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Luxor says attackers used its Commander software to redirect client hashrate; OCEAN has paid 0.162 BTC to the address CoreX flagged

Luxor says attackers used its Commander software to redirect hashrate from a dozen client accounts. OCEAN has paid 0.162 BTC to the address CoreX flagged.

10 min read

Abstract pickaxe and hooded figure beside a broken chain and a falling arrow
Table of contents
  1. What Luxor says happened to Commander
  2. The figures Luxor confirms, and the ones it does not
  3. Two OCEAN payouts, and more may follow
  4. Hansen blames an AI-enabled attack, without technical detail
  5. Why a fleet dashboard is a single point of failure
    1. Hashrate has been stolen before, by other routes
  6. What mining operators can check
  7. What is still unknown

Luxor Technology said on Sunday 15 November that attackers used Commander, its fleet-management software for bitcoin mining machines, to point the hashrate of “just over a dozen client accounts” at another mining pool. The company’s statement, posted on X at 17:25 UTC, says Commander was patched within two hours, that no data left its systems and that every affected client will be paid “as if it had mined normally”.

The Luxor Commander hack was first flagged in public by a hosting company. At 03:08 UTC on Sunday, CoreX Hosting warned on X of “a big miner hack going on as we speak”, with machines being pointed at the OCEAN pool under a single bitcoin address, which it published. Nobody has said who controls that address. It has since received two payouts from OCEAN, 0.16202083 BTC in total, about $10,470 with bitcoin near $64,620 at 05:47 UTC on Monday 16 November. The coins had not moved at 05:49 UTC.

Luxor has not said how many machines were involved, how much hashrate was diverted or for how long. Early reports of about 64,000 machines and 13 exahashes per second (EH/s) remain unconfirmed by the company. OCEAN has not published a statement on the incident.

What Luxor says happened to Commander

Luxor’s account is short. Its internal monitoring raised an alert about “an unauthorized redirect of hashrate through Commander” on what the Sunday statement calls “last night”. The on-call engineers patched the software within two hours, and the team then began putting affected machines back on their original pool settings. The machines were “pointed to a different pool for a limited window”, the statement says, without naming OCEAN.

Commander is “operating normally and no action is needed from users”, the same post says, and a full post-mortem is promised, with no date. In a further statement quoted by Cointelegraph on Monday, the company said the problem “was isolated to the Commander tool” and that Luxor Pool and LuxOS, its firmware for mining machines, were not affected.

Chief executive Nick Hansen gave a start time in his own post at 17:17 UTC on Sunday: “Around 6:00p PDT yesterday”, meaning Saturday 14 November. He wrote PDT, but the US Pacific coast has been on standard time since 1 November, and 6 p.m. there is 02:00 UTC on Sunday 15 November. On that reading, CoreX’s public warning came about an hour after the first machines were redirected.

Hansen said affected clients would receive an email on Sunday with details of the compensation. He also apologised: “I apologize. You trust us with your fleet, and we need to be better.”

The figures Luxor confirms, and the ones it does not

The size of the incident is where the accounts part ways. Luxor counts accounts, not machines. The 64,000 machines and 13 EH/s come from early reports that Cointelegraph relayed on Monday while noting that Luxor had confirmed neither figure. For scale, 13 EH/s would be about 1.4% of the 942 EH/s that mempool.space estimated for the whole Bitcoin network at 05:50 UTC on Monday.

ItemFigureSourceStatus
Client accounts affectedJust over a dozenLuxor, 15 NovemberConfirmed by Luxor
Time to patchWithin two hoursLuxor, 15 NovemberConfirmed by Luxor
Start of the compromiseAbout 6 p.m. Pacific on Saturday 14 November (02:00 UTC on Sunday)Nick Hansen, Luxor CEOStated by Luxor’s CEO
Machines redirectedAbout 64,000Early reports relayed by CointelegraphNot confirmed by Luxor
Hashrate redirectedAbout 13 EH/sEarly reports relayed by CointelegraphNot confirmed by Luxor
Paid to the address CoreX flagged0.16202083 BTC in two payoutsOCEAN statistics page, mempool.spaceVerifiable on chain
Work still credited to the address28.51 trillion shares, 2.64% of OCEAN’s reward windowOCEAN statistics page, 16 November 05:49 UTCPool data

OCEAN’s own statistics page for the address CoreX flagged gives the best public measure so far. At 05:49 UTC on Monday it credited the address with 28.51 trillion shares, or 2.64% of the pool’s reward window.

Those shares can be turned into time. OCEAN’s documentation counts shares in units of difficulty 1, and one such share stands for about 4.29 billion hash attempts on average (2 to the power 32). So 28.51 trillion shares are roughly 1.22 × 1023 hashes, and a fleet of 13 EH/s, which makes 1.3 × 1019 hashes a second, needs about 9,400 seconds to produce them: a little over two and a half hours. The number fits the early reports without proving them. A smaller fleet running for longer would leave the same total, and the page does not give the peak.

The same page dates most of the work. It counted 0.77 trillion accepted shares in the 24 hours to 05:49 UTC on Monday, less than 3% of the total, so nearly all of it arrived before 05:49 UTC on Sunday.

Pool-wide numbers settle little. OCEAN’s dashboard showed 43.59 EH/s on Monday at 05:49 UTC, and mempool.space’s weekly estimates for the pool, which are derived from blocks found and swing with luck, have ranged from about 24 to 55 EH/s since mid-October.

Abstract server rack beside a gear, a warning sign and a target
Luxor confirms just over a dozen accounts; the 64,000 machines and 13 EH/s remain unconfirmed.

Two OCEAN payouts, and more may follow

Early coverage on Sunday said the attackers had earned nothing. That changed within hours. OCEAN found block 975,995 at 17:22 UTC on Sunday, three minutes before Luxor posted its statement, and block 976,029 at 22:54 UTC. The address CoreX flagged was paid 0.08088977 BTC in the first and 0.08113106 BTC in the second, straight from each block’s coinbase transaction. Both outputs are visible on mempool.space and were unspent at 05:49 UTC on Monday.

Whoever redirected the machines did not mine those blocks. OCEAN pays with a system it calls TIDES: each block reward is split among all miners according to their share of a rolling log of recent work, and the pool’s documentation sets that log at eight times the network difficulty. Shares keep earning on every block the pool finds until they slide out of the log, even if the machines behind them have left. Because rewards are generated directly to miners in the block itself, the pool does not hold them first.

That is why the bill is still open. OCEAN’s page estimated 0.66075996 BTC of rewards for the address over the window, about $42,700 at the same bitcoin price, and 0.08096434 BTC on the pool’s next block. Those are the pool’s estimates, not payments. The page also listed eight workers still submitting work for the address at 05:49 UTC on Monday, at about 2 petahashes per second combined, a sliver of the earlier flow. Who runs those eight machines is not known. Luxor’s statement says restoration had “started”, not that it was complete.

Whether OCEAN can or will withhold future rewards from the address is unknown. The pool has not said so publicly, and Luxor’s only reference to third parties is that it is “working with the teams involved”.

Hansen blames an AI-enabled attack, without technical detail

Hansen described the entry point as “a sophisticated AI-enabled vector”. Neither he nor Luxor has explained what that means in practice: which flaw was used, how the attackers reached client accounts, or what part AI tools played. Until the post-mortem is out, the AI attribution rests on the chief executive’s word alone.

In a longer post at 18:04 UTC, he said any substantial business, “especially in crypto, is inundated with AI-enabled attacks”, and that the pace is rising “as models get better and more attackers enter the arena”. Luxor has put most new feature work on hold to harden its infrastructure, he wrote, listing key rotation, kernel updates and pinned dependencies. It has also bought its own GPUs to run what he called “abliterated” models, a term for AI models stripped of their refusal safeguards.

His posts come two weeks after another crypto company disclosed an intrusion of its own, covered in our piece on the Chainalysis breach.

Why a fleet dashboard is a single point of failure

A mining machine does not care who gets paid. It is configured with a pool address and a username, which on OCEAN is simply a bitcoin address, and it sends its work there. Change those two fields and the machine keeps running at full power with normal temperatures and hashrate on every monitoring screen, while the income goes to someone else. Our guide to how bitcoin mining works covers the relationship between miners and pools.

Commander exists to make such changes easy. Luxor’s product page lists “Change pool settings” among the bulk actions an operator can apply to thousands of miners in a single operation, next to rebooting or sleeping machines, and the software works with LuxOS as well as stock Antminer, Whatsminer and Avalon firmware. One console that can repoint thousands of machines saves the operator hours. It does the same for an intruder.

Nothing in this touches Bitcoin itself. No block was altered and no coins were taken from a wallet; what was diverted is the future income of the machines, for as long as they pointed elsewhere. The network’s total hashrate and difficulty are unaffected by which pool a machine reports to.

Abstract pickaxe linked to connected nodes, with a key and an eye
Commander can change the pool settings of a whole fleet in one bulk action.

Hashrate has been stolen before, by other routes

Redirecting miners is an old trick. In August 2014, researchers Pat Litke and Joe Stewart of Dell SecureWorks described a hijacker who used bogus internet routing announcements between February and May of that year to pull miners away from their pools and onto his own. The machines kept receiving work and were not paid for it. The researchers counted 51 compromised networks at 19 internet providers and estimated the take at $83,000.

In April 2020, the mining company Braiins wrote about the same risk on the link between miner and pool, where a third party intercepts work and claims the payout, and presented the encrypted Stratum V2 protocol as the fix. Encryption on that link would not have helped here. In the Luxor case the instruction to switch pools came from the management software the operators themselves had authorised.

What mining operators can check

According to Luxor, users need to do nothing. Operators who want to verify for themselves have a few things they can look at without waiting for the post-mortem.

  • The pool URL and username on each machine, compared with their own records, and whether the address CoreX published, bc1qphukp9rjfc4rcej7erpm9ae20xmtspw8pcddrr, appears anywhere in the configuration.
  • Pool-side earnings for the night of 14 to 15 November against what the fleet normally produces, since a redirected machine looks healthy on site.
  • The email Luxor said it sent to affected clients on 15 November, which should state the compensation.
  • Which accounts, API keys and third-party tools are allowed to change pool settings across the fleet, and whether such a change triggers an alert.

What is still unknown

The post-mortem should answer the main questions: how the attackers got into Commander, how many machines and how much hashrate were redirected, for how long, and what the compensation amounts to. Luxor has given no date for it.

On the pool side, the open points are whether OCEAN acts on the address and how much more its reward system assigns to it before the redirected shares age out of the log. The incident also comes in a tight month for miners, two days after the 9.13% difficulty cut of 14 November. OCEAN’s next block will show whether the address is paid a third time.

Sources

  1. X post by @luxor, 15 November 2026 x.com
  2. X post by @hash_bender (Nick Hansen, Luxor CEO), 15 November 2026 x.com
  3. X post by @CoreX_Hosting, 15 November 2026 x.com
  4. OCEAN: statistics page of the address flagged by CoreX ocean.xyz
  5. mempool.space: transactions of the address flagged by CoreX mempool.space
  6. OCEAN documentation: TIDES reward system ocean.xyz

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