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Hijacked Optimizely scripts swapped crypto addresses on the sites of 178 organisations for 17 hours, Ledger’s website among them

The Optimizely hack put a crypto address swapper and a card skimmer on 178 organisations' sites on 16 November, Ledger's website included. What to check.

14 min read

Abstract broken chain and warning sign above a globe and a payment card
Table of contents
  1. 178 organisations, 188 poisoned files: what the count covers
  2. From 04:21 to 21:52 UTC: the timeline of the attack
  3. How a trusted script turned on its own sites
    1. Wallet addresses swapped on the page and in the clipboard
    2. Card numbers, cookies and screenshots
    3. iPhones and iPads: two exploit kits
  4. About $7,000 reached the attacker, and perhaps a third of it came from victims
  5. What Optimizely and Salesforce said, and what Ledger has not
  6. What to do if you visited one of the sites on 16 November
    1. Why the hardware-wallet screen only helps if you compare
  7. Only 24 of the sites tested blocked the payload
  8. After Polymarket and Swarm, another trusted supplier turned against users

For about 17 and a half hours on Monday 16 November 2026, scripts hosted by the A/B-testing company Optimizely served malware to visitors of 178 organisations, among them the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC and the website of hardware-wallet maker Ledger. The code swapped cryptocurrency addresses for the attacker’s own, copied payment card details and tried to load iPhone exploit kits, according to the investigation published the same day by Scott Helme, founder of the security service Report URI.

The Optimizely hack took little crypto for its reach. Report URI counted about $7,040 received by the attacker’s wallets as of 19:25 UTC on Monday, and a Galaxy researcher who traced the payments says victims account for only about $2,300 of that. Nobody has yet measured how many cards and session cookies were copied, or whether any iPhone was compromised.

Optimizely confirmed the incident to BleepingComputer on Monday evening. It said an unauthorized party “exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow” and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Ledger’s exposure is narrow: the affected script ran on ledger.com, its public website. No source reports any effect on the Ledger Live app, on device firmware or on the devices themselves.

178 organisations, 188 poisoned files: what the count covers

Report URI fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely “snippets”, the JavaScript file each customer loads from Optimizely, and checked each one. It found the malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations. Helme writes that the real number is likely higher, because his team could only test the snippets it managed to find in time.

Other figures in circulation come from earlier moments of the same count. Report URI’s sweep between 19:24 and 19:59 UTC found 186 infected snippets, and Helme wrote on X that evening that 186 sites were confirmed infected. Cointelegraph speaks of 187 websites in one passage of its report and 178 organisations in its headline. The 188 and 178 figures are the final ones in Report URI’s post, and BleepingComputer repeats them.

Helme’s first public warning came at 20:10 UTC on Monday, before he named Optimizely. He wrote that his team was tracking a breach of a third-party JavaScript host affecting hundreds of high-value websites, and added: “This is staggering.” In a reply he said crypto users looked like the likely target, judging by the malware.

Banking and finance is the largest group in Report URI’s list with 32 organisations, including HSBC sites in 11 countries and territories, Equifax, Paychex and ABN AMRO. Technology and software follows with 23 (Zoom, Bitly, Salesforce, GitLab, Mixpanel), then retail with 20 (IKEA, ASOS, Mattel), streaming with 12 (Peacock, NOW TV, Starz), news and media with 10 (CNN, BBC, Fox News, NPR) and airlines and travel with 9, Air France-KLM among them. Optimizely’s own sites, including its login page, carried the code too.

The “Crypto & Trading” group has six names: Ledger (ledger.com and www.ledger.com), the brokers IG, OANDA with its crypto arm Coinpass, interactive investor, TMS Brokers, and the Australian fund manager Betashares. BleepingComputer says it confirmed independently, from scans recorded by urlscan.io, that the script loaded or tried to load on sites including Zoom, KLM, GitLab, BBC, CNN and Salesforce.

From 04:21 to 21:52 UTC: the timeline of the attack

All times below are UTC on Monday 16 November and come from Report URI’s timeline, unless another source is named.

Time (UTC)Event
02:21Last clean public capture of the BBC’s Optimizely snippet
04:21First injection seen, in the BBC snippet
05:23The payload domain 1688360.cc is registered
08:10First build of the payload, track.js, a crypto address swapper
08:28track.js first seen loading on bbc.com
11:20Zoom’s snippet modified
13:03 to 13:05The attacker moves received crypto out of the wallets
13:43A card skimmer is added to the payload
17:13 to 17:57A second iOS host is added; an exploit frame is injected into visits from iOS 18.6 or earlier
19:24 to 19:59Report URI’s sweep finds 186 of 1,611 snippets infected
About 20:40 to 21:10Mass clean-up: Ledger at 20:41, Smartsheet at 20:56, BBC at 21:07
21:52One of the 188 snippets still infected, TalkTalk’s

The clean-up went fast once it started. Report URI still counted 169 infected snippets at 20:56 and a single one at 21:52. The moment each site was first infected is known for only a few of them. For Ledger, the published timeline gives the end, 20:41, and no start.

StepSecurity, a second security firm that analysed the campaign, puts the exposure window at 13 hours at least, counting from the first public scan that recorded the payload at 08:28. Its post uses the name OPTIMJACK, which Cointelegraph credits to the researcher Amirul Iman.

How a trusted script turned on its own sites

Optimizely Web lets a company test versions of its pages on real visitors. To do that, the company’s site loads a snippet from Optimizely’s content network on every page. One part of that snippet is a field called Project JavaScript: custom code the customer writes in its Optimizely dashboard, which then runs on each page.

The attacker wrote into that field. In most cases the addition was a few lines that pulled a second script, track.js, from 1688360.cc. Everything else in the snippet stayed as it was. The file still came from Optimizely’s domain with Optimizely’s certificate, from a host the site already trusted, and companies that serve the snippet from their own domain were hit as well, since the content comes from the same project.

“Optimizely’s CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack,” Helme writes. He saw three versions of the loader: a plain script tag, the same address hidden in base64 so that a search for the domain name finds nothing, and a full copy of the payload placed inside the snippet, which runs if 1688360.cc is blocked. Smartsheet’s snippet was cleaned once and then infected again with the hidden version, a sign that the attacker still had access at that point.

The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day, by Report URI’s count. Features and wallets were added, none removed. StepSecurity measured the file growing from 28,877 to 30,430 bytes and dates the last version at 17:56 UTC.

Abstract cloud linked by a chain to a laptop, with a bug and a hooded figure
The attacker's code sat in a field of the Optimizely snippet that runs on every page of a customer's site.

Wallet addresses swapped on the page and in the clipboard

The first function, live from the morning, looks for any valid address on eight networks: Bitcoin, Ethereum and compatible chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. It checks the checksum so that it only touches real addresses, then replaces them with the attacker’s. Report URI lists where: page text, form fields, links and images, the clipboard, outgoing requests and the iOS share sheet. The page is scanned again each time it changes.

One detail widens the risk beyond the infected page. According to Report URI, an address copied from anywhere else while an affected tab stayed open could also be pasted as the attacker’s. This is the same family of attack as the tampered Udesk chat script that swapped deposit addresses in October.

Card numbers, cookies and screenshots

From 13:43 the script also watched forms and outgoing requests for a card number, an expiry date and a security code. Once it had all three, it sent them to the attacker’s server. Cards typed into payment frames hosted by a processor such as Stripe or Adyen were out of its reach, Report URI says. Cards typed into a site’s own form fields were not.

When the script swapped an address next to wallet or payment wording, it sent more: the page address, the cookies readable by JavaScript (those not marked HttpOnly), the original addresses it had replaced and a screenshot of the page.

iPhones and iPads: two exploit kits

On Apple mobile devices the script read the iOS version and loaded an exploit chain in a hidden frame. Report URI identifies them as Coruna for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18, with a separate path for iOS 26 that, for now, only fingerprints the device. The kit’s own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, are patched. Pages opened on iOS 18.6 or earlier reloaded every 60 seconds to try again.

Whether any phone was taken over is not known. StepSecurity says it did not retrieve the iOS files, so it cannot confirm which exploit chain runs or what that stage delivers.

About $7,000 reached the attacker, and perhaps a third of it came from victims

Report URI’s on-chain count, as of 19:25 UTC on 16 November, is about $7,040, all received within roughly nine hours that day.

NetworkReceived (Report URI)Approx. value
Bitcoin0.08298 BTC$5,380
Litecoin17.02 LTC$762
TRON662.9 USDT and 184 TRX$719
Ethereum0.055 ETH$100
BNB Smart Chain82 USDT$82

The other counts are close without being identical. BleepingComputer gives the same Bitcoin amount but seven transactions where Report URI lists four, and 0.074 ETH on Ethereum where Report URI has 0.055. Its table also counts three Litecoin transactions, as Report URI does, 50 on TRON, six on Ethereum and two on BNB Smart Chain, 68 in all, for a total it rounds to $7,000. It found the Solana, TON, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin wallets empty and notes that some wallets were active before the attack. Cointelegraph’s own check gives about $7,100 for Monday. StepSecurity arrives at roughly $6,600 and notes that some balances on Ethereum and TRON may predate the campaign. Report URI makes a related point: the TRON wallet has been in use since March 2026.

The lowest figure comes from Alex Thorn, head of firmwide research at Galaxy Digital. In a post on X at 02:28 UTC on Tuesday 17 November he wrote that he had traced the flows on-chain: “victims paid ~$2,300. most of the rest was the attacker’s own money”. Cointelegraph, summarising his thread, says most of the Bitcoin receipts looked like the attacker’s own funds routed back through an exchange. StepSecurity also observes that a single transaction, of 0.0761 BTC or about $4,970, makes up most of the Bitcoin.

The funds were moved out between 13:03 and 13:05 UTC, and USDC on Ethereum went to a deposit address at the exchange HitBTC, according to Report URI. The on-chain total says nothing about the cards and cookies. “We cannot see how many cards or cookies reached 1688360.cc,” Helme writes.

What Optimizely and Salesforce said, and what Ledger has not

Optimizely’s statement, quoted by BleepingComputer on 16 November, lists its response: it blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix, removed the injected code from affected projects, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected user accounts and blocked delivery of the code at Cloudflare. “We have notified all affected customers,” it said. Its status page carries an incident titled “Web Experimentation Security Incident”, with a first update dated 17 November at 01:02 UTC and the status “Monitoring”. The notice gives the same account in shorter form.

That explanation came after Report URI published. Helme wrote in his post that he did not know how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects, and that his attempts to reach Optimizely had gone unanswered at the time of publication. How a flaw in an account sign-up flow gave write access to existing customers’ projects has not been explained in public.

Salesforce told BleepingComputer it was investigating changes to the Optimizely scripts on some of its websites. “As a precaution, Salesforce is confirming Optimizely scripts are disabled across preview and production instances,” it said, adding that it would notify customers if it found unauthorized access to their data.

Ledger has published no statement that any of these sources report. Cointelegraph says it contacted Ledger, Coinpass and other listed companies, and its article, updated at 04:43 UTC on Tuesday, carries no reply. What is established: Report URI found the code in the snippet used by ledger.com and www.ledger.com, and saw it removed at 20:41 UTC. That snippet belongs to the website. None of the reports mentions the Ledger Live app, the firmware or the devices, none says a visitor of ledger.com lost funds or card data, and none rules that out.

This has no link with the telemetry in Ledger’s signing kit reported on 12 November, which concerned software used by wallet makers.

Nobody has attributed the attack. Report URI ties it to an earlier wave, from 13 to 16 November, in which the same actor’s injector reached sites through scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, and says the Coruna loader is byte-identical to a sample it analysed in October from another campaign.

What to do if you visited one of the sites on 16 November

The advice below comes from Report URI, BleepingComputer and StepSecurity. It applies to anyone who opened an affected site on Monday, on any device.

  • Review every crypto transfer you made that day. Compare the destination address in your wallet’s history, or on a block explorer, with the address you meant to pay. If they differ, the address may have been swapped.
  • If you typed card details into a form on one of the sites, watch your statements and contact your card issuer at the first unknown charge. StepSecurity goes further and advises treating such a card as compromised and replacing it.
  • Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. StepSecurity suggests a forensic check for devices on iOS 18.6 or earlier that opened an affected site.
  • Watch for unusual activity on accounts you were logged into on those sites, since some session cookies could be read by the script.
Abstract wallet and key beside a phone under a magnifying glass and a shield
Monday's transfers, card statements and the iOS version are the three things visitors are advised to check.

Why the hardware-wallet screen only helps if you compare

StepSecurity is the one source that speaks to hardware-wallet owners: it advises verifying the address on the device screen. The reason lies in how this clipper works. Report URI describes a blockchain, dove gli utenti scambiano token direttamente dal proprio wallet senza affidare la custodia dei fondi a una società.">swap that happens on the web page and in the clipboard, before the wallet is involved, so the address that reaches the wallet app can already be the attacker’s. The device then displays that address, because it shows what is about to be signed.

Reading the screen is therefore half the check. StepSecurity’s wording is to compare the address with the one you meant to use, not with what you copied, since a copied address can already be swapped when it is pasted. Our step-by-step guide to setting up a hardware wallet covers address verification on the device.

Only 24 of the sites tested blocked the payload

Report URI also measured which defences worked. It crawled 256 hosts of the affected organisations and evaluated their Content Security Policy (CSP), the browser rule set by which a site declares where scripts may come from and where data may go. Its results table counts organisations: 68 had no CSP at all, 50 had one that let the payload run and the data leave, and 17 blocked the data theft, though the address swapping, which happens inside the page, still worked. Twenty-four, which Report URI gives as 15%, blocked the payload.

“What separated the 24 protected sites from the rest was a restrictive script-src,” Helme writes, meaning a short list of the exact hosts allowed to serve scripts. Trusting Optimizely’s domain was no help, since the bad code came from it. He also points at a setting that Optimizely’s documentation asks customers to allow, unsafe-eval: at HSBC, the policy stopped track.js and the data theft, yet the copy embedded in the snippet still ran.

For site owners who use Optimizely Web, Report URI gives a list. Open every project’s Project JavaScript and every experiment’s custom code and look for 1688360.cc, for atob( and for any script nobody on the team wrote. Review who and what can write to the account, and rotate credentials. Treat cards entered in the site’s own forms on 16 November as potentially exposed, and rotate session tokens kept in cookies that JavaScript can read. StepSecurity adds a rule for the future: keep third-party tags off checkout pages.

After Polymarket and Swarm, another trusted supplier turned against users

Two recent cases followed the same route. On 30 October, a vendor script drained about $2.65 million from Polymarket users. On 10 November, Swarm’s own release pipeline shipped a wallet-stealing backdoor. Each time the site or software people trusted was intact, and the code it pulled in was not.

Monday’s attack took far less crypto than the Polymarket one, on the evidence so far. Four things remain unknown: how many cards and cookies were copied, what happened to the iPhones that received an exploit frame, whether the list of 178 organisations is complete, and who the attacker is. Optimizely told BleepingComputer it would publish updates at status.optimizely.com.

Sources

  1. Report URI (Scott Helme): World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely, 16 November 2026 blog.report-uri.com
  2. BleepingComputer: Optimizely hack infected CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce sites with malware, 16 November 2026 bleepingcomputer.com
  3. Optimizely status page: Web Experimentation Security Incident, update of 17 November 2026, 01:02 UTC status.optimizely.com
  4. StepSecurity: OPTIMJACK, Optimizely-hosted scripts with a crypto clipper and card skimmer stepsecurity.io
  5. Cointelegraph: Hackers inject malware into 178 major websites, 17 November 2026 cointelegraph.com
  6. X post by @Scott_Helme, 16 November 2026 x.com
  7. X post by @intangiblecoins, 17 November 2026 x.com

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