
Metrics
About the project
Lighter is a perpetual futures exchange that runs on its own zero-knowledge rollup on Ethereum and charges ordinary traders no trading fee. On Monday 16 November 2026, 10,393,057 USDC left its Ethereum contract in a single transaction at 10:11 UTC, and the exchange froze withdrawals for several hours. Lighter says the money was taken with the API keys of one trader’s account, rebuilt from that trader’s own signatures, and that its protocol and smart contracts were not breached. Withdrawals reopened that evening, and Lighter’s Security Council returned about $5 million in USDC to the trader, according to the post-mortem as relayed by The Block and Crypto Briefing. As of 17 November 2026, Lighter has published no total for the loss and has not named the trader.
The day is a fair summary of the project. The mathematics that Lighter posts to Ethereum proves that orders were matched and positions liquidated by the rules. It says nothing about who holds the keys of an account, and it does not stop a small group of signers from pausing the contract or changing its code at short notice. Lighter used the first power on 16 November and announced the second. The rest follows the same line: retail trades are free because professional accounts pay, the LIT token gives staking rewards, pool access and buybacks but no claim on the company, and the nine published audits cover the contracts and the circuits, not the keys.
Lighter exchange: free perpetuals on a rollup built for one job
Lighter lists perpetual futures, spot pairs and, more recently, contracts on stocks, ETFs, commodities and pre-IPO companies, plus short-dated binary options. Its documentation describes a platform built for “a zero-fee trading environment for Standard accounts” and calls it the first exchange with verifiable order matching and liquidations. On 17 November 2026 at 19:20 UTC, Lighter’s own public API reported $1.97 billion traded over the previous 24 hours in 2.04 million trades, across 490 order books.
The exchange is a central limit order book, like Binance or Hyperliquid, and not a pool-based design like GMX. Traders deposit collateral, mostly USDC, into a contract on Ethereum. From there everything happens off-chain at the speed of a normal exchange, and the results are sent back to Ethereum in batches with a cryptographic proof that the batch followed the rules.
Lighter opened its public mainnet in October 2025. A second deployment runs on Robinhood Chain: according to Tokenomist, which cites Robinhood’s newsroom, Lighter perpetuals went live inside Robinhood Wallet on 1 July 2026 with the USDG stablecoin as collateral. DefiLlama counted $101.7 million on that deployment on 17 November 2026.
How Lighter works: a sequencer, a prover and Ethereum
Technically, the exchange is an application-specific zk-rollup. A general rollup such as zkSync or Scroll proves the execution of any smart contract. Lighter proves one program only: an exchange. Its architecture page describes the proving engine, Lighter Core, as written from scratch for exchange workloads, which is how the team justifies order-book speeds on a system that still settles on Ethereum.
The path of an order has four stops. The user signs a transaction with an API key registered to the account. A sequencer, run by Lighter, puts transactions in first-in-first-out order, executes them and gives what the docs call soft finality: the trade shows in the interface at once. Witness generators then turn the executed transactions into inputs for the prover. The prover produces a proof for each one, and an aggregation engine folds hundreds of thousands of those proofs into a single batch proof.
That batch proof goes to Lighter’s contracts on Ethereum, which hold the deposits and the state root, a fingerprint of every balance, position, order book and pool. The contracts update the root only if the proof verifies. Each update comes with data blobs that carry the changes account by account, compressed, so that anyone can rebuild their own balance from Ethereum data alone.
The proof has a precise scope. It shows that the sequencer did not invent a trade, skip the queue or liquidate an account that was above its margin requirement. It does not show that the person who signed a transaction was the account’s owner. A valid signature from a stolen key produces a valid proof.
The escape hatch: leaving without Lighter’s help
A sequencer run by one company can go offline or refuse a user. Lighter’s answer is a priority queue on Ethereum itself. A user can send a withdrawal, an exit from a pool or a reduce-only order straight to the contracts, and the sequencer has to process it within a set period. The docs call that period a “predefined timeframe” and do not give its length.
If the sequencer misses the deadline, the system enters what the docs call Escape Hatch mode and the code calls desert mode. The exchange freezes. Each user then proves a balance from the blob data and withdraws on Ethereum. Zellic’s review of June 2026 notes that the switch is one-way: once desert mode is set it cannot be cleared, and no further batches are accepted.
The escape hatch has two limits. It answers a silent or censoring sequencer, not a pause decided by Lighter’s administrators or a change to the contract code. And its public record consists of audits: two of them found serious bugs in it, both fixed, as the audit section below shows.

Zero fees for retail: where Lighter’s revenue comes from
A Standard account, the default, pays nothing to make or take on regular perpetual and spot orders. The price is time. Lighter’s fee page gives Standard accounts a 300-millisecond delay on taker orders and on cancellations, while professional accounts that opt into the Premium tier pay fees and get 140 milliseconds. Makers on the Premium tier post and cancel with no added delay.
| Account type | Maker fee | Taker fee | Taker delay |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard (default) | 0% | 0% (0.01% on TWAP, advanced orders and RFQ) | 300 ms |
| Plus (opt-in) | 0.005% | 0.005% | 300 ms |
| Premium, no LIT staked | 0.0040% | 0.0280% | 140 ms |
| Premium, 500,000 LIT staked | 0.0028% | 0.0196% | 140 ms |
The model is the one retail stockbrokers use: the customer who is not in a hurry trades free, and the firms that live on speed pay. High-frequency traders and market makers buy lower latency, and their fees fall by up to 30% if they stake LIT.
DefiLlama, read on 17 November 2026, counted $233,400 of fees over 24 hours, $6.90 million over 30 days and $91.6 million since launch across Lighter’s products. Of the 30-day figure, $5.64 million was protocol revenue (maker, taker, transfer and withdrawal fees) and $4.61 million went to LIT buybacks, which DefiLlama records as revenue to holders. The difference between fees and revenue, about $1.27 million, is money that does not reach the protocol, such as the liquidation fees that the docs send to the liquidity pool.
Those numbers are well below the peak. Tokenomist, citing DefiLlama, put monthly protocol revenue near $14 million in November 2025, the month before the token launch, and at $2 million to $3 million a month by mid-2026.
LLP and public pools: who takes the other side
The Lighter Liquidity Pool, or LLP, is the exchange’s house pool and its insurance fund. The docs call it the primary liquidity provider of the protocol, and it is the backstop in liquidations. When an account falls below its maintenance margin, the engine closes its positions with limit orders at a computed “zero price”; if the fill is better than that price, up to 1% of the position goes to the LLP as a liquidation fee. Below the close-out margin, the LLP takes over the positions itself. If the LLP cannot absorb them, the exchange closes them against profitable traders on the other side, a process known as auto-deleveraging.
LLP depositors therefore share the pool’s trading results and its liquidation fees, and they bear the loss when the pool inherits positions in a violent market. The LLP is now open to LIT stakers only: each LIT staked allows a deposit of up to 10 USDC. Withdrawals from the LLP have a five-minute cooldown.
Public pools are a separate product. An operator, whitelisted by Lighter according to the docs, trades pooled money from an account that the developer docs treat as a special kind of sub-account; depositors receive shares and redeem them when they leave, with no lock-up. That share mechanism is the one the attacker used on 16 November 2026.
LIT token: supply, staking, buybacks and the insider unlock
LIT, the Lighter Infrastructure Token, began trading on 30 December 2025. The supply was set at 1 billion. Half went to the “ecosystem”: 25% of the supply was airdropped at launch to users who had earned points in the two seasons of 2025, and 25% was kept for later incentives and partnerships. The team received 26% and investors 24%. “The team and investors all have a 1-year unlock and 3-year linear vesting after,” Lighter wrote that day, as quoted by Cointelegraph.
The token is not a share. The Block reported at launch that LIT is issued by Lighter’s US company, which the team described in these words: “We are building in the USA and the token is issued directly from our C-Corp”. Lighter also said the value created by its products would accrue to LIT holders. In practice holders get three things, listed on the LIT utility page: a fixed 6% annual staking reward paid in LIT, with a three-day wait to unstake; access to the LLP; and fee discounts on Premium accounts.
The fourth benefit is indirect. Lighter buys LIT on the market with trading fee revenue, in daily orders spread over 24 hours. On 30 June 2026 it announced that repurchased tokens would be burned instead of held, and Tokenomist counted a first burn of about 15.6 million LIT on 10 July 2026. The same research puts buybacks between 5 January and 17 July 2026 at 16.0 million LIT for about $23.0 million. Staking rewards are now paid from the ecosystem reserve, according to Tokenomist.
The date that weighs on the token is the end of the one-year cliff. From then on, the 500 million LIT of the team and investors start to vest over three years, about 3.2 million LIT a week by Tokenomist’s projection, several times the pace of the buybacks counted so far. Lighter has published no calendar date. Trackers disagree between 27 December 2026 and 28 January 2027, as our page on the LIT insider unlock explains.
Team and funding: Founders Fund, Ribbit and Robinhood
Lighter was founded in 2022 by Vladimir Novakovski, its chief executive. Fortune describes a career that started at the hedge fund Citadel at 18, after Harvard, followed by almost 15 years as an engineer and trader. In 2017 he co-founded the networking start-up Lunchclub, and Lighter came out of a change of direction of that company.
On 11 November 2025 Lighter announced a $68 million round led by Founders Fund and Ribbit Capital, with Haun Ventures and Robinhood. Fortune put the valuation at about $1.5 billion, citing two unnamed sources; Novakovski declined to confirm it and said the deal combined equity and token warrants. “Vlad and the team that he’s built is like 85% to 90% of why we made the investment,” Founders Fund partner Joey Krug told the magazine.
Robinhood is thus an investor, a distribution channel and the host of the second deployment. Apart from the reference to a US C-Corp, Lighter’s documentation names no legal entity, and its official software kits are published under the GitHub organisation elliottech.
Size: $672 million locked, a fraction of Hyperliquid’s open interest
DefiLlama counted $671.8 million in Lighter at 18:32 UTC on 17 November 2026: $490.3 million in the Ethereum contract, $101.7 million on Robinhood Chain and $79.8 million that it files under the rollup itself. At 00:00 UTC on 15 November the total was $777.3 million. About $105 million, or 14%, went out across the incident and the reopening, the stolen $10.39 million included. On 11 November the total was $801.9 million. The record is $1.46 billion, reached on 18 December 2025, twelve days before the airdrop; by 1 April 2026 it had fallen to $512 million.
| Exchange | Open interest (DefiLlama, 17 November 2026) |
|---|---|
| Hyperliquid | $5.54 billion |
| Aster | $1.14 billion |
| Variational | $685.8 million |
| Lighter (Ethereum rollup) | $385.3 million |
| Grvt | $339.6 million |
| Lighter on Robinhood Chain | $174.9 million |
Open interest, the value of positions still open, is the better measure of how much risk traders keep on a venue. On that count Lighter’s main deployment is about fourteen times smaller than Hyperliquid and a third the size of Aster. Adding the Robinhood Chain deployment brings Lighter to about $560 million, a tenth of Hyperliquid’s figure. Deposits are closer: Aster held $713.2 million the same day according to DefiLlama, and Hyperliquid $7.24 billion.
16 November 2026: $10.39 million out through one trader’s keys
The facts that anyone can check are on Ethereum. At 10:11:47 UTC, Lighter’s main contract paid 10,393,057 USDC to a single wallet. Within six minutes that wallet had sold almost all of it for ether on CoW Swap, according to the on-chain firm Bitquery, and from 10:19 UTC it began sending 160 ETH at a time to new wallets. Bitquery traced twelve of those payments, 1,920 ETH in all, through the LI.FI routing service to Hyperliquid, where the receiving accounts bought a wrapped form of Monero worth about $3.46 million. The first wallet still held 3,845 ETH at 11:55 UTC and 3,404 ETH at 22:35 UTC.
Lighter spoke at 11:02 UTC. Its first message on X reported a security incident involving a “single compromised external party” and suspended all withdrawals and the creation of pools. At 12:49 UTC a second message gave a cause. “Our investigation indicates that today’s incident was caused by a leaked API key for a specific trader’s account,” Lighter wrote, as quoted by Altcoin Buzz. The protocol and the contracts were not affected, it said. According to Unchained, the same message pointed to a wallet that Lighter believes is the attacker’s, said “Guardian mode” had been switched on in the contract as a precaution, announced a contract upgrade by the Security Council, and gave as its priority the recovery of funds tied to “an additional withdrawal attempt by the attacker”.
The post-mortem followed at 18:20 UTC, according to Cointelegraph. As relayed by Crypto Briefing at 19:09 UTC and by The Block on 17 November, it says the account signed its transactions with software that was not one of Lighter’s official kits, and that this software reused nonces. A nonce is a number a signature scheme must use only once. When two signatures made with the same key share one, the private key can be computed from the signatures themselves. Those signatures were public, and the attacker rebuilt the API keys from them.
A key alone was not enough to take the money. Lighter’s developer docs say an API key can trade and can request a “secure withdrawal”, which only pays the Ethereum address that created the account; sending funds to another owner needs the wallet’s own signature. The attacker went around that rule through a public pool. In The Block’s account of the post-mortem, the attacker opened a pool from the compromised account, minted its shares from a separate account, then moved the trader’s funds into the pool without minting new shares. The attacker’s shares rose in value by as much, and were redeemed and withdrawn. “A key that can trade can still lose you money if someone else holds it,” Lighter wrote, in a line quoted by Cointelegraph.
Lighter says it has closed that route: a wallet signature is now required to move funds into a public pool, and API-key signatures are no longer public. It plans IP allowlists, permissions set key by key, including limits on the markets a key may trade, and monitoring for reused nonces. Traders who sign with custom or third-party software were told to rotate their keys and move to the official kits.
Withdrawals came back the same evening. CoinDesk still described them as suspended at 16:41 UTC; the post-mortem of 18:20 UTC said Guardian mode was off and pending requests were being processed. “Deposits and withdrawals are back to normal following the deactivation of Guardian Mode by the Lighter Security Council,” Lighter wrote, as quoted by The Block. Counted from the 11:02 UTC notice, the freeze lasted between about five and a half and seven and a half hours.
The post-mortem also says the Security Council returned about $5 million in USDC to the affected trader, a point Crypto Briefing, The Block and Cointelegraph report in the same terms. That money did not come back from the thief. The Defiant and Crypto News Flash both report that it is the sum the attacker tried to take in a second withdrawal, which the pause stopped before it left the exchange. Bitquery’s reading of Ethereum fits: it found no second withdrawal from Lighter’s contract.
What is confirmed and what is only reported
The $10.39 million withdrawal is confirmed on-chain. Lighter itself has published no total and has not named the trader, The Block noted on 17 November 2026. The larger figure in circulation, about $15.5 million, comes from on-chain analysts: the account posting as 0xTria gave it at 10:48 UTC on 16 November, citing Korean contacts, as $10.39 million and $5.09 million across two market-maker accounts. Bitquery could not verify the second amount and wrote that it had not left Lighter when it last read the chain. If the roughly $5 million returned by the Security Council is that second sum, as The Defiant and Crypto News Flash describe it, then the $15.5 million counted money that never left the exchange, and the loss stands at the $10.39 million seen on Ethereum. Lighter has put no number on it in any statement relayed so far. It has not said who bears it either, the trader or the exchange.
As of 19:20 UTC on 17 November 2026, Lighter’s latest statements were the post-mortem and its message that deposits and withdrawals were back to normal, both from the evening of 16 November. Its status page showed all services online at 19:17 UTC on 17 November and carried no entry for the freeze; the last entry was a network upgrade on 15 November. The statements relayed do not say whether the Security Council’s contract upgrade took place, and none reports any recovery of the ether and wrapped Monero that Bitquery traced. Our report on the freeze follows the day hour by hour.

Who controls Lighter: a governor multisig and a Security Council
The events of 16 November 2026 showed four powers that sit outside the proofs. Guardian mode can pause withdrawals for every user. The Security Council can switch that mode off. The council can also change the contract’s code with no waiting period, and Lighter said at 12:49 UTC that it would. And it moved about $5 million back to a trader, according to the post-mortem. Each was used here in the users’ favour, and each is a power over funds that depositors have to trust.
The documentation says little about who holds them. The developer docs mention a “governor”, described as “a multi-sig controlled by the protocol”, that manages markets and settings. They name no signers and give no threshold. Neither Guardian mode nor the Security Council appears anywhere in the documentation as it stood on 17 November 2026.
The audits say more. Nethermind’s review of the core contracts, finished on 21 September 2025, lists the privileged roles: a network governor with the highest authority over markets, fees, validators and the treasury and insurance fund addresses; validators that commit and verify batches; the sequencer, which decides what is included; an upgrade gatekeeper; and a Security Council that “can reduce upgrade notice periods from 3 weeks to zero for urgent fixes”. The auditors also found the notice period hardcoded to zero in the code they reviewed, which in their words “completely nullifies the intended time-lock for upgrades”. Lighter acknowledged the finding without changing it at the time.
Zellic’s report of June 2026 confirms the structure: upgrades are gated by a security council and are disabled while the rollup is in desert mode. In plain terms, users have no guaranteed window to leave before new code takes effect. That is the main difference between Lighter and a rollup whose upgrades wait behind a delay longer than the exit time, and the announcement of an upgrade within hours on 16 November 2026 shows which path is in use.
Audits: nine reports from three firms, none on trading keys
Lighter publishes nine reports on its audits page. Five are by zkSecurity and cover the proving circuits: the block circuits (August 2025), the block and delta layers (September 2025), the wrapper circuits (October 2025), the exit hatch (November 2025) and the spot and multi-asset circuits (begun on 24 November 2025). Two are by Nethermind, on the Ethereum contracts and on the USDC deposit bridge (both September 2025). Two are by Zellic, on the contracts after the spot upgrade (January 2026) and after a restructuring (June 2026).
The reports found real problems, and they record the most serious ones as fixed. Nethermind rated one finding critical: a mismatch in how data was hashed would have permanently broken emergency withdrawals. The report, dated 21 September 2025, marks it fixed. zkSecurity’s exit hatch audit found a high-severity bug that let an account with a negative value withdraw the absolute amount; also fixed. Zellic’s January 2026 review reported two medium findings and no critical one, and its June 2026 review three informational notes.
The scope is the limit. Zellic’s June report lists what it did not assess: front ends, infrastructure, key custody and the off-chain components. Nethermind’s review assumes every privileged role acts honestly, and noted that in the version it examined, shares of public pools could not be recovered in desert mode. No published audit looks at how traders’ software signs transactions, which is where the loss of 16 November 2026 started.
An earlier outage: four and a half hours on 10 October 2025
Lighter was in its first weeks on public mainnet when the market crash of 10 October 2025 hit. The exchange went down for roughly four and a half hours. Lighter blamed a database failure, according to AMBCrypto, and its own post-mortem counted 2,008 users with losses above $1,000, of whom 367 lost more than $10,000 and 38 more than $100,000. Lighter promised compensation in stablecoins and points, AMBCrypto reported.
The two incidents have different causes and one thing in common. In both, the parts that failed were outside what the proofs and the audits cover: a sequencer database in 2025, a customer’s signing software and a pool feature in 2026.
How risky is Lighter? Our rating: 4 out of 5
We rate Lighter 4 on a scale where 5 is the most risky. The design has real strengths: funds sit on Ethereum, every state change is proven, the data needed to rebuild a balance is published, and an exit path exists that does not depend on the company. Nine audits by three firms is more than most rivals publish, and the exchange has serious backers and real revenue.
Against that, the contracts can be upgraded with no delay by a council that the documentation does not describe, Guardian mode can pause withdrawals for everyone, and the sequencer is a single operator. The theft of $10.39 million on 16 November 2026 showed that account-level features can be turned against a user without any contract bug, and Lighter has not said who bears that loss. The LLP carries market risk for its depositors. And LIT holders face the start of a 500 million token vesting, estimated from 27 December 2026, with no date confirmed by the team.
Lighter’s own advice to API traders is short: use its official software kits, and rotate any key created with other signing code. Whatever is left on the exchange beyond margin needs is exposed to the pause and upgrade powers described above. A proof on Ethereum covers the sequencer’s arithmetic. It is no guarantee against a stolen key, or against the people who run the exchange.
What to watch next
Four things were still open on the evening of 17 November 2026: a written account from Lighter of what the Security Council’s upgrade changed, and whether it happened; a loss total and a statement on who covers it; the fate of the ether and wrapped Monero that Bitquery traced; and the calendar date of the first insider unlock, which the trackers place on 27 December 2026 at the earliest. The IP allowlists, per-key permissions and nonce monitoring that Lighter promised are announced, not live.
Strengths and points of vigilance
Strengths
- Deposits held on Ethereum, with every batch of trades and liquidations verified by a validity proof
- No maker or taker fee on regular orders for Standard accounts
- An escape hatch on Ethereum lets users exit if the sequencer stops processing requests
- Nine published audits by zkSecurity, Nethermind and Zellic, with the critical and high-severity findings recorded as fixed
- On 16 November 2026 the pause stopped a second withdrawal attempt and about $5M went back to the trader, according to The Block and The Defiant
- Fee revenue is tracked by DefiLlama and funds LIT buybacks, burned since July 2026
Points of vigilance
- Contracts can be upgraded with no delay by a Security Council that Lighter's documentation does not describe
- $10.39M was taken on 16 November 2026 through one trader's API keys and the public pool feature; Lighter has not said who bears the loss
- Guardian mode can pause withdrawals for every user, as it did for several hours on 16 November 2026, and the sequencer is a single operator
- 500 million insider LIT start vesting from an estimated 27 December 2026, with no official date
Team
- Vladimir Novakovski Founder and CEO
Funding and audits
| Round | Amount | Date | Investors |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equity and token warrants | $68M | Founders Fund and Ribbit Capital (leads), Haun Ventures, Robinhood |
Roadmap
- 2022Lighter fondata da Vladimir NovakovskiDone
- 2025-10Apre il mainnet pubblico; interruzione di circa 4,5 ore il 10 ottobreDone
- 2025-11-11Annunciato il round da 68 milioni di dollari guidato da Founders Fund e Ribbit CapitalDone
- 2025-12-30Lancio del token LIT, 25% dell'offerta distribuito con airdrop ai possessori di puntiDone
- 2026-07-01I perpetui di Lighter vanno online su Robinhood Chain (Tokenomist, che cita Robinhood)Done
- 2026-07-10Prima combustione di LIT riacquistati, circa 15,6 milioni di token (Tokenomist)Done
- 2026-11-1610,39 milioni di USDC sottratti con le chiavi API ricostruite di un trader; prelievi sospesi per diverse ore e riaperti lo stesso giorno; circa 5 milioni restituiti al traderDone
- 2026-11-16Annunciati nel post-mortem del 16 novembre: allowlist di IP, permessi e limiti di mercato per chiave, monitoraggio del riuso dei nonce
- 2026-12-27Data stimata più vicina per l'inizio del vesting di team e investitori (Tokenomist; un altro tracker indica il 28 gennaio 2027)
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