Wallets linked to hackers, phishing operations and sanctioned entities pushed $518 million through the blockchain, where users swap tokens directly from their own wallets without handing custody of their funds to a company.">swap module of Sky, the protocol once known as MakerDAO, according to an investigation by the risk analytics firm Inca Digital that CoinDesk reported on Thursday 19 November. In CoinDesk’s account, Inca links $101.9 million of that directly to North Korean actors, most of it money from the February 2025 theft at the exchange Bybit. The report itself has not been published. Sky itself was not hacked: the report does not describe any theft from the module or from holders of its stablecoins.
Sky’s side, in the reply the Sky Frontier Foundation gave CoinDesk, is that the flagged transactions are less than 0.06% of everything the module has ever processed, that most of them by value date from 2021 to mid-2024, and that none went through Sky’s own websites.
The report raises a second point, and this one is about design. The dollars behind the module sit at a single Ethereum address, in USDC, a token whose issuer Circle can block address by address. No freeze has been announced or ordered. On the Ethereum blockchain, that address held 2.51 billion USDC at 11:44 UTC on 19 November and was not on the token’s blacklist.
What Inca Digital says it traced through Sky’s PSM
Every figure in this section is Inca’s, as reported by CoinDesk, the only outlet that has seen the document. The firm shared its report with CoinDesk and has not published it: neither the reports page of its website nor its newsletter, whose latest issue is dated 30 October, carried it on 19 November. The wallet list and the method cannot be read by outsiders for now, and Inca’s totals have no second public source.
In CoinDesk’s account, Inca counted $518 million of transactions in Sky’s Peg Stability Module (PSM) across 422 wallets that it associates with hackers, phishing operations, sanctioned entities and addresses already blacklisted by Circle and Tether. The figure measures what those wallets swapped. CoinDesk’s account does not give the period the total covers.
The part Inca ties directly to North Korean actors comes to $101.9 million, CoinDesk reports. Wallets funded with proceeds of the Bybit theft, about $1.5 billion stolen in February 2025, sent $91.5 million through the module in the ten days that followed, according to Inca’s findings as CoinDesk gives them. Close to $30 million of it moved after 26 February 2025, the day the FBI attributed the theft to North Korea.
CoinDesk names two other cases from the report. The wallet known as the FTX Accounts Drainer swapped $26.1 million in November 2022, Inca says. Whoever drained the payments firm Infini in February 2025 turned $49.5 million of USDC into DAI on the day of the exploit. That last swap is the one item on Inca’s list with a public trace of its own: the outlet TechFlow wrote on 21 March 2025 that the attacker’s address had converted about 49.52 million USDC into DAI through Sky on 24 February, then into ether. The same article reported that Infini had sued a contract engineer over the loss and that he remained a suspect until judgment.
| Inca Digital’s claim, as reported by CoinDesk | Amount | When |
|---|---|---|
| PSM transactions by wallets tied to illicit activity, 422 wallets | $518 million | Period not given |
| Share Inca links directly to North Korean actors | $101.9 million | Not given |
| Wallets funded by the Bybit theft | $91.5 million | Ten days after the February 2025 theft |
| Of which after the FBI’s attribution | Nearly $30 million | After 26 February 2025 |
| Infini exploiter, USDC to DAI | $49.5 million | February 2025 |
| FTX Accounts Drainer | $26.1 million | November 2022 |
About 95% of the flagged transactions reached the module through decentralized trading aggregators, Inca found according to CoinDesk, among them 1inch, ParaSwap and MetaMask Swaps, which route a swap to whichever venue gives the best rate. Inca’s phrase for what the module offers such wallets, as CoinDesk quotes it, is an “exit from freezable USDC”.
CoinDesk also asked a second firm to look. Nominis, which does crypto compliance and investigations, examined more than 560 transactions across more than 320 addresses tied to the Bybit theft and confirmed the links to North Korean actors, the outlet reports. That review covers the Bybit flows only, not the full $518 million, and Nominis has not published it either.
Sky’s reply: under 0.06% of volume, and none through sky.money
The foundation told CoinDesk that it “takes any concern about illicit activity in DeFi seriously” and that it had reviewed the transactions Inca flagged.
Most of the flagged value dates from 2021 to mid-2024, the foundation says. None of the transactions passed through Sky’s own sites, including sky.money and spark.fi, which screen wallets and block access from sanctioned jurisdictions. On scale, the flagged transactions come to less than 0.06% of the more than $930 billion the PSMs have processed, and less than 0.03% of the volume of the current version, the LitePSM. As arithmetic, $518 million against $930 billion is about 0.056%.
The foundation also describes Sky Protocol, DAI and the PSM included, as open, decentralized infrastructure that third parties can integrate outside Sky’s governance framework. “Keeping DeFi both open and safe is a challenge for the whole industry,” it added.
As CoinDesk presents them, the two accounts differ less on the transactions than on their weight. Inca’s own figure has 95% of the flagged swaps arriving through aggregators, which fits the foundation’s point about its websites, and the foundation’s reply does not deny that the wallets used the contracts. One thing the reply leaves aside: the Bybit and Infini swaps Inca describes, $141 million together, date from February 2025, after the mid-2024 window in which the foundation places most of the value.

How the swap module works, and why DAI and USDS lean on USDC
DAI and its successor USDS are stablecoins that Sky’s contracts create against collateral, a model our guide on how collateral-backed stablecoins such as DAI and USDS work describes in detail. A token of that kind needs a way to stay at one dollar when demand shifts. The PSM is that tool: a user can hand it one USDC and receive one DAI, or do the reverse, at a fixed rate. When DAI trades above a dollar, traders bring USDC and mint DAI. Below a dollar, they bring DAI and take USDC out.
The price of that stability is dependence. Each DAI or USDS issued through the module is backed by a USDC that Sky does not issue and does not control. The module is the most direct door between the Sky protocol‘s stablecoins and dollars.
The current version is the LitePSM. Spark’s integration documentation gives its address and explains that the USDC is not kept in the swap contract: it sits in a separate “pocket” address, while the contract holds a stock of DAI minted in advance. On the blockchain, at 11:44 UTC on 19 November, both swap fees were set to zero, the contract held about 808 million DAI ready to hand out, and the pocket had granted it a near-unlimited allowance to move its USDC. That allowance is how a contract pays out coins it does not hold.
The older PSM is being wound up. A technical post on Sky’s governance forum dated 16 November by the developer team Sidestream says it was fully migrated to the LitePSM in a governance action of 4 October 2024 and proposes to finish removing it in a governance action scheduled for 19 November. One of its contracts still held 99.33 USDC when the team checked on 11 November.
The wallet screening the foundation describes takes place on its websites. The contract can also be reached without them, directly or through an aggregator, which is the route Inca says 95% of the flagged swaps took. That openness is what Inca criticises and what the foundation defends.
One address, $2.51 billion of USDC, and what a blacklist would do
The pocket is a single Ethereum address ending in 7341. At block 26,448,910, timestamped 11:44 UTC on 19 November, it held 2,514,242,744 USDC. Etherscan, which labels the address “Sky: PSM”, showed 2,506,401,410 USDC a few minutes later, at about 11:52 UTC. CoinDesk puts the figure at about $2.7 billion and does not date it; the balance moves with every swap. Against the market values CoinDesk gives for USDS ($4.6 billion) and DAI ($3.8 billion), the pocket’s 2.51 billion equals roughly 30% of the two tokens combined ($8.4 billion). USDC’s supply on Ethereum stood at about 44.4 billion at the same block, so this one address holds between 5% and 6% of it.
The address has no contract code. It is an ordinary account, set up through Coinbase Prime according to CoinDesk. Sky says the wallet’s independent keys were destroyed after setup, CoinDesk reports, which leaves the PSM as the only thing able to move the funds. Coinbase pays rewards on the balance. A Coinbase spokesperson told CoinDesk that customers control their self-custodial wallets and that the exchange cannot move their assets.
USDC has a blacklist built into its contract. Circle’s published design document for the token says a single role, the blacklister, can add any address to the list, and that a listed address can neither send nor receive USDC. The role can also remove an address. The list works on whole addresses: the document describes no way to block part of a balance.
Applied to the pocket, the mechanics are short. A swap out of the LitePSM moves USDC from the pocket to the user. A swap in moves USDC from the user to the pocket. Both are transfers that the USDC contract would reject if the pocket were listed, so the module would stop working in both directions and the 2.51 billion USDC would stay where it is until the address was taken off the list. Legitimate reserves and any tainted deposit are the same coins in the same account. This is a description of how the two contracts interact, not of anything that has happened.
What a listing would do to the price of DAI or USDS, no source cited here says: CoinDesk’s article gives no estimate, and neither does Sky.

What Circle has done, and what it has not
Circle has not blacklisted the pocket: the USDC contract’s blacklist check returned “false” for that address at 11:44 UTC and again at 11:52 UTC on 19 November. CoinDesk’s article mentions no court order or request aimed at Sky’s reserves and carries no comment from Circle.
Circle does use the function elsewhere. After the $6.3 billion theft at Binance in October, Binance said about $2.8 billion had been frozen or intercepted, more than $2.3 billion of it in USDT and USDC blocked by Tether and Circle, CoinDesk recalls. The court side of that case is in our piece on the Abu Dhabi freezing order Binance obtained this week. And in May, a temporary court-ordered freeze, made at the request of a California judge, locked $12 million of USDC held in a contract of the Zama project. CoinDesk cites it as a precedent for a freeze that reaches a contract and not just a wallet.
Amey Dandawate, ratings director for stablecoins at Bluechip Ratings, told CoinDesk about the scenario for Sky: “I think this is a low probability outcome, but it is not entirely hypothetical.”
The exposure is not new to the protocol. In 2022, after the United States sanctioned Tornado Cash and Circle froze the USDC at the listed addresses, Maker’s founder Rune Christensen talked of preparing emergency measures in case Circle froze the PSM and of cutting DAI’s reliance on USDC, CoinDesk recalls.
Can Sky be made to screen who uses the module?
That depends on whether someone controls it. According to governance records Inca reviewed, as CoinDesk reports them, Sky governance can modify, migrate or halt the PSM by vote, and an exception approved in 2024 lets it halt the facility without the usual delay. Spark’s documentation points the same way: the two fees are parameters set by governance, and governance or an emergency contract can stop swaps in one direction by pushing a fee to its maximum value. The pocket’s address, by contrast, is fixed in the deployed contract, so moving the USDC elsewhere would mean migrating to a new module.
Control is the test that sanctions lawyers quoted by CoinDesk keep returning to. A US appeals court ruled in 2024 that Tornado Cash’s immutable contracts were not property that could be blocked. The Financial Action Task Force said in a July report that DeFi arrangements fall within its standards where a person has “control or sufficient influence”. Ari B. Good, a partner at the law firm Cogent, told the outlet that the word decentralized settles nothing under sanctions law when identifiable people keep admin keys, collect fees and push upgrades. Sanjeev Bhasker, a partner at K&L Gates, said obligations depend on what a protocol does and who controls it, governance included. The background is in our guide to DeFi regulation, Tornado Cash and developer liability.
CoinDesk’s article carries no reaction from a regulator, American or European. A holder of DAI, USDS or the savings version sUSDS in Europe is exposed to the module’s reserves in the same way as a holder anywhere else.
Who is exposed, and what to watch
CoinDesk lists institutions with ties to Sky’s stablecoins. Galaxy holds $100 million of sUSDS and has a $500 million credit facility, funded in USDS, from Grove, which CoinDesk describes as a Sky agent; neither answered the outlet’s requests for comment. Funds tied to Securitize, credit strategies such as Maple’s and Janus Henderson funds offered through Centrifuge are connected to Sky deployments, and the US-listed Stablecoin Development Corp held about 10% of the SKY supply, with its voting rights, at the end of June.
The report lands eleven days after USDS supply fell by $893 million in a single day with no redeemer named.
TokenBrice, the pseudonymous founder of the stablecoin risk platform Pharos, told CoinDesk he would expect “stronger transaction screening, identified counterparties at institutional gateways” and procedures for sanctioned funds and lawful freeze requests. The foundation’s reply, as CoinDesk gives it, announces none of these. Four things remain open: whether Inca publishes its wallet list, whether Circle says anything about the pocket, whether a proposal on screening or on spreading the USDC across more than one address reaches Sky’s governance forum, and how the pocket’s balance moves in the coming days.
