Trezor said on Monday 16 November that an attacker got into the systems of Skladon, one of the companies that ships its hardware wallets, and, the company believes, exported the records of about 27,000 orders placed between 9 August and 7 November 2026. The Trezor data breach exposed buyers’ full names, phone numbers, delivery addresses and email addresses, together with what they bought, when and at what price, according to the company’s blog post. Skladon was breached on 7 November and told Trezor eight days later, on 15 November.
No coins can be moved with that data. “No wallet backups, PINs or passphrases were involved. Neither Trezor nor Skladon ever holds them,” the post says. Trezor adds that its own systems were not compromised and that the devices are secure.
The danger sits elsewhere. “Some customers have already reported scam calls,” Trezor writes, and it warns that scammers may quote the real product and the real price to make a call or a message look genuine. It is the second time since August that a shipping partner has lost the contact details of Trezor buyers.
What the Skladon breach exposed, and what it could not reach
Trezor’s post lists five kinds of data in the exported records: full names, phone numbers, delivery addresses, email addresses and order details. Its FAQ spells the last item out as the order date, the product name and the price. “We believe the attacker exported this data,” the company says, and it describes the investigation as ongoing.
The three secrets that protect a hardware wallet were never in a warehouse database. The wallet backup, the list of words written down when the device is set up, exists only on paper or metal in the owner’s hands. The PIN lives on the device. The passphrase, an optional extra word or sentence, is known only to the person who chose it. A shipping company needs a name, an address and a phone number to deliver a parcel; it has no reason to see any of the three and no way to obtain them.
So the leak, taken alone, gives nobody access to a wallet. Nothing in Trezor’s post asks affected buyers to reset their device, replace it or move their coins. What the attacker holds is a list of people who own a hardware wallet, with a way to reach each of them. Our guide to backing up and storing a recovery phrase explains why those words are the only thing a thief needs.

Who is affected: orders from 9 August to 7 November
The rule Trezor gives is simple. Anyone who received its email about the incident and ordered between 9 August and 7 November 2026 had their order data exposed. Anyone who received the email but ordered after 7 November is not affected.
One group falls through the gap. A “small number” of customers who ordered between 9 and 14 August may also be in the stolen records, but Trezor says it cannot write to them: their details had already been anonymised in its own systems under its 90-day retention policy. Those buyers are being warned through the blog post and a post on X instead, so some of them may be affected without ever receiving an email.
The figure of 27,000 counts orders. Trezor does not say how many people that represents, and one person can order more than once.
The post does not list countries either. “Skladon delivers Trezor orders to many countries, so this isn’t limited to one region,” the FAQ says. According to DeFiprime, Trezor’s statement on X excludes customers in the United States because Skladon does not ship there; the blog post itself says nothing on that point.
How a scam call built on real order details works
A stranger who phones to say “there is a problem with your Trezor” is easy to dismiss. A caller who greets you by name, cites the model you bought, the date and the amount you paid is harder to doubt, because only the shop is supposed to know those things. That is what the stolen records make possible, and Trezor says so directly: scammers “may quote real order details, including what you bought and what you paid, to make a message look genuine”.
The pretext varies: a fake security alert, a supposed recall, a firmware problem, a refund. The request that matters does not. Sooner or later the victim is asked to read out the wallet backup, type it into a website or an app, or scan a QR code that leads to a page asking for it. Whoever has those words can rebuild the wallet on another device and empty it, without ever touching the original Trezor or knowing its PIN.
The phone is only one route. Trezor warns of phishing “by phone, text, email and post”, which covers a text message with a link, an email dressed up as an order update, and a printed letter sent to the delivery address. A leaked email address can be changed in a few minutes. A phone number is a chore to replace, and a home address is not something most people can change at all, which is why this kind of leak stays useful to criminals long after the headlines.
Trezor also raises a risk that has nothing to do with phishing. The records tie a street address to the purchase of a device made to hold crypto. “Please be alert to potential risks to your physical security,” the post says, and its FAQ advises customers to be careful about who knows they own crypto.
What Trezor will never ask
The company sets out two rules that make most of these scams fail. Nobody from Trezor will cold-call a customer. Nobody from Trezor will ask for a wallet backup, by any channel. The backup goes in one place only, the Trezor device itself.
What affected buyers can do now
Trezor’s advice to customers comes down to four habits:
- Treat any unexpected call, message or letter about an order as suspicious, however accurate the details in it.
- Contact Trezor through trezor.io/support, never through a link, a QR code or a phone number contained in the message.
- Never share the wallet backup, and never enter it anywhere except on the device.
- If a message contains a threat or makes you feel unsafe, contact the local police first.
The caller will not always claim to be Trezor. After the August leak the company warned that scammers could also “impersonate banks, crypto exchanges, or even Trezor”. Our guide on how to avoid crypto scams lists the usual red flags and where to report an attempt. Separately, and as a matter of general European data protection law, not of anything Trezor announced, people in the EU can ask a company what personal data it holds on them and can lodge a complaint with their national data protection authority.

Trezor cuts data retention to 45 days and opens Anonymous Pickup
Trezor says it emailed every affected customer it can still reach and “informed the data protection authority”. The post does not name that authority. The company is also reviewing its relationships with outside partners and the security requirements it places on them.
Two changes concern future orders. The first is how long order data is kept: Trezor is “working to reduce” the period from 90 days to 45, “with the goal of reducing it further”. The wording describes work in progress, and the post gives no date for the switch. In a separate post dated 13 November, Trezor says its shipping partners must follow the same retention policy, while conceding that essential delivery details still have to be shared with them.
The second is Anonymous Pickup, which Trezor says it has been building since early 2026. The 16 November post says that “from today” customers in 18 European countries can have an order sent to a parcel locker or a pickup point, so that “their name and home address never reach us”. It arrives later than first promised: in August, Trezor said it aimed to offer the option, then called Anonymous Delivery, in the EU by September 2026 and in the US by the end of 2026. The 13 November post explains the mechanics: the buyer can use an alias and a disposable email address, the parcel travels in unbranded packaging, and a pickup code arrives by email. Support, returns and warranty claims run on the order number.
Coverage is uneven. That post says the service applies across the EU except Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg. Germany gets a different version, Discreet Pickup, because pickup points there check identity: the buyer must give the name shown on an official document and present it, though no home address or phone number is required. For the United States, Trezor says it is working on a launch “as soon as possible” and gives no date. It also recommends paying in crypto for more privacy, since a card processor receives a name and a billing address.
None of this helps the people whose records are already gone, a point Trezor concedes: “We know these changes don’t undo what happened to those affected.”
The second shipping-partner leak since August
“We know this is not the first time customer contact details and addresses have been exposed in an incident involving one of our partners,” the post says, adding that the company is “truly sorry”, especially towards customers hit again.
The earlier case is recent. On 10 August 2026, US logistics firm ShipMonk told Trezor of unauthorised access to its systems, and Trezor announced it on 13 August, according to its post on that incident. At first the count was 11,742 customers with full exposure (name, email, phone number, shipping address) and 1,947 with partial exposure (name, city, email), for orders placed from 10 May to 8 August and sent to the US, the UK, Sweden, Colombia, Brazil, Italy and Portugal. Trezor called it the first breach since its founding in 2013 to expose customers’ phone numbers and shipping addresses.
Then it grew. On 2 September Trezor learned that about 67,000 more US customers were involved, with orders dating from November 2019 to August 2021, far beyond the 90-day limit, and it published the wider count on 4 September. The total reached 80,689. Trezor wrote that it had “repeatedly requested and received written assurance” from ShipMonk that the data had been deleted, and that it was not.
The Skladon records are fewer, but they say more about each buyer. In the ShipMonk case, Trezor’s FAQ stated that the contents of the parcel were not exposed. This time the product name and the price are in the stolen data, which is what lets a caller describe a purchase accurately.
| Incident | Disclosed | Where the data sat | Scale | Data exposed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skladon | 16 November 2026 | Shipping partner | About 27,000 orders (9 August to 7 November 2026) | Name, phone, delivery address, email, order date, product, price |
| ShipMonk, first count | 13 August 2026 | US logistics firm | 11,742 customers in full, 1,947 in part | Name, email, phone, shipping address; name, city and email for the partial group |
| ShipMonk, wider count | 4 September 2026 | US logistics firm | About 67,000 more US customers, 80,689 in total | Name, email, phone, shipping address, order number, for orders from November 2019 to August 2021 |
| Mailchimp | April 2022 | Newsletter service | Audience data exported from 102 Mailchimp accounts | Audience data (mailing lists) |
| Ledger | July 2020, database dumped in December 2020 | Ledger’s own e-commerce database | About 1 million email addresses, about 272,000 detailed records | Email; postal address, name and phone number for the detailed records |
Older episodes show what criminals do with such lists. In April 2022, Trezor newsletter subscribers received emails announcing a fake data breach and urging them to download software to reset their PIN; the software was built to steal their crypto. The addresses came from Mailchimp, which said it had become aware on 26 March that year of an intruder using one of its internal tools. Attackers viewed 319 Mailchimp accounts and exported audience data from 102 of them, BleepingComputer reported on 4 April 2022.
Trezor’s main competitor went through the same thing on a larger scale. Ledger suffered a breach of its e-commerce database in July 2020, and in December of that year the contents were dumped on a hacking forum. In a message dated 21 December 2020, Ledger’s chief executive put the damage at about 1 million email addresses and about 272,000 records with a postal address, a name and a phone number. He wrote that many customers had been targeted by phishing by email and text message, and that some feared physical attacks because their shipping addresses were out.
The pattern is not limited to wallet makers. This month alone, Gnosis Pay users reported exposed home addresses and Coinone disclosed a breach at its support vendor. For Trezor the leak also lands two and a half weeks after it confirmed implants in three wallets sold by a reseller, a separate matter that concerned devices and not customer data.
What Trezor and Skladon have not said
Trezor’s post does not say who the attacker is or how they got into Skladon’s systems, and it quotes no statement from Skladon. Nor does it say why eight days passed between the breach and the notification, whether the stolen records have been offered for sale, how many individual customers stand behind the 27,000 orders, or which countries they live in.
Two dates are missing as well: the day the 45-day retention period takes effect, and the day Anonymous Pickup opens in the United States. Trezor ends its post with a commitment: “We’ll update this post as we learn more.”
