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A Safe multisig loses about $6.4 million through its Zodiac Roles module; the owner and the cause are unknown

On Ethereum, a Safe multisig lost about $6.4 million in USDC and syrupUSDC on 16 November through its Zodiac Roles module. The cause is not established.

8 min read

Abstract hooded figure beside a key, a turning gear and a warning sign
Table of contents
  1. What the Safe multisig drain looks like on-chain
  2. Where the funds went after the drain
  3. The signers swapped an owner and moved about $6.6 million out
  4. How a Zodiac Roles module moves funds without the owners
  5. Three possible causes, none confirmed
  6. Earlier module incidents and Safe’s advisory
  7. What Safe owners who delegate can check now

A Safe multisig wallet on Ethereum lost about $6.4 million in a single transaction at 11:35 UTC on Monday 16 November. The money did not leave with the owners’ signatures. It left through a Zodiac Roles module enabled on the wallet since 2024, on a call from the address that has operated that module for more than two years. The on-chain investigator Specter reported the drain on Telegram as a possible compromise and put the loss at about $6.45 million. The transaction on the Blockscout explorer matches that account. The wallet’s owner is not publicly known, and the cause is not established.

What the Safe multisig drain looks like on-chain

The wallet, 0x5953…80de, is a Safe created on 26 June 2024 that needs two of its four owners to sign. The explorer shows no name or label for it. Its Roles module, 0x729c…6410, was deployed two minutes after the wallet itself.

At 11:35:23 UTC, in block 26427327, the address 0x065F…4148 sent one call to that module. The address is not one of the four owners.

The module passed the instruction to the Safe, and the Safe executed it. It redeemed 3,851,642 shares of the Gauntlet USDC Prime vault on the Morpho lending network, received 4,387,188 USDC, and sent it straight to another Safe, 0x2b02…B9E1. In the same transaction it sent 1,717,919 syrupUSDC, the yield-bearing dollar token of Maple Finance, to the same address.

Asset takenAmountValue in dollars
USDC4,387,188about $4.39 million
syrupUSDC1,717,919about $2.05 million (redemption rate at 17:59 UTC)
Totalabout $6.44 million

Add the two token counts and the result is 6.1 million, less than Specter’s figure. The gap is not missing money. One syrupUSDC is worth more than a dollar because it accrues loan interest: at 17:59 UTC the token’s own contract valued each one at 1.193 USDC, so the batch was redeemable for about 2.05 million USDC. That brings the total to about $6.44 million, in line with the analyst’s number.

Abstract vault door with stacks of coins, a magnifying glass and chain links
One transaction pulled the USDC out of a Morpho vault and sent it, with the syrupUSDC, to another Safe.

Where the funds went after the drain

The receiving Safe began selling within three minutes. From 11:37:47 UTC it sent USDC in batches to decentralised exchange routers and Uniswap pools. At 11:39:47 UTC it passed 3,000,000 USDC to a second Safe, 0xe804…6198, which sold the same way. All 1,717,919 syrupUSDC went into swaps in six transactions between 11:39 and 11:48 UTC. At 17:59 UTC the two addresses held less than one cent of USDC between them.

Specter lists a third Safe, 0x5275…D613, with the first two. The explorer shows it sending about 236,000 USDC to the same routers at 15:21:23 UTC, and it held about 129.9 ETH at 17:59 UTC. Specter also says about $1.2 million was converted to Monero through Wagyu, the blockchain, dove gli utenti scambiano token direttamente dal proprio wallet senza affidare la custodia dei fondi a una società.">swap service whose records leaked in October. That leg cannot be followed on Ethereum.

The dust transfers of fake tokens with USDC-like names around the three addresses are decoys, not part of the loss. Circle, the issuer of USDC, can freeze an address by blacklisting it in the token contract. At 17:59 UTC the contract listed none of the three.

The signers swapped an owner and moved about $6.6 million out

The drain took the USDC and the syrupUSDC. It left the rest of the wallet in place, and the signers acted on it within the hour. At 12:18:35 UTC the Safe replaced one of its four owners: 0x889e…2a34 was removed and 0x734c…0589 added, with the two-signature threshold unchanged.

Between 12:26 and 12:38 UTC, 14 transactions then moved the remaining positions to another Safe, 0x7DC3…7498, a three-of-six wallet created in June 2023. The largest were shares in two Sentora vaults and a deposit on Aave’s Horizon market. At 17:59 UTC their contracts valued them at about 2.91 million RLUSD, 2.43 million PayPal USD and 1.30 million RLUSD, some 6.6 million dollar-pegged tokens in all. The chain does not say who controls the destination wallet.

What stayed behind is small change. One setting did not move: at 17:59 UTC the Safe’s contract still listed the Roles module as enabled.

How a Zodiac Roles module moves funds without the owners

Safe wallets are multisig wallets: by default nothing moves unless enough owners sign. Modules are the exception. A module is a separate contract that the owners authorise once, and that can then make the Safe execute transactions with no further signature from them.

Zodiac Roles, built by Gnosis Guild, is the best-known module for delegation. Owners use it to give a trading bot, a fund manager or a treasury operator a “role”: a list of calls that address may trigger from the Safe, defined per target contract, per function and per parameter, as the project’s documentation describes. The safety of the arrangement rests on that list. A role limited to depositing into one vault and withdrawing back to the Safe cannot send money elsewhere. A role that can withdraw or transfer to any recipient can.

On this wallet the list is not kept by the drained Safe itself. The module names a different Safe, 0x9540…32a2, as its owner, the account allowed to change what each role may do. That Safe is also a two-of-four and shares two signers with the drained one.

Three possible causes, none confirmed

The transaction fits three explanations, and they do not exclude one another. The role may have been written too loosely, with a withdrawal or transfer whose recipient was not restricted. The key of the address holding the role may have been stolen or misused. Or the module itself may have a flaw that let the call through.

One fact is established, and it settles none of the three. The address that sent the call was not new. The explorer counts 800 transactions for it, 769 of them calls to this module, the first on 9 July 2024 and the last before Monday on 31 October. Monday’s call used the same function as every one of them. On that record the address is the module’s regular operator. The chain shows that its key signed the call. It does not show who was holding the key, or whether the role was ever meant to allow a payment to an outside address.

The Defiant, citing an analyst it does not name, puts the drain down to a gap in the wallet’s delegated trading permissions. The transaction alone does not establish that. Neither The Defiant nor Cryptonomist, which also relayed Specter’s report on Monday, quotes Safe, Gnosis Guild or the wallet’s owner.

Earlier module incidents and Safe’s advisory

Modules have been the weak point in several Safe losses this year. In an incident reported on 25 May, about $3.2 million was drained from at least 86 Safes on Ethereum and Base through a third-party module named SquidRouterModule, according to the security firm Blockaid, Cointelegraph reported; Squid said the contract was not its own and that it did not know who had written or deployed it, according to The Block. On 1 June a bug in Zodiac’s Delay and Roles modules hit the Gnosis Pay card: about $1.8 million was affected across 5,281 wallets and about $1.5 million was taken, according to Gnosis Pay’s post-mortem, and Gnosis covered users. On 1 October two Safes lost up to $310,000 through an Aave v3 adapter module, Crypto Briefing reported.

Safe keeps an advisory on a Zodiac module vulnerability, last updated on 3 June. It names Roles Modifier v2 in versions 2.1.0 and 2.1.1 and Delay Modifier 1.1.0, and says Safe’s own contracts and app are not affected. It lists Roles Modifier v1 among the modules that are not affected either. The advisory tells users to run the Zodiac checker and to remove an affected module under Settings, then Modules, and it warns: “Safe Labs will never message you first”.

The module used on Monday points to code deployed in November 2022 (0xD8Df…1889), whose functions identify a role by a number, as the first version of Roles does; version 2 uses a named key. No source has tied Monday’s drain to the vulnerability in that advisory, or to any of the earlier module incidents.

Abstract software bug beside a shield, a document and a calendar page
Safe's advisory, last updated on 3 June, covers a flaw in Roles v2; no source ties it to Monday's drain.

What Safe owners who delegate can check now

Whatever the cause turns out to be, a Safe with an enabled module is only as protected as that module and the keys allowed to call it, which is one of the contract and access risks in our map of DeFi risks. Owners can open Settings, then Modules, in Safe{Wallet} to see what is enabled, and read each role for two things: which contracts and functions it may call, and whether the recipient of a withdrawal or transfer is fixed to the Safe itself.

Still open: who owns the wallet, who was holding the operator key at 11:35 UTC, and why the role could pay an outside address.

Sources

  1. Blockscout: drain transaction of 16 November 2026, 11:35:23 UTC, from Safe 0x595362A906a0B4e90AEe1430b1f80FDDe2bE80de eth.blockscout.com
  2. Blockscout: drained Safe 0x595362A906a0B4e90AEe1430b1f80FDDe2bE80de (owner swap at 12:18 UTC, transfers at 12:26-12:38 UTC, Roles module 0x729c87d1B6939C9b2b0858ac25E235E83E5e6410, operator 0x065F395147FC72747c7f48f67f039d4235884148) eth.blockscout.com
  3. Blockscout: receiving Safe 0x2b02c38022FEE2f3c805055f49Cd8D24A90cB9E1 (onward to 0xe804FC0c7756977E0C512B7a1C392693f4F36198; third address 0x52753A5d7816302ba6bCcEDb3CF65227BDF4D613) eth.blockscout.com
  4. Specter, Telegram post on the Safe drain, 16 November 2026 t.me
  5. Safe Help Center: Zodiac module vulnerability advisory (updated 3 June 2026) help.safe.global
  6. Gnosis Pay: post-mortem of the June 2026 vulnerability exploit gnosispay.com

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