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What is a DAO? How on-chain organisations decide

What is a DAO? How an on-chain organisation votes, what its treasury really holds, what has gone wrong since 2016 and who answers when one is sued.

Intermediate 22 min readUpdated Read first: How to buy an NFT safely, step by step
A ballot box, a group of people, a vault door and connected nodes
Table of contents
  1. What is a DAO? A treasury with a voting procedure attached
  2. The DAO of 2016 raised $150 million and broke within seven weeks
    1. Slock.it, curators and 1.15 billion tokens
    2. What the SEC took from it in 2017
  3. How a decision travels from a forum post to a transaction
    1. The stages, and what each one binds
    2. One proposal followed day by day: Arbitrum’s quorum change of 2026
    3. Councils, multisigs and vetoes: who can act without a vote
  4. On-chain treasuries: rich mostly in their own token
  5. Modern DAOs, from protocol governance to a bid for the Constitution
    1. Protocol DAOs
    2. Collector and investment DAOs
    3. Grants DAOs
  6. What goes wrong: captured votes, absent voters, foundations that act first
  7. Who is liable when a DAO is sued
  8. Taking part without getting hurt
  9. Five checks before trusting a DAO

At 11:19 UTC on 30 March 2026, in Ethereum block 24,770,077, a transaction changed the way Arbitrum DAO counts its quorum. The text had been posted on a forum on 29 January, polled in February, voted on chain until 12 March, then held in time-locked contracts for 17 days.

Ten years earlier the first organisation of this kind to draw a crowd, The DAO, raised about $150 million in 28 days and lost a third of it three weeks later.

So what is a DAO, once the slogans are set aside? The letters stand for decentralised autonomous organisation. In practice it is a pot of money and a set of contracts whose keys are held by a vote, with forums, delegates, councils and often a foundation around that vote. The Arbitrum decision is followed below from its first forum post to its execution, next to what DAO treasuries really hold. One question runs through all of it: who can move the money or change the code, and how long does everyone else have to react?

Voting means signing with a wallet, so the habits from the previous lesson of this path, how to buy an NFT safely and read what you sign, apply here without change.

What is a DAO? A treasury with a voting procedure attached

Start with what sits on the chain. A DAO controls one or more addresses that hold funds, and it holds the administrator rights of a protocol: the power to upgrade its smart contracts, change a fee or pay a contributor. Those rights belong to a governance contract, and that contract obeys the result of a vote. Whoever holds or is lent voting tokens takes part; nobody else does.

Everything else is people. Proposals are written by a few contributors, debated on a forum, pushed by professional delegates and often carried out by a foundation or a company with employees. The contracts are the last step of a decision, not the place where it is made.

The idea is older than the practice. On 6 May 2014, more than a year before Ethereum launched, Vitalik Buterin published a terminology guide to DAOs, DACs and DAs. He separated a decentralised organisation, where humans decide under rules enforced by a protocol, from a DAO proper, which holds capital of its own and decides for itself. His formula for the second: “DAOs == automation at the center, humans at the edges.” The same post credits Daniel Larimer of BitShares as the main promoter of a sister term, the decentralised autonomous corporation, a DAO that pays dividends on tradable shares.

By that 2014 yardstick, most organisations called DAOs in 2026 are decentralised organisations: humans vote and code executes.

A DAO is not a legal form. Unless its members have registered one, the law decides after the fact what the group was, and US judges have started to answer (see the section on liability). Nor is it decentralised by definition: where four delegates carry a vote, or a council can act alone, power is concentrated much as in a company. Votes are public, too, and addresses can be tied to names.

The ballot paper itself, the governance token, has its own lesson: what a governance token lets you vote on and who holds the votes. Tokens locked for voting power are covered in the lesson on vote escrow and the Curve wars. Here the subject is the organisation. Bitcoin, for contrast, has no token vote at all: its changes pass by rough consensus among developers, miners and node operators.

The DAO of 2016 raised $150 million and broke within seven weeks

The story of the hack and of the fork that split Ethereum from Ethereum Classic is told in our lesson on Ethereum’s history: about 3.6 million ETH drained from 17 June 2016, and a fork at block 1,920,000 on 20 July to return the money. What that lesson leaves out is how The DAO was built, and why a regulator read it so differently from its authors.

Slock.it, curators and 1.15 billion tokens

The DAO came from a German start-up, Slock.it, co-founded in September 2015 by Christoph Jentzsch, his brother Simon and Stephan Tual. Its product was meant to connect door locks and other rentable objects to Ethereum. Christoph Jentzsch, the chief technology officer, wrote the white paper for a fund that token holders would steer, and released its final draft around 23 March 2016, according to the SEC’s later report of investigation.

The sale ran from 30 April to 28 May 2016. Buyers sent ether to a contract and received DAO tokens: about 1.15 billion tokens for about 12 million ETH, worth roughly $150 million when the sale closed, per the same report. Holders would then vote, in proportion to their tokens, on proposals from contractors asking for funding, and share in whatever those projects earned. Jentzsch compared it to “buying shares in a company and getting … dividends”, a phrase the SEC quoted back.

It was less leaderless than the name suggested. Before any proposal reached a vote, it had to be reviewed by one or more “curators”, a group of individuals chosen by Slock.it. They controlled which addresses could receive ether and which proposals could be submitted, voted on and funded. The white paper itself said they had “considerable power”. Slock.it had announced that it would submit the first proposal.

None of it was put to the test. Before The DAO had funded anything, an attacker used a flaw in its code to take about a third of its assets. The rescue came from outside the organisation, through a change to Ethereum itself.

What the SEC took from it in 2017

On 25 July 2017 the US Securities and Exchange Commission published its report under section 21(a) of the Exchange Act. Its conclusion was that DAO tokens were securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Buyers had put money into a common enterprise and expected profits from the work of others, namely Slock.it, its co-founders and the curators. The vote did not change that analysis, because holders depended on those people to select and vet the projects.

The Commission chose not to bring an enforcement action. The report served as a warning to those who came next: calling something decentralised does not take it outside securities law, and a regulator looks at who actually does the work.

How a decision travels from a forum post to a transaction

A modern DAO spreads a decision over several stages, each with its own venue and its own way of being stopped. Arbitrum, the second Ethereum rollup by value secured behind Base on 11 November 2026 according to ETHBEAT (formerly L2BEAT), writes its stages into a constitution. They make a good model because every one of them can be checked on chain.

The stages, and what each one binds

Stage (Arbitrum DAO rules, read 16 November 2026)WhereLengthWhat it binds
DiscussionGovernance forumAbout 1 week, recommendedNothing. A post reaches no contract
Temperature checkSnapshot, off chain1 week, simple majorityNothing on chain. Posting it needs 500,000 ARB of voting power
Formal proposalGovernor contract on Arbitrum One3 days before voting opensFixes the code to be executed. Needs 1,000,000 ARB delegated to the proposer
On-chain voteGovernor contract14 days, up to 16Binding if more vote for than against and the quorum is met
Waiting periodsTimelocks on the rollup and on Ethereum3 days for treasury spending; 8 days, a challenge period and 3 more days for changes to the chainNothing new. Users who disagree can leave
ExecutionA transaction anyone can sendMinutesThe change takes effect

The first two stages cost the voter nothing. A Snapshot poll is a signed message, not a transaction: it uses no gas, and its result has force only because the DAO’s rules and its delegates treat it as a filter for what goes on chain. The on-chain vote is a real transaction. On Arbitrum One the median fee was about $0.004 on 15 November 2026, against about $0.08 on Ethereum itself, according to growthepie. Arbitrum’s votes are cast on the rollup, so a ballot cost less than a cent that day.

Delegation holds the system up. Most holders never vote, so they lend their voting power to a delegate without handing over the tokens, and can take it back at any time. The quorum is the minimum weight of votes for a result to count. The timelock is the delay between a passed vote and its execution. The constitution states the totals: at least 42 days from the temperature check for a change to the chain or to the DAO’s rules, at least 27 days for ordinary spending.

One proposal followed day by day: Arbitrum’s quorum change of 2026

The proposal executed on 30 March 2026 dealt with the quorum itself. Until then Arbitrum computed it as a share of all ARB that could vote, whether or not anyone had ever delegated it. The Arbitrum Foundation’s post of 29 January 2026 put the problem in one line: the quorum was based on a supply “which has no relationship to the tokens registered to vote.” Delegated voting power stood at 348.61 million ARB, while the threshold for ordinary proposals stood at 145.56 million and kept drifting up with supply.

The fix ties the quorum to delegated tokens: half of them for constitutional changes, with a floor of 150 million ARB and a cap of 450 million; 40% for the rest, between 100 and 300 million. The same package lets a proposer cancel a proposal during the three days before voting opens.

StepDate (2026)WhereResult
Implementation post29 JanuaryArbitrum governance forumParameters published, audit linked
Temperature check5 to 12 FebruarySnapshot211.1 million ARB for, 3.55 million against, 1,575 votes cast
Submitted on chain23 February“Arbitrum Core” governor, by a delegateProposal fixed, three-day wait starts
Vote opens26 February, 21:54 UTCGovernor contract
Vote closes12 March, 23:38 UTCGovernor contract247.89 million ARB for (1,489 addresses), about 362,600 against (40 addresses)
Queued12 MarchTimelock on Arbitrum OneDelays begin
Executed30 March, 11:19 UTCEthereum, block 24,770,077New quorum rule in force

Sixty days separate the post from the execution, of which about 17 and a half were pure waiting after the vote had closed. The figures come from the Snapshot poll and from the proposal’s page on Tally, a governance interface now called Cactus, which marks its Arbitrum pages as archived.

A document, a ballot box, an hourglass, a gear and chain links
Arbitrum's 2026 quorum change: a forum post, two votes, 17 days in timelocks, then one transaction.

Read the result twice. On the forum, at least three delegates said they were voting against. On chain, 99.85% of the votes cast were in favour, from 1,489 addresses. And 247.9 million ARB is about 2.5% of the 10 billion ARB supply: a rule that governs a rollup securing billions of dollars was changed by a sliver of the token, the very problem the proposal set out to measure honestly.

Councils, multisigs and vetoes: who can act without a vote

Sixty days is too slow for an emergency, so every large DAO keeps a faster lever. Arbitrum’s is a Security Council: twelve elected signers of a multisig wallet. Nine of the twelve can carry out an emergency action with no delay at all, the constitution says. For non-emergency upgrades the same nine-of-twelve applies, but the action then passes through the waiting periods.

That power was used in April 2026, days after an exploit of the restaking protocol KelpDAO that The Block put at $292 million. In a statement dated 21 April, the council said it had acted to freeze 30,765.67 ETH held by the KelpDAO exploiter on Arbitrum One. By its account it temporarily upgraded the rollup’s Inbox contract on Ethereum, moved the ether to an address from which only a further act of Arbitrum governance can release it, then restored the original code. A Snapshot poll held from 30 April to 7 May backed releasing the ether to a recovery effort: 182.2 million ARB for, none against, 18.1 million abstaining, or 90.96% in favour. The next day The Block reported that a court order of 1 May, sought by plaintiffs holding old judgments against North Korea, restricted the DAO from moving the funds.

A twelve-seat council moved first and the token vote came weeks later, before a court stepped in. Anyone judging how decentralised this DAO is has to count the council and the court as well as the vote.

Other DAOs place the brake elsewhere. In Lido, the people whose money is at stake (holders of staked ether) are not those who vote (holders of LDO). Since 4 July 2025, Lido’s dual governance lets stakers lock their stETH in an escrow to oppose a decision: at 1% of the stETH supply, execution is delayed by 5 to 45 days; at 10%, the objectors can withdraw their ether while all governance motions stay blocked. Optimism runs its protocol upgrades the other way round: once an upgrade is ready, its governance documentation gives token holders a seven-day period in which they can veto it, and silence counts as consent.

On-chain treasuries: rich mostly in their own token

A DAO’s treasury is public. Anyone can look up the addresses and add up the balances, which no listed company allows. The totals impress less once you ask what they are made of.

DAO treasury (DefiLlama, 16 November 2026)Assets other than its own tokenIts own tokenShare held in own token
UniswapAbout $0$1,348.2M in UNIAbout 100%
Arbitrum DAO$70.4M$403.5M in ARB85%
ENS$99.9M$240.1M in ENS71%
Sky$0.2M$106.4MAbout 100%
Aave$33.9M$63.6M in AAVE65%
Lido$56.8M$33.6M in LDO37%

This table is an illustration, not a ranking or an audit: DefiLlama’s treasury tracker counts only the wallets it knows about. The last column is the one to read. A treasury held in the DAO’s own token is valued at a market price that would not survive the DAO selling in size. It is a budget only for as long as the token holds its price, and spending it means selling the token to the same market that sets that price.

That is why “the DAO has a billion dollars” and “the DAO can pay its developers for five years” are two different statements. It is also why some DAOs now run something like a finance desk. Arbitrum has a Treasury Management Committee.

Who controls the treasury? In the strict design, only an executed vote can move it. In many smaller DAOs the funds sit in a multisig whose signers carry out what a Snapshot poll decided, which makes the signers, not the voters, the last line of control.

Modern DAOs, from protocol governance to a bid for the Constitution

Protocol DAOs

The largest family governs a piece of financial or network infrastructure: Uniswap, Aave, Sky (the former MakerDAO), Lido, Arbitrum, Optimism, ENS. Their votes set fees, list assets, fund teams and approve upgrades. Most sit beside a foundation or a development company that employs people and signs contracts, and the two do not always agree. The dispute between Aave Labs and Aave’s token holders over swap fees and the company’s funding, closed by a binding vote on 12 April 2026, is told in the governance token lesson.

Collector and investment DAOs

A second family pools money to buy something. The best-known attempt was brief. In November 2021 ConstitutionDAO collected more than $49 million in ether from over 17,000 donors, with a median gift of just over $200, to bid for a first printing of the US Constitution at Sotheby’s. It lost on 18 November 2021 to a bid of $43.2 million, reported to be that of hedge fund manager Ken Griffin. Donors could reclaim their ether, minus gas fees that for small gifts ate much of the refund, CoinDesk wrote the next day.

Nouns works on a longer clock. Each Noun is an NFT sold at auction, the proceeds go to a common treasury, and one Noun is one vote. If that sentence is unclear, the lesson on what an NFT is and what its owner really holds comes first. In September 2023 a majority of holders used a new exit right: 472 of 846 Nouns, almost 56%, joined a fork and left with almost 16,757 ETH, about $27.3 million at the time, according to Decrypt. About 13,310 ETH stayed. Seen from one side, that is an exit right working as designed, since holders who disagreed could leave with their share. From the other, more than half a treasury walked out.

Grants DAOs

A third family exists to give money away, to open-source software or to the ecosystem of a chain. Gitcoin is the usual example, and its purse is small next to the protocol DAOs: on 16 November 2026 DefiLlama showed about $2.0 million plus $1.7 million in its own GTC token. A grants DAO has the reverse problem of an investment DAO. It has to measure whether the money did any good.

What goes wrong: captured votes, absent voters, foundations that act first

CaseDateWhat happenedAmount
The DAOJune 2016A code flaw let an attacker drain a third of the fundAbout 3.6 million ETH
Build FinanceFebruary 2022A holder won a vote that gave him control of the token contract, then minted tokensAbout $470,000
BeanstalkApril 2022Voting power borrowed through flash loans passed a malicious proposalAbout $181 million drained
Arbitrum AIP-1March and April 2023The foundation asked the DAO to ratify an allocation already made; the vote failed750 million ARB at issue
Tornado CashMay 2023A proposal with hidden code handed the attacker the votesAbout 483,000 TORN
Nouns forkSeptember 202356% of members left with their share of the treasuryAbout 16,757 ETH left
Compound proposal 289July 2024A contested treasury transfer passed narrowly, then was cancelled499,000 COMP

Beanstalk, Tornado Cash and Compound are told in full in the lesson on governance tokens and captured votes, and the Beanstalk mechanics in the lesson on flash loans. Two cases are new here.

Build Finance was a small DAO, and that was the weakness. On 9 February 2022 a moderator warned its Discord about a proposal that would let its author mint tokens at will, and the proposal failed. The author moved his tokens to another wallet and submitted it again. Nobody noticed, and it passed on 10 February. He minted 1.1 million BUILD, drained the liquidity pools on Balancer and Uniswap, minted a billion more and sent about 160 ETH to a mixer, The Block reported on 14 February 2022. No code was hacked. The vote did exactly what it was built to do, for the only person watching.

Arbitrum’s first proposal went wrong at the other end of the scale. AIP-1, in March 2023, asked the new DAO to approve its own structure, including 750 million ARB for the Arbitrum Foundation. Delegates then learned the foundation had already started spending: it said it had converted 10 million ARB to cash for operating costs and placed 40 million as a loan with a market maker. More than 77% of the votes counted were against when The Block wrote on 2 April 2023, and the proposal failed. The foundation withdrew the package and came back with AIP-1.1: 700 million ARB locked in a contract and released over four years, a published budget and regular reports. A vote presented as a formality became the DAO’s first act of control.

Behind the incidents sits the ordinary weakness: few people vote. In the June 2026 vote that renewed the Arbitrum Foundation’s funding, the winning side was 206.4 million ARB from 1,185 addresses, and four delegates supplied about 75 million of it, the proposal’s record shows. Addresses are not persons, so the number of human beings involved may be lower still. Whether Compound’s proposal 289 was an attack or a legitimate vote by a large holder has never been ruled on, and low turnout makes both readings possible.

Who is liable when a DAO is sued

This section describes the position as of 16 November 2026. It is general information, not legal advice.

In the United States the first answer came from regulators. The SEC’s 2017 report treated The DAO’s tokens as securities. In June 2023 Judge William Orrick entered a default judgment for the CFTC against Ooki DAO, holding that the DAO was a “person” under the Commodity Exchange Act and could be held liable, with a $643,542 penalty. A default judgment is what a court enters when the defendant does not answer the suit.

Private lawsuits then asked a sharper question: if the DAO is nothing in law, are its members partners who answer for its debts? Two federal judges in California have let that theory go forward. Both rulings came on motions to dismiss, the stage at which a court takes the facts alleged in the complaint as true. Neither decided that a partnership exists.

In Sarcuni v. bZx DAO, decided on 27 March 2023, users who lost money after a phishing attack on a developer led to a $55 million theft sued for negligence. Judge Larry Alan Burns, taking the complaint’s allegations as true, wrote that the plaintiffs had “stated facts sufficient to allege that a general partnership existed among the BZRX tokenholders”. He let the claim proceed against one of the protocol’s co-founders and two investment firms, and dismissed it without prejudice against the other co-founder and two companies.

In Samuels v. Lido DAO, a man who bought LDO on an exchange and lost money claims the token is an unregistered security. In an order of 18 November 2024, Judge Vince Chhabria wrote that Samuels had “adequately alleged” that Lido DAO is a general partnership under California law and that Paradigm, Andreessen Horowitz and Dragonfly are general partners. He granted the motion to dismiss of a fourth investor, Robot Ventures, and denied the others. Who else counts as a partner stays open: discovery, the judge wrote, may show a partnership “narrower (for instance, including only the founders) or broader (for instance, including everyone who has voted on a governance proposal or who holds any LDO)”. In April 2025 he dismissed counterclaims that tried to treat Samuels himself as a partner, for lack of facts showing he took part in running Lido.

A gavel and scales of justice beside a crowd and a signed document
Two California rulings let partnership claims against DAO participants proceed at the pleading stage; neither decided that a partnership exists.

Under California law partners are jointly and severally liable for a partnership’s obligations, which is why DAOs now register legal wrappers. Wyoming has allowed DAOs to organise as limited liability companies since 1 July 2021, and created a non-profit form, the decentralised unincorporated nonprofit association or DUNA, in force since 1 July 2024. Uniswap’s governance adopted one, executed on 12 September 2025. A wrapper gives members limited liability and gives the DAO an entity that can sign a contract, pay tax and be sued in its own name. It does not answer the securities question, which depends on how the token was sold.

The United Kingdom has no DAO statute. The Law Commission of England and Wales published a scoping paper on 11 July 2024 and saw “no current need to develop a DAO-specific legal entity for England and Wales”.

The European Union’s crypto rulebook does not define a DAO either. MiCA, covered in our dedicated guide, regulates issuers and service providers. Recital 22 of the regulation says that crypto-asset services provided “in a fully decentralised manner without any intermediary” should not fall within its scope. The same recital keeps inside it services that are performed, provided or controlled by a person, directly or indirectly, even when part of the activity is decentralised. The regulation does not define “fully decentralised”, so each DAO-run service has to be placed on one side of that line or the other.

Taking part without getting hurt

Reading costs nothing and needs no wallet. Forums, Snapshot polls and on-chain proposals are public, and following one DAO for a month teaches more than any description.

Read the executable part of a proposal, not its title. An on-chain proposal is a list of contract calls: which contract, which function, which amounts, to which address. The Tornado Cash takeover of 2023 passed because the code attached did more than the text announced. If you cannot read the calls, look in the forum thread for an independent review by a delegate or an auditor. Its absence is information.

If you delegate, choose by voting record and published reasons, then check a few times a year that the delegate still votes. Under a quorum counted on delegated tokens, as Arbitrum’s now is, a delegate who has gone silent makes the threshold harder to reach.

Neither kind of vote, the free Snapshot signature or the on-chain transaction, should ever ask for your recovery phrase, a token approval or a transfer. Fake governance pages that announce a vote closing within the hour are a standard way to empty wallets: reach the vote from the DAO’s own documentation, never from a link in a chat, and keep governance tokens in a wallet that holds little else. Our guide to avoiding crypto scams lists the other patterns.

Holding a governance token carries the financial risk of any token, and since Sarcuni and Samuels, taking part in governance with one raises an open legal question in the United States. Nothing here is a reason to buy one.

Five checks before trusting a DAO

  1. Find who can upgrade the contracts today. Look for the multisig or council, its size, its threshold and whether the signers are named. For a rollup, ETHBEAT (formerly L2BEAT) lists this chain by chain.
  2. Measure the delay. A timelock of a few days lets users leave before a change they reject. No timelock means the vote, or the council, acts at once.
  3. Compare the quorum with the tokens that actually vote, and see how many delegates it takes to reach it. Four or five is common.
  4. Open the treasury and split it into the DAO’s own token and everything else. Then find who holds the keys: a governor contract or a handful of signers.
  5. Look for the legal wrapper and the foundation. A DAO with neither leaves the question of who answers for it to a judge.

All five checks use public pages. They answer the question this path has asked since its first lesson: who can still switch it off, and who would have to agree.

The next lesson of this path turns to ENS and decentralised identity: names that replace long addresses, and what a wallet can prove about its owner. ENS is also run by a DAO, with a treasury that appears in the table above.

Sources

  1. SEC, Report of Investigation: The DAO, Release No. 34-81207 (25 July 2017) sec.gov
  2. Vitalik Buterin, "DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide" (6 May 2014) blog.ethereum.org
  3. The Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO docs.arbitrum.foundation
  4. Arbitrum forum: DVP Quorum for ArbitrumDAO, implementation and parameters (29 January 2026) forum.arbitrum.foundation
  5. Tally (now Cactus): [Constitutional] DVP Quorum & Proposal Cancellation, executed 30 March 2026 tally.xyz
  6. Arbitrum forum: Security Council Emergency Action (21 April 2026) forum.arbitrum.foundation
  7. DefiLlama: protocol treasuries (read 16 November 2026) defillama.com
  8. Lido: Dual Governance overview blog.lido.fi
  9. Sarcuni v. bZx DAO, S.D. Cal., order of 27 March 2023 govinfo.gov
  10. The Block: Arbitrum Foundation and AIP-1 (2 April 2023) theblock.co
  11. Samuels v. Lido DAO, N.D. Cal., order re motions to dismiss (18 November 2024) govinfo.gov
  12. Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCA), recital 22 eur-lex.europa.eu
  13. CFTC press release 8715-23: default judgment against Ooki DAO (9 June 2023) cftc.gov
  14. The Block: Arbitrum DAO approves ETH release for Kelp DAO recovery (8 May 2026) theblock.co
  15. The Block: Build Finance DAO suffers hostile governance takeover (14 February 2022) theblock.co
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