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Swarm’s own release robot shipped a wallet-stealing backdoor: what node runners must do after bee-js 13.3.0 and Desktop 0.56.2

Attackers used Ethersphere's release bot to ship bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 with a node-wallet stealer. Safe versions and steps inside.

11 min read

Abstract bug crawling over a server rack, a hooded figure and a diamond
Table of contents
  1. Who is affected by the bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 compromise
  2. What Swarm node runners and developers must do now
    1. If you run Swarm Desktop
    2. If you build software with bee-js
  3. How Ethersphere’s release robot shipped a signed backdoor
    1. Valid provenance, real signatures, no human check
    2. What the payload takes: node wallet, password and a remote shell
    3. The payload server’s address lives in an Ethereum contract
  4. No loss reported so far, and few confirmed installs
  5. What is still unknown about the Swarm attack
  6. From Ledger Connect Kit to chalk: earlier supply-chain attacks on crypto users
  7. Swarm, bee-js and BZZ in brief

Attackers used the release robot of Ethersphere, the team behind the Swarm decentralised storage network, to publish two poisoned updates on Monday 9 November: version 13.3.0 of the bee-js JavaScript library on npm and version 0.56.2 of the Swarm Desktop app for Windows, macOS and Linux. Both carried a loader that sends a Swarm node’s wallet key and its password to the attacker, then installs a backdoor that stays on the machine. GitHub flagged the npm package as malware in advisory GHSA-hh7j-5m3j-23pf at 01:25 UTC, and supply-chain security firm Socket published the full technical analysis the same day.

No loss has been reported. The exposure windows were short: about 75 minutes for bee-js, about eight and a half hours for the desktop app. But the builds looked legitimate in every check a user or a build server would normally run. The npm package carried a valid provenance attestation and the macOS app was signed and notarized with Ethersphere’s real Apple credentials, because the company’s own pipeline produced them.

Anyone who installed either version should treat the computer as compromised. Updating does not undo it.

Who is affected by the bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 compromise

Two groups of people are exposed, and the risk is not the same for each.

The first is anyone who runs a Swarm node through Swarm Desktop and received version 0.56.2. According to Socket, the update service offered it automatically to Windows x64 machines from 00:43 UTC and to Apple Silicon Macs from 00:44 UTC on 9 November. Linux users only got it if they downloaded a package by hand. Ethersphere deleted the v0.56.2 tag at 09:04 UTC and the release was gone from public view by about 09:14 UTC. Its releases page now lists v0.56.3 as the latest version, published by the same bee-worker account, with two release notes that both read “replace compromised 0.56.2 release”.

The second group is developers and build servers that installed @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 with npm install scripts enabled. npm received the version under the “latest” tag at 00:09:50 UTC and removed it at 01:24:58 UTC. The malicious code ran during installation, so a machine that pulled the package in that window is at risk even if the install later failed, Socket says.

Some projects never named bee-js directly but still pulled it in, because their version ranges allowed 13.3.0. Socket lists @ethersphere/swarm-cli 3.6.0 and 3.7.0, @ethersphere/bee-dashboard 0.37.0 and 0.37.1 (and 0.33.0 to 0.36.2 through @solarpunkltd/file-manager-lib), @snaha/swarm-id 0.5.0 to 0.8.0, @solarpunkltd/file-manager-lib 1.1.0 and 1.1.1, bee-wasm-js 0.1.0 and 0.1.1, and new projects created with create-swarm-app during the window.

SoftwareBad versionPublic window (9 Nov, UTC)Safe version
bee-js (npm)13.3.0 only00:09:50 to 01:24:5813.2.0 (pin it)
Swarm Desktop0.56.2, all platformsabout 00:43 to about 09:140.56.3 or later
Auto-update reachWindows x64, Apple Siliconfrom 00:43:17 and 00:44:49Linux: manual replacement
GitHub advisoryGHSA-hh7j-5m3j-23pfissued 01:25no patched bee-js release

What Swarm node runners and developers must do now

The GitHub advisory is blunt. Any computer with the package installed or running “should be considered fully compromised”, every secret and key on it should be rotated from a different computer, and removing the package may not remove the malware. Socket’s guidance adds concrete steps for each group. Blockchain security firm SlowMist, quoted by Cryptonomist on 10 November, gave the same short advice for developers: delete the package and go back to 13.2.0.

If you run Swarm Desktop

  1. Open the file bee-desktop.log and look for the line “Bee Desktop version: 0.56.2 (production)”. The app writes it at each launch, before the loader runs, so if it is there the machine ran the bad build.
  2. Uninstall 0.56.2 and install 0.56.3 or later from the official releases page. Linux packages have to be replaced by hand.
  3. Assume the node password and the node key were stolen. From a different, clean computer, create a new key and move the node’s funds, its chequebook and its stake to it.
  4. Look for what the malware leaves behind, because a reinstall does not delete it: a folder named .solidity in your home directory, a macOS LaunchAgent named com.solidity.langsupport.runner, a Linux systemd user unit named solidity-langsupport-runner.service, and on Windows a service named ScreenConnect Client (5cbe79c9c25524df).
  5. If any of those exist, rebuild the machine from a trusted image rather than cleaning it by hand. Researchers quoted by the tech site QUE.com give that advice, and the GitHub advisory warns that removing the package may not remove everything it installed.

The order matters. Moving funds from the infected computer itself gives the attacker a chance to watch you do it. A node wallet is a hot wallet: its private key sits on disk next to the software, which is exactly what this payload was built to read.

Abstract shield in front of a laptop, a wallet and a magnifying glass
Node runners first check one log line, then move funds to a new key from a clean computer.

If you build software with bee-js

  1. Search lockfiles, package caches, internal registries and mirrors for bee-js 13.3.0. Socket gives its integrity value as sha512-ltkrphoNy7TBIjCICDW7y3qa+j8yljt3+ohPRSM+id1rK2NaOgm5H5V/FioTQ0rEJ5IJ+Zj1micbAdQCqqc8iw==. On npm 11.16 to 11.21, install logs also show the warning @ethersphere/[email protected] (postinstall: node scripts/generate-version.cjs).
  2. Pin 13.2.0 and purge caches. There is no fixed 13.3.x release; 13.2.0, published on 15 October, is the latest clean version on the bee-js releases page.
  3. Treat any laptop or CI job that installed 13.3.0 with scripts enabled as compromised, even if the install failed, and rotate every credential it could reach from another machine, including cloud credentials that CI jobs obtain through OIDC trust.
  4. Turn off install scripts in CI where you can, and require a human approval and a protected branch for any workflow that publishes or signs releases.

Mirrors are a trap. Socket found that Huawei Cloud’s npm mirror was still serving the 13.3.0 tarball at 10:30 UTC on 9 November, hours after npm itself had removed it.

How Ethersphere’s release robot shipped a signed backdoor

Socket’s timeline shows an attacker who prepared for days. Between 17:06 and 19:55 UTC on 6 November, the actor tested write access to the swarm-desktop and swarm-cli repositories and tried to dump secrets through manually triggered GitHub workflows. Socket says, with moderate confidence, that nothing was taken at that stage. The payload server’s domain was registered the same day.

Two GitHub accounts did the work. One belonged to “nugaon”, a maintainer with rights to force-push to the bee-js master branch, which had no protection. The other was “bee-worker”, the account that automates Ethersphere’s releases. At 23:59 UTC on 8 November a commit appeared under bee-worker that rewrote a build script, generate-version.cjs, and turned it into a postinstall hook, code npm runs on every machine that installs the package. At 00:06 UTC on 9 November a v13.3.0 release was created. The publish workflow had no approval step, so the package reached npm under the “latest” tag at 00:09:50, less than four minutes later.

Swarm Desktop went the same way through a different door. Its release came from a branch called “emergency/0.56.2” and a workflow named pre-release.yml, which anyone with access could launch by hand and which had no environment protection. That workflow received Ethersphere’s Apple and Windows code-signing certificates and its notarization credentials. One CI run produced nine packages for Linux, macOS and Windows between about 00:41 and 00:45 UTC, each with the loader inside the Electron main process, where it runs every time the app starts.

Time (UTC)Event, according to Socket
6 Nov, 17:06-19:55Probing of write access and secret-dump attempts in swarm-desktop and swarm-cli
8 Nov, 23:30Payload server address updated in the Ethereum contract
8 Nov, 23:59Malicious bee-js commit pushed as bee-worker
9 Nov, 00:09:50bee-js 13.3.0 live on npm under “latest”
9 Nov, about 00:41-00:45Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 built, signed, notarized; auto-update starts
9 Nov, 01:24:58npm removes bee-js 13.3.0
9 Nov, 09:04-09:14v0.56.2 tag deleted, release no longer public
Abstract robot turning a gear beside a key and a running hourglass
Ethersphere's release bot published bee-js 13.3.0 for about 75 minutes and Desktop 0.56.2 for about eight and a half hours.

Valid provenance, real signatures, no human check

npm’s provenance system links a package to the source repository and the build that produced it. For bee-js 13.3.0, “the provenance attestation is not forged”, Socket writes. It came from Ethersphere’s real trusted-publishing setup. The catch, in Socket’s words, is that provenance “proves where a package was built, not that the source was reviewed.”

The same logic applied to the desktop app. Apple’s notarization tells a Mac that a known developer signed the app and that Apple scanned it. Both statements were true. The weak point was upstream: release workflows that accepted any branch, handed over signing secrets and never waited for a person to approve.

What the payload takes: node wallet, password and a remote shell

The loader fetched JavaScript from a server at api[.]frameworkmetrics[.]xyz and ran it with full Node.js rights. The second stage sent two files to the attacker: the Bee node’s config.yaml and data-dir/keys/swarm.key. The config file stores the keystore password in plain text, so the pair is enough to open the node’s wallet, Socket explains. That wallet holds the node’s balance, its chequebook and its stake.

A third stage aims to stay. On macOS and Linux it drops a Go backdoor that Socket calls “evjawbreaker” in the hidden .solidity folder and registers it as a LaunchAgent or a systemd user service, giving the attacker a persistent shell. On Windows, obfuscated PowerShell tries to bypass User Account Control, adds an exclusion to Microsoft Defender and installs a ScreenConnect remote-access client as a SYSTEM service. That is why “Deleting a release does not roll anyone back”, as Socket puts it: the update service never pushes an older version, and the backdoor does not depend on the app any more.

The payload server’s address lives in an Ethereum contract

The malware does not hard-code where to fetch its next stage. It reads the address from a smart contract on Ethereum, 0xf8a900Db50b3331be6B768bA460BB59f3E40C344, which has been active since 14 March 2026. Because anyone can read a contract and no registrar can seize it, the attacker can move servers by sending one transaction; the update before this attack came at 23:30 UTC on 8 November. Our explainer on how smart contracts work covers why such code cannot simply be taken down.

Socket ties the contract to earlier work. Contract history, payload hashes, persistence names and the ScreenConnect instance match the infrastructure that Pluto Security linked to the SleepyDuck, or EtherDuck, campaign on Open VSX, a marketplace for code-editor extensions. Socket advises security teams to watch the contract for new writes, since it emits no events.

No loss reported so far, and few confirmed installs

No theft has been confirmed in any public report so far. Outlets including PANews said on 10 November that no fund losses had been confirmed, and Socket did not report any wallet being drained.

The known exposure is small. Socket estimates that bee-js 13.3.0 was fetched about ten times, a figure that includes security scanners and mirrors; the package as a whole had 3,741 downloads from 1 to 8 November. The Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 download counters stood at 65 at 08:27 UTC on 9 November, including 22 downloads of the Apple Silicon zip and 3 of the Windows update package. Socket calls these upper bounds, since researchers downloaded the files too. They do not show how many nodes took the update through auto-update.

For people who did run it, a small total is no comfort. The stolen files give access to the node wallet, and a backdoor can sit quietly until it is used. A Swarm node is an internet-facing server; our guide to what a blockchain node is explains what these machines do and why they hold keys.

What is still unknown about the Swarm attack

How the attacker took over the nugaon and bee-worker accounts has not been explained. Socket says it does not know. QUE.com attributes the words “stolen CI credentials” to Ethersphere’s maintainers and adds that how they were stolen is unclear. SlowMist, as relayed by Cryptonomist, says the attackers broke into GitHub accounts. Ethersphere has published no post-mortem, and the 0.56.3 release notes say nothing about the cause.

Also open: whether any key was actually taken and used, how many Swarm Desktop installs pulled 0.56.2 automatically, and what Ethersphere will change in its release process. Socket’s recommendations for maintainers are specific. Check in the publishing workflow that a release commit comes from a protected branch or a merged pull request, require reviewers on the publish environment, keep signing and notarization secrets out of workflows that anyone can start by hand on any branch, and give release bots narrow tokens.

From Ledger Connect Kit to chalk: earlier supply-chain attacks on crypto users

Crypto users have been hit through JavaScript packages before. On 14 December 2023 an attacker phished a former Ledger employee, logged into his npm account and published a malicious Ledger Connect Kit that drained wallets through apps using the library. Ledger later put user losses at about $600,000.

In early September 2025, maintainers of widely used packages such as chalk, strip-ansi and color-convert received fake npm-support emails asking them to update two-factor authentication. The attackers took over the accounts and slipped in a crypto clipper that swaps wallet addresses during transactions. Ledger’s chief technology officer Charles Guillemet said the affected packages had been “downloaded over 1 billion times”, Cointelegraph reported on 8 September 2025.

Both attacks went through a person’s account on npm. The Swarm case went through the automation instead, and the result carried the marks that are meant to prove a build is genuine. Our guide can a blockchain be hacked? looks at where crypto thefts really happen.

Swarm, bee-js and BZZ in brief

Swarm is a decentralised storage and messaging network that grew out of the Ethereum community. People run nodes, called Bee nodes, that store and serve data; bee-js is the JavaScript library developers use to talk to them, and Swarm Desktop is a one-click app that runs a node on a personal computer. Nodes are paid and pay in xBZZ on Gnosis Chain and need xDAI for gas, which is why a node’s key is worth stealing.

Sources

  1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-hh7j-5m3j-23pf: malware in @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 (9 November 2026) github.com
  2. Socket Research: bee-js and Swarm Desktop compromise analysis (9 November 2026) socket.dev
  3. Ethersphere swarm-desktop releases on GitHub (v0.56.3) github.com
  4. Cryptonomist: SlowMist security alert on bee-js (10 November 2026) en.cryptonomist.ch
  5. QUE.com: attackers hijacked Ethersphere's own release pipeline (9 November 2026) que.com
  6. Cointelegraph: npm attack injects crypto-stealing malware (8 September 2025) cointelegraph.com
  7. ForkLog: Ledger puts estimated user losses at about $600,000 (December 2023) forklog.com

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