module drains have this in common: the contract checked signatures and permissions as written, and the failure sat in what people trusted around it. A multisig protects against one stolen key. It does not protect owners who all approve the same misleading screen.

What Safe changed afterwards

The Foundation said at the time that the Safe{Wallet} team had rebuilt its infrastructure and rotated all credentials before bringing the app back in stages. The larger change came later. On 15 October 2025, Safe Labs took over the operation of app.safe.global from Core Contributors GmbH, the independent company that had run it. The Foundation gave three reasons: it had little direct say over how the app was run, the operator’s income came mostly from support contracts, and reliability problems, Bybit included, had shown how one operator could damage the whole project.

Safe has since built its security products around checking a transaction before it executes. Safenet, launched in beta on 2 April 2026, is a network of validators that check a transaction against rules and record an attestation; a guard on the Safe can then require that attestation, and owners who still want to proceed can do so, in the Foundation’s words, “with explicit additional owner approval after a delay”. On 21 October 2026 Safe Labs added a jury of four security firms (BlockSec, Candide, IntentGuard and OpenCover), the programme SafeDAO funds under the name Safenet Aegis, for Safe Pro customers on Ethereum, Arbitrum and Gnosis Chain, with visible checks promised to all multisig users in 2027. A Policy Engine, which enforces recipient lists, spending limits and delays through a guard, was announced on 27 October 2026 and is due in the fourth quarter for paying plans. None of these would necessarily stop a call that a module’s role allows, and Safe has not claimed that they would.

Who builds and controls Safe

Safe began inside Gnosis as Gnosis Safe. In 2022 it was spun out after a vote of GnosisDAO, renamed Safe, and announced a $100 million raise on 11 July 2022 led by 1kx, with Tiger Global, Blockchain Capital, Digital Currency Group, Greenfield One, ParaFi and Lightspeed among the investors. Safe did not publish a valuation.

The structure, as set out by co-founder Lukas Schor in a forum post of 16 December 2025, has four entities. The Safe Ecosystem Foundation, a non-profit foundation in Zug, Switzerland, created in 2022, sits at the top and has no shareholders. It wholly owns Safe Labs GmbH, the commercial company created in 2025 that runs Safe{Wallet}, whose chief executive is Rahul Rumalla, and Hecate Ventures AG, which manages the treasury. Core Contributors GmbH is the former development company. The same post put the headcount at about 100 at the start of 2025 and slightly under 60 expected at the end of that year.

SafeDAO, the body of SAFE token holders, votes on Safe Enhancement Proposals (SEPs) on Snapshot and controls the largest token allocation. The Foundation’s board is a separate body, and neither it nor the DAO holds keys to users’ accounts. Nobody at Safe can move funds out of a Safe, pause one or upgrade it. Each account is a contract controlled by its owners, and changing the version of the code it runs takes a transaction signed by those owners.

An early investor has asked the Swiss foundation supervisor to step in

Control of the Foundation is contested. On 4 October 2026, Jascha Samadi, founding partner of Greenfield Capital, an investor since the 2022 round that says it has never sold its SAFE, published an open letter on Safe’s governance forum saying the firm had filed a supervisory complaint with Switzerland’s Federal Supervisory Authority for Foundations (ESA). These are Greenfield’s allegations, and no authority has ruled on them.

The letter alleges that the board had only two members from September 2025 to April 2026, when its deed requires at least three, that it has no independent directors, and that two members have conflicts of interest: Stefan George through his role at Gnosis, and Richard Meissner through ties to the companies that build and operate Safe products. It asks for George to be replaced and for independent directors to be recruited from outside. Greenfield says it is not seeking a seat. It also cites figures: second-quarter 2026 revenue of $1.98 million, which it sets against the roughly $20 million a year that Safe’s goal of doubling revenue in 2026 would imply, and value held in Safe accounts down from about $66 billion in January 2024 to about $30 billion in August 2026.

Safe’s public reply so far is short. Greenfield’s own letter says the Foundation, through its lawyers, rejected every point the firm raised. A spokesperson, Samuel Akpan, told Cointelegraph that the Foundation had not received a formal inquiry from the ESA and declined to comment on the details, in an update the outlet published on 6 October 2026. The Foundation’s third-quarter report, published on 30 October, does not mention the complaint. Greenfield is also one of the six genesis validators of Safenet, so the critic is a participant too.

How much sits in Safe accounts, and why the figures disagree

Safe’s size depends on who counts and how. The Foundation’s third-quarter 2026 report gives $57.64 billion in Safe accounts on 30 September 2026, up from $27.24 billion three months earlier. That is not a doubling of deposits: the report says the new figure includes positions held in DeFi protocols for the first time and that ether’s price rose 66% in the quarter. Greenfield’s $30 billion for August was measured before that change of method.

MeasureFigureSource and date
Value held in Safe accounts$57.64 billion (DeFi positions included for the first time)Safe Foundation Q3 report, 30 Sep 2026
Same, previous quarter$27.24 billionSafe Foundation, 30 Jun 2026
Stablecoins in Safe accounts$7.48 billionSafe Foundation Q3 report, 30 Sep 2026
Transfer volume in the quarter$44.75 billionSafe Foundation Q3 report
Safe accounts created65.7 million, on more than 400 chainsSafe Foundation Q3 report, 30 Sep 2026
Monthly active accounts2.73 millionSafe Foundation Q2 report, June 2026
Swap fees paid to Safe, last 30 days$57,768DefiLlama, read 17 Nov 2026
Swap fees paid to Safe, last 12 months$912,672DefiLlama, read 17 Nov 2026

The 65.7 million accounts are not 65.7 million treasuries. Consumer apps create a Safe for each of their users behind the scenes, and The Block reported on 29 July 2026 that World App accounted for 52% of Safe’s transaction volume in the second quarter and Polymarket for 35.7%. Separately, DefiLlama showed a total value locked of zero for Safe on 17 November 2026, because its method does not count assets that users hold in their own accounts. That zero says nothing about how much money Safe accounts hold.

Revenue: small next to the assets secured

Securing tens of billions of dollars does not mean earning from them. Creating and using a Safe is free apart from network fees, and the contracts charge nothing. Safe makes money at the edges: a partner fee on swaps made inside Safe{Wallet} through CoW Swap, paid subscriptions under the Safe Pro name (Starter, Business and Enterprise plans), and paid access to its API.

DefiLlama tracks only the swap fee: $17,837 over seven days and $3.67 million since tracking began, as read on 17 November 2026. Safe’s own numbers are higher because, in Schor’s words in December 2025, not all revenue is onchain. He put revenue at more than $10 million annualised for 2025, up from about $2 million a year earlier, said the project was not yet profitable, and set the goals of doubling revenue and reaching break-even in 2026. Greenfield’s letter, citing the Foundation’s second-quarter report, puts revenue for that quarter at $1.98 million, which would be about $8 million a year. The Foundation’s treasury arm had about $16.3 million deployed in yield positions on 30 September 2026.

A ballot box next to a pie chart and a printed report
SafeDAO votes and the Foundation's reports show small revenue next to the assets Safe accounts hold.

The SAFE token: votes, staking and no share of revenue

SAFE is an ERC-20 token on Ethereum with a maximum supply of one billion. It was distributed to users and to delegates called Guardians when SafeDAO launched in September 2022, and it could not be transferred at first. Holders set five conditions for lifting that restriction, the last of which was ratified in March 2024. The vote to unpause the token contract (SEP 22) ran on Snapshot from 3 to 15 April 2024 and passed with about 54.24 million SAFE in favour and 3,046 against, across 1,028 voters. The Foundation published the allocation on 16 April 2024.

AllocationShareTerms stated by the Foundation
SafeDAO treasury40%Vested over 8 years, 50 million available at once
Core contributors15%Generally 4-year vesting
GnosisDAO treasury15%Vested over 4 years, 10 million available at once
Strategic raise (60+ backers)8%Vested over 4 years with a 1-year lockup
Safe Foundation7%Vested over 4 years, 20 million available at once
Users5%Half available at once, half vested over 4 years
Guardians5%25 million airdropped (half vested over 4 years), 25 million reserved
Joint treasury5%Available at once

Add the lines up and 55% of the supply went to two DAO treasuries, with a further 30% to contributors, investors and the Foundation. The initial circulating supply was 427 million. CoinGecko listed about 790.75 million in circulation on 16 November 2026.

A SAFE holder gets a vote, including with tokens that are still vesting, and since April 2026 the option to stake. Staking means delegating SAFE to one of Safenet’s validators. SafeDAO approved SEP 55 in a vote that ran from 8 to 20 April 2026: 5 million SAFE from the treasury, of which 4.5 million pays staking rewards over six months and 0.5 million funds independent staking interfaces. A second vote, SEP 56, closed on 6 October 2026 with all votes cast in favour, from 30 voters, and funds Safenet Aegis for a first year with about 7.4 million SAFE, according to the Foundation’s report.

The yield needs two qualifications. The rewards are paid from the DAO’s own token treasury, not from fees earned from customers, so they are a subsidy for now. And the six genesis validators, each required to stake at least 3.5 million SAFE, are Gnosis, Greenfield, RockawayX, Blockchain Capital, Core Contributors and Safe Labs, all investors or insiders. At the end of September 2026, 73.5 million SAFE were staked by 884 stakers. The Foundation warns that withdrawals from staking “are not on-demand” and that smart contract risk applies.

The token carries no claim on revenue. No buyback or burn is in force. In December 2025 Schor wrote that cash flow from the commercial companies may fund purchases of SAFE for a strategic reserve, which depends on those companies producing that cash flow first.

Audits and formal verification of the Safe contracts

The audit reports for each version of the Safe Smart Account are kept in the docs folder of the official repository. Version 1.5.0 was reviewed by Certora, whose security assessment and formal verification report is dated January 2025, and by Ackee Blockchain Security, whose report is dated 28 May 2025. Version 1.4.0 was audited by Ackee (report dated 28 March 2023). Version 1.3.0, the one the Safe drained on 16 November runs, has reports from G0 Group, Nethermind and Certora; Certora’s assessment of that five-year-old version is recent, dated July 2026. Version 1.0.0 was formally verified by Runtime Verification. The Foundation also says the Safenet Guard was formally verified and audited by Certora and Nethermind.

These reports cover Safe’s contracts. They do not cover modules written by others. Zodiac lists Omniscia and G0 Group among the firms that reviewed its modules, without publishing dated reports on its security page, and the Roles repository says version 2 is the one in production while version 3, audited by Côme du Crest in October 2026, is not yet released for production.

Risk: 3 out of 5, and where it sits

Coindaro rates Safe 3 on a scale of 5. The core contracts pull the score down: years of use at very large scale, audits for each version and formal verification, no admin key that could move users’ funds, and none of the thefts described on this page came from a flaw in them. Four things pull it up.

  • Add-ons carry the losses. Modules and front ends have been the route of every large Safe-related theft, and owners, not Safe, decide what to enable and what to sign.
  • The organisation is under strain. The Foundation expected headcount to fall from nearly 100 to under 60 during 2025, the app changed operator, revenue is small, and an early investor says it has taken the Foundation’s governance to its Swiss supervisor.
  • The token is weakly tied to the business. SAFE gives votes and subsidised staking rewards, no revenue share, and a majority of the supply sits in treasuries and insider allocations.
  • Public figures are hard to compare. Assets in Safe accounts read $27 billion or $57 billion a quarter apart because the method changed.

What to watch next: a statement from Safe or from the drained wallet’s operators, who alone can confirm or contradict Zodiac’s account of 16 November; any decision by the ESA on Greenfield’s complaint; the Policy Engine’s launch, due in the fourth quarter of 2026; and the 2027 rollout of Safenet checks to every multisig user.

Strengths and points of vigilance

Strengths

  • The core contracts have years of use at very large scale and audits for each version; none of the thefts covered here came from a flaw in them.
  • Nobody at Safe can move, freeze or upgrade a user's account: only the owners' signatures can.
  • The code is open source and other interfaces can operate the same account if Safe{Wallet} is unavailable.
  • Safenet and the Policy Engine add checks before execution, a response to the way the Bybit theft worked.

Points of vigilance

  • Modules can move funds without owner signatures; five module incidents in 2026 include the $6.4 million drain of 16 November.
  • The Safe{Wallet} app was the route of the $1.5 billion Bybit theft in 2025.
  • Revenue is small, and an early investor says it has filed a complaint about the Foundation's governance with its Swiss supervisor.
  • SAFE gives no share of revenue, and staking rewards are paid from the DAO treasury, with insiders as the first validators.

Team

Funding and audits

RoundAmountDateInvestors
Strategic raise$100M1kx (lead), Tiger Global, A&T Capital, Blockchain Capital, Digital Currency Group, Greenfield One, Rockaway Blockchain Fund, ParaFi, Lightspeed, Polymorphic Capital, Superscrypt

Roadmap

  1. 2022-07-11Raccolta da 100 milioni di dollari guidata da 1kx, annunciata dopo lo scorporo da GnosisDone
  2. 2024-04SAFE diventa trasferibile dopo il voto sulla SEP 22Done
  3. 2025-02-21Bybit perde circa 1,5 miliardi di dollari dopo la compromissione della macchina di uno sviluppatore di Safe{Wallet}Done
  4. 2025-10-15Safe Labs rileva da Core Contributors GmbH la gestione di Safe{Wallet}Done
  5. 2026-04-02Debuttano la beta di Safenet e lo staking di SAFEDone
  6. 2026-10-21La giuria di sicurezza di quattro società (Safenet Aegis) si apre agli utenti Safe Pro su Ethereum, Arbitrum e Gnosis ChainDone
  7. 2026-10-27Annunciata la Safe Policy Engine, con lancio previsto nel quarto trimestre 2026Done
  8. 2027Controlli di Safenet visibili a tutti gli utenti multisig di Safe, con applicazione onchain facoltativa in seguito

Crypto-assets are volatile and you can lose all the money you invest. Nothing published on Coindaro is investment advice.

Related