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Project · DeFi

Tydro: the Aave-based lender on Kraken’s Ink, where four wallets hold four fifths of the deposits

Active Risk 4/5

Metrics

TVL406.95 M USD

About the project

Tydro is the lending market of Ink, the Ethereum layer 2 incubated by Kraken. It runs on Aave V3 code under an agreement with the Aave DAO, is operated by the Ink Foundation and has no token of its own. On DefiLlama, its total value locked (TVL) went from $102.1 million on 16 November 2026 to $405.7 million at 18:40 UTC on 18 November: four times as much in under three days, in a fortnight when crypto prices were falling.

The cause is unconfirmed, and Tydro has published no explanation. The chain does show where the money sits. Read at 19:45 UTC on 18 November, one wallet held 97% of the kBTC posted as collateral and owed 98% of the USDC borrowed, another supplied 93% of the USDT0 and 60% of the USDC, and four wallets together accounted for 83% of all deposits. What the TVL chart draws as a surge is, on the ledger, a few very large positions. This page explains how Tydro works, who controls it, what happened when it paused every market in May 2026, and what that concentration means for anyone who lends there.

What is Tydro? Aave V3 on Kraken’s layer 2

Tydro opened in October 2025 as the main lending venue of Ink, a layer 2 that its own documentation places on Optimism’s Superchain and that The Block describes as Kraken-incubated. Users deposit assets to earn interest, or post them as collateral and borrow against them, as they would on Aave, the largest DeFi lender. The contracts are Aave’s. Tydro’s documentation defines the protocol as “Open source lending smart contracts running on Aave 3.7”, with a web app at app.tydro.com maintained by the Tydro team.

The industry calls this a white-label deployment. In July 2025 the Aave DAO voted, with 99.8% in favour according to The Block, to let the Ink Foundation run a branded instance of Aave V3 instead of joining the main Aave markets. In a case study dated 20 May 2026, Aave Labs says Tydro uses the code “under a commercial agreement” and gives no terms. The Block reported them on 21 July 2025: the DAO receives a share of the platform’s revenue “equal to or greater than the equivalent of a Reserve Factor” of 5%, based on borrow volume across all pools; Aave’s service providers help run the instance for its first six months; and the Ink Foundation and its partners may not turn to another lending protocol for at least 12 months after deployment. Neither source says how much Tydro has paid the DAO so far.

Kraken appears three times in the structure. It incubated the chain. It issues kBTC, “Kraken Wrapped Bitcoin”, which Tydro’s docs say is backed 1:1 by bitcoin held in Kraken’s segregated custody. And it offers the custody service through which, according to the same docs, institutions can lend and borrow on Tydro while their assets stay with a regulated custodian. Aave Labs adds that Kraken DeFi Earn, a product announced in January 2026 that offers customers three USDC vaults built on Veda, counts Aave and Tydro among the protocols those vaults use. Our Kraken review covers the exchange itself.

How Tydro lending works: one pool, a fixed-rate bitcoin loan and a USDe corner

The first version of Tydro was a standard pooled Aave market. It launched with wrapped ether, kBTC and three stablecoins (USDG, USDT0 and Aave’s GHO), The Block reported at the time. On 18 November 2026 the pool contract listed 14 reserves, seven of them holding more than $1 million: kBTC, USDC, USDT0, USDe, WETH, syrupUSDT and SolvBTC. The docs now present “Tydro V2”, built around fixed-rate loans with no maturity, and a configuration change reviewed by the audit firm Zellic in July 2026 split the shared pool into separate borrowing corridors. Two of those corridors hold nearly all the money.

The kBTC / USDC market: a borrowing rate that does not move

The launch market of V2 pairs one collateral with one loan asset. A borrower posts kBTC and draws USDC at a fixed rate, with no maturity: the loan can be repaid on any day, and the rate changes only if Tydro’s governance changes it through a timelock. The docs call the model flat: the borrow rate “does not climb as more of the pool is borrowed, and there is no kink”. Read on-chain at 19:45 UTC on 18 November 2026, that rate was 6.30% a year. It was the same at 00:00 UTC on 16, 17 and 18 November, although the amount borrowed tripled in between.

Lenders do not get a fixed rate. They receive the interest borrowers pay, spread over all the USDC in the pool, minus the protocol’s cut (a reserve factor of 10% on USDC, read on-chain). With 93% of the USDC lent out on the evening of 18 November, suppliers were earning 5.27%. Two days earlier, with 81% lent out, the same 6.30% paid them 4.58%. Our guide to fixed-rate DeFi lending explains why few protocols offer this, and the reason shows here: somebody has to carry the rate risk, and on Tydro it is the lender.

The collateral settings leave little room. On-chain, kBTC carries a loan-to-value of 85%, a liquidation threshold of 87% and a 5% bonus for liquidators. So $100 of kBTC supports up to $85 of USDC debt, and the position can be liquidated once the debt exceeds 87% of the collateral’s value: a borrower at the maximum is a 2.3% bitcoin drop away from that line. These are the values recommended by LlamaRisk, a risk firm, in a parameter review dated August 2026 that Tydro lists on its audit page. The same review describes how the isolation is obtained: not with a separate contract, but by configuring the Aave pool so that USDC is the only asset that can be borrowed against kBTC outside the special “efficiency modes”.

A flat rate has a side effect that lenders should understand before depositing. In an ordinary Aave market, the borrowing rate climbs steeply when the pool is nearly empty, which pushes borrowers to repay and draws in new deposits. Here nothing of the sort happens. At 19:45 UTC on 18 November the pool held $158.9 million of USDC deposits, of which $147.9 million was lent: about $11 million could be withdrawn at that moment, whatever the size of a lender’s balance. The caps, also on-chain, stood at $175 million for USDC deposits and $150 million for USDC borrowing.

A coin beside a padlock, a pair of scales and a handshake
On Tydro, kBTC is locked as collateral for a USDC loan at a fixed 6.30% rate, read on 18 November 2026.

USDe as collateral, USDT0 as the loan

The second corridor belongs to Ethena’s synthetic dollar. On 14 November 2026, Ethena and Ink said Tydro would accept up to $200 million of USDe deposits from that Saturday evening, used as collateral to borrow USDT0, according to a bsc.news report carried by cryptonews.net. The chain agrees. At 23:25 UTC on 14 November, a governance payload queued 48 hours earlier raised the USDe supply cap from 5 million to 200 million tokens, and the USDT0 supply cap from 50 million to 215 million. The largest USDe accounts borrow under a loan-to-value of 90% and a liquidation threshold of 92%. By 19:45 UTC on 18 November, 59.6 million USDe had been deposited and USDT0 borrowers were paying 4.50%, a base rate lowered from 4.75% at 16:54 UTC that day. How USDe holds its dollar value, and when it has not, is the subject of our USDe guide.

Why Tydro’s TVL quadrupled in two days

First the numbers, all from DefiLlama’s daily series (each point is taken at 00:00 UTC), re-read at 19:48 UTC on 18 November. DefiLlama counts as TVL the assets sitting in the pool, deposits minus loans, and reports borrowed amounts separately.

Date (00:00 UTC unless stated)TVLBorrowed
9 November 2026$116.6M$59.0M
15 November 2026$109.8M$57.7M
16 November 2026$102.1M$55.4M
17 November 2026$231.7M$61.3M
18 November 2026$347.6M$123.7M
18 November 2026, 18:40 UTC$405.7M$198.2M

The rise came in three legs. Net of loans, USDT0 in the pool went from $2.9 million on 16 November to $121.7 million a day later. kBTC went from 1,106 tokens on 17 November to 2,906 on 18 November and 3,930 by 18:40 UTC. USDe grew from $0.35 million on 16 November to $46.9 million. Each leg can be followed on the Ink explorer, and each leads to very few addresses.

The stablecoin leg is one wallet, 0xb873…313c. At 00:00 UTC on 16 November it had almost nothing in Tydro. Between 11:42 and 18:57 UTC that day it deposited 125.0 million USDT0 in eight transactions, among them one of 32 million at 12:58 UTC. It then moved on to USDC: about 50 million between 19:12 and 19:35 UTC on 17 November, and 45 million more between 16:07 and 16:21 UTC on 18 November. At 19:45 UTC that evening the wallet accounted for 93.3% of all USDT0 supplied to Tydro and 59.8% of all USDC.

The bitcoin leg is another wallet, 0xacc5…c044, and it was not new to the market. At 00:00 UTC on 16 November it already held 1,005 kBTC in Tydro, 91% of the kBTC there, and owed 45.5 million USDC, 95% of the USDC then borrowed. At 23:42 UTC on 17 November it added 1,800 kBTC and, four minutes later, borrowed 50 million USDC. On 18 November it borrowed 15 million USDC at 15:19 UTC, added 1,025 kBTC at 18:24 UTC and borrowed another 35 million USDC at 18:40 UTC. At 19:45 UTC it held 3,830 kBTC, or 97.4% of the 3,930.5 in the pool, which Tydro’s oracle valued at $240.1 million. It owed $145.6 million of USDC, 98.4% of all the USDC borrowed on Tydro. Its health factor at that minute was 1.44, with bitcoin at $62,690 on Tydro’s oracle; the figure moves with every price update.

The USDe leg is a handful of wallets that post USDe and borrow USDT0 against it, close to the limit. At 19:45 UTC on 18 November the two largest held 34.3 million and 14.4 million USDe, together 82% of the USDe in Tydro, and owed 30.8 million and 12.9 million USDT0, together 72% of the USDT0 borrowed. Their health factors were 1.023 and 1.022 at that reading.

Add the four up and they come to $508.6 million of deposits. At the same block the pool held $615.3 million of deposits and had lent out $209.6 million, which leaves the $405.7 million DefiLlama reports as TVL. Four addresses therefore held 83% of the money deposited in Tydro on the evening of 18 November. Two more take the share to 92%: 0x0EF3…4907, which has kept about 45.4 million USDC in the pool since before 16 November, and 0x4271…8bBB, a third USDe account with 10.5 million. The rest is spread thinly. The explorer counts 6,736 holders of the USDT0 deposit token and 5,687 of the kBTC one.

The deposit limits moved shortly before the large deposits, and the dates are on-chain. Tydro’s kBTC supply cap had stood at 1,575 tokens since at least the end of October. At 18:16 UTC on 17 November a single transaction raised it to 3,150 and lifted the USDC caps from $100 million to $175 million for deposits and from $75 million to $150 million for borrowing. Within the hour the stablecoin wallet began depositing USDC, and at 23:42 UTC the bitcoin wallet added the 1,800 kBTC, which took the pool to 2,907 tokens. At 18:16 UTC on 18 November the kBTC cap went to 4,950; eight minutes later the same wallet added 1,025 kBTC. Both changes were executed by the address Tydro’s docs list as its Risk Council, a Safe multisig that required both of its two signers when read on 18 November. They did not pass through the 48-hour delay that the USDe changes of 14 November did, which matches the docs’ description of fast, bounded cap adjustments.

That is a sequence of dated facts, and it says nothing about why. The Ink explorer shows no label on any of these wallets, and nothing on-chain says who owns them or whether any of them are related. The cause of the inflows is unconfirmed. As of 18 November 2026, Tydro has published no explanation.

A magnifying glass over a bar chart, an upward arrow and an eye
On-chain, most of the jump in Tydro's TVL traces back to four wallets, none of them labelled on the Ink explorer.

Who controls Tydro: the Ink Foundation and multisigs without names

The operator is the Ink Foundation, the non-profit that supports the chain. Its directors are anonymous, The Block wrote when Tydro launched. Day-to-day power sits in roles copied from Aave and described in the governance page of the docs: a Risk Steward that can move caps and rate settings inside preset bounds, a Guardian multisig that can pause a market or the whole protocol but cannot move funds, and a governance body that lists markets, sets the bounds and controls contract upgrades. That body, the docs say, “operates through a multisig, with directors who review risk reports and approve listings”.

The docs give the addresses of the Risk Steward contract, the Guardian multisig and a Risk Council, and name no signer. The chain fills in part of the gap. Read at 19:51 UTC on 18 November 2026, the Guardian was a Safe that needs four of its nine owners, and the Risk Council a Safe that needs both of its two. Broader changes go through a payload contract with a delay: none of the 14 payloads executed between April and November 2026 ran sooner than 48 hours after it was queued. Who holds the keys is not public.

Tydro presents the ability to change markets after launch as a strength, and the May 2026 episode below supports that. It also writes the cost down plainly: mutable markets “require trust that the parties holding these roles act responsibly”. Depositors have no vote. There is no Tydro token and no on-chain governance open to users.

The token in the background is INK. The Ink Foundation announced it on 17 June 2025, The Block reported that day, with a supply capped at 1 billion, no role in the governance of the network, and a first distribution to users of the Aave-based liquidity protocol that became Tydro. At launch, a representative told The Block that Tydro users “will accumulate points that represent claims on the first airdrop”. Neither article carried a date for the token.

The chain adds its own layer of dependence. Ink is a rollup, and Tydro’s docs say a contract called PriceOracleSentinel restricts new borrowing and liquidations when the Ink sequencer is unavailable. That protects borrowers from being liquidated on stale prices. It also means that during an outage nobody can be liquidated at all.

May 2026: every market paused over an oracle scare

Tydro’s one serious incident involved no reported theft. On 4 May 2026, Chaos Labs, which then supplied Tydro’s price feeds, warned of an attack on its systems that it compared to the work of a state-level actor, and the Guardian multisig paused all 13 reserves in one transaction at 19:26 UTC. According to a ChainCatcher account republished by KuCoin on 8 May, Chaos Labs said about 48 hours later that the compromised keys had been rotated and a restart was possible. Tydro chose to stay closed until it had moved to Chainlink feeds. The Defiant reported during the pause that Tydro was bringing in Chainlink and RedStone feeds before reopening.

The on-chain record matches that account. A governance payload was queued at 23:52 UTC on 7 May and executed 48 hours later. At 00:22 UTC on 10 May twelve reserves were unpaused, with liquidations held back until 04:22 UTC: a four-hour grace period so that borrowers below the liquidation line could repay or add collateral first. The thirteenth reserve reopened on 14 May. The pause had lasted a little over five days.

Tydro said no abnormal price reached its markets and that positions were unaffected, ChainCatcher reported, and no loss of user funds has been reported since. Tydro’s governance page refers to the episode in one sentence, as an oracle migration made during a potential vulnerability at its data providers, and dates it to May 2025; the transactions are from May 2026.

Deposits did not wait to find out. DefiLlama shows the record at $506.1 million on 15 January 2026 and still $398 million on 15 April. TVL was already down to $239.8 million on the day of the pause, and it went on falling to $61.0 million on 15 June and a low of $50.9 million on 14 August. It had recovered to $134.0 million by 1 October before slipping back towards $100 million in mid-November.

A shorter episode followed in the autumn. At 22:53 UTC on 29 October 2026 the Guardian multisig froze every reserve, a setting that blocks new deposits and loans while repayments, withdrawals and liquidations stay open, and cut kBTC’s loan-to-value to zero. The freeze was lifted at 13:28 UTC on 30 October and the kBTC setting restored at 14:13 UTC. A RootData news item of 30 October called it a preventive freeze without giving the cause, and Tydro’s docs do not mention it. DefiLlama’s TVL went from $133.5 million on 29 October to $120.4 million the next day.

One point about the oracle set-up remains unclear in public documents. RedStone, which deployed feeds on Ink within 48 hours of the May incident, wrote in a post of 6 August 2026 that it “will be providing a failsafe for all 12 assets currently live on Tydro”. Tydro’s docs say prices come from Chainlink, that a layer cross-checking several providers “is on the roadmap, not live today”, and that reliance on Chainlink “is a concentration to be aware of”.

Fees and revenue: small so far, larger if the loan stays

DefiLlama counted $305,525 of interest paid by Tydro borrowers in the 30 days to 18 November 2026 and $30,815 of protocol revenue, the part kept after lenders are paid. Since launch the totals are $6.71 million and $745,688. Those windows mostly predate the new positions. A $145.6 million loan at 6.30% produces about $9.2 million of interest a year, of which the 10% reserve factor would send roughly $0.9 million to Tydro’s Collector contract, for as long as the position stays open and the rate is unchanged. What part of that reaches the Aave DAO depends on the terms The Block reported.

Tydro audits: Aave’s base, two Zellic reviews, one risk report

Tydro’s audit page separates two layers. The Aave V3 base was audited in 2021 and 2022 by OpenZeppelin, Trail of Bits, PeckShield, ABDK and SigmaPrime, and formally verified by Certora; the reports sit in Aave’s GitHub repository. Tydro states itself that these cover the core lending logic and not its own contracts or configuration.

For its own code the page lists two Zellic reports, both also in Zellic’s public repository. The first, dated 4 August 2026, covers “Multiply”, a module for opening and closing looped positions on the pool. Zellic spent 2.3 person-weeks on it and reported five findings: none critical or high, one of medium impact, four informational. The second, dated 18 August 2026, is a best-effort review of half a person-day on the configuration change that split the pool into borrowing corridors; it lists no findings. The remaining document is LlamaRisk’s kBTC parameter review, which is a risk analysis and not a code audit. The page mentions a bug bounty without giving its terms. DefiLlama lists no hack for Tydro.

The risks: one borrower, thin exits and a wrapped bitcoin

The concentration cuts both ways. If the kBTC borrower repays and leaves, most of the new TVL leaves too, and Tydro is back near $100 million. If it stays, the health of the whole USDC market depends on one position. At the 19:45 UTC reading on 18 November, that position would have reached the liquidation line after a fall of about 30% in bitcoin with the debt unchanged, near $43,700. The margin changes with every move in bitcoin and every new loan. Our guide to the health factor and liquidation price shows how to redo the sum.

The harder question is what happens if that line is ever reached. LlamaRisk’s August review says its 85% and 87% settings hold only if liquidators perform as on Aave’s main market, and that on Ink this rests on service agreements with liquidators able to clear $2 million of kBTC every ten minutes, because kBTC/USDC liquidity on Ink’s exchanges was, in its word, “non-existent”. The review sized that capacity for a kBTC book of up to 2,750 tokens. One account held 3,830 on 18 November, worth $240 million. LlamaRisk also notes that its threshold absorbs an 8.65% fall in collateral before bad debt appears, while the worst one-hour move in its data was 10.52%. Tydro’s audit page shows no later review covering the new caps.

Lenders face a liquidity risk before any credit risk. With 93% of the USDC lent to one borrower at a rate that does not rise, a lender who wants out depends on the $11 million or so that is idle, on new deposits, or on the borrower repaying. The USDT0 side has its own fragility: the three largest USDe accounts ran health factors between 1.02 and 1.03 at the same reading, so a fall of little more than 2% in the price the oracle gives USDe against USDT0 would open about $53 million of debt to liquidation, in a market where one wallet supplies 93% of the USDT0.

Then come the structural risks that the figures do not show. kBTC is a claim on bitcoin held by Kraken, and LlamaRisk states that its analysis leaves custody and wrapper risk out. The contracts can be changed by multisigs whose signers are not public. Prices come from a single oracle provider on the main feeds. And Ink’s sequencer can halt liquidations by going down.

Tydro next to Aave, Morpho and Spark

Scale puts the episode in proportion. At 19:52 UTC on 18 November 2026, DefiLlama showed $13.61 billion in Aave V3 across 21 chains, $9.95 billion in Morpho Blue and $3.94 billion in SparkLend. Tydro’s $405.7 million sits on one chain and equals about 87% of the $465.7 million DefiLlama counts as Ink’s TVL. The next protocol in that count is Nado’s spot exchange at $45.4 million. DefiLlama lists vault managers apart from the chain total, and Veda shows $699.9 million on Ink there. On a chain where one lender carries most of the counted value, two wallets can move the statistics of the whole network.

What to watch

Three readings will show which way this goes. The first is the big borrower’s position: total USDC borrowing was within $2.1 million of the $150 million cap at 19:45 UTC on 18 November, so further growth needs another cap increase, which would again be visible on-chain. A new governance payload, number 34, was queued at 16:57 UTC on 18 November and can run from about the same hour on 20 November if the usual delay applies. The second is any statement from Tydro, the Ink Foundation or Kraken on the November inflows, and any update of the liquidation arrangements to match a kBTC cap of 4,950. The third is the unfinished list in Tydro’s own docs: a multi-source oracle layer, vaults, tranches and tokenized collateral, none of them dated.

Strengths and points of vigilance

Strengths

  • Built on Aave V3 code, audited by five firms and formally verified by Certora before Tydro existed.
  • Borrowers get a fixed USDC rate against kBTC with no maturity: 6.30% when read on 18 November 2026.
  • The May 2026 oracle scare ended with a pause and a provider change, and no loss of user funds has been reported.
  • Risk settings, caps and positions are all readable on-chain, which is how the November concentration can be measured.
  • Tied to Kraken's chain, custody and wrapped bitcoin; Aave Labs says Kraken DeFi Earn uses Tydro among its destinations.

Points of vigilance

  • On 18 November 2026, one wallet owed 98% of the USDC borrowed and four wallets held 83% of deposits.
  • With a flat rate and 93% of USDC lent out, lenders can only withdraw what is idle or newly deposited.
  • Multisigs can change parameters, pause markets and upgrade contracts; their signers are not named.
  • kBTC liquidations rely on contracted liquidators sized for a much smaller book, according to LlamaRisk's August 2026 review.
  • Tydro has published no explanation for the November inflows, and the Ink Foundation's directors are anonymous.

Roadmap

  1. 2025-06-17La Ink Foundation annuncia il token INK, da distribuire prima di tutto agli utenti del suo protocollo di liquidità basato su AaveDone
  2. 2025-07-21Il voto della DAO di Aave che approva un'istanza white-label di Aave V3 per Ink è riportato approvato con il 99,8%Done
  3. 2025-10Tydro apre su Ink con wETH, kBTC, USDG, USDT0 e GHODone
  4. 2026-01-15TVL record di 506,1 milioni di dollari su DefiLlamaDone
  5. 2026-05-04Tutti i mercati in pausa dopo che Chaos Labs, il fornitore dei feed dei prezzi, segnala un attacco ai propri sistemiDone
  6. 2026-05-10I mercati riaprono con i feed di Chainlink dopo un timelock di 48 ore, con quattro ore di tolleranza per le liquidazioniDone
  7. 2026-08-04Valutazione di Zellic sul modulo Multiply; nello stesso mese seguono una seconda revisione Zellic e la revisione dei parametri di kBTC di LlamaRiskDone
  8. 2026-10-29Tutte le riserve congelate dal multisig Guardian per circa 14 ore; nessuna causa pubblicataDone
  9. 2026-11-14Tetto di deposito di USDe portato a 200 milioni di dollari, annunciato da Ethena e InkDone
  10. 2026-11-18TVL a 405,7 milioni di dollari dopo l'aumento dei tetti di kBTC e USDC del 17 e 18 novembreDone

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