Cisco Talos, the threat research arm of Cisco, published on Wednesday 18 November 2026 a report on a Windows malware kit whose remote access trojan, Overlord RAT, finds its command server by reading encrypted notes left in Solana transaction memos. Talos tracks the operator as UAT-12643 and describes it as financially motivated. It suspects a group aligned with North Korea, but only with low confidence, in its own words. The kit goes after cryptocurrency holders, gamers and users of internet telephony software, with a stealer that collects data from 21 wallet applications and a tool that swaps wallet addresses in the clipboard. The report gives no victim count and no loss figure.
The crypto press picked the story up on Friday 20 November, two days after publication. The Italian-language outlet Cryptonomist, for one, headlined on a North Korean malware “on Solana” that Talos suspects. The report itself is more careful on both points. Nothing on Solana is exploited: the memo is a public note that the malware reads the way any block explorer would. The theft takes place on an infected Windows computer.
What the Solana memo does: an address book for the malware
Solana’s Memo Program lets any wallet attach a short piece of free text to a transaction. Talos puts the limit at 566 bytes. Once the transaction is confirmed, the text sits in the ledger for good. UAT-12643 uses that field to publish the address of its command server, in encrypted form, from a wallet it controls.
On the infected machine, the trojan asks a Solana RPC endpoint, the kind of public access point that wallets and apps use to query a blockchain node, for the transaction history of that wallet, newest first. It then fetches each transaction in decoded form and walks through its instructions, looking for one whose data string is exactly 43 characters long. According to Talos, that is the fixed length produced when a WebSocket address is encrypted with AES-256 and encoded in Base58. Everything else is skipped, ordinary memos from other users included. The matching string is decrypted and the trojan connects to the server it names.
The point of the detour is resilience. When a server is blocked or seized, the operator posts one new transaction with a new memo, and every infected machine picks up the change on its next lookup. No file has to be sent again to the victims. The cost is close to nothing: Talos’s companion article puts the average Solana fee at about $0.000025 per transaction.
Three limits follow from the report’s own description. The lookup is a read-only query, so no Solana program is attacked and no wallet other than the operator’s is involved; using the chain puts nobody at risk. Solana carries neither the commands nor the stolen data: the trojan talks to its server over a WebSocket connection, and the stealer uploads its loot to the file-sharing service GoFile, then sends the download link to a Discord webhook. And the memo is useless to a machine that is not already infected.
Talos does not publish the operator’s wallet address or name the RPC endpoint the trojan queries. The indicator file the team posted on GitHub lists eleven file hashes and one IP address. It contains no Solana address.

Why nobody can take the memo down
Talos published a second article the same day, by the same researcher, Chetan Raghuprasad, on what it calls dead drops on public blockchains. A classic command server has a weak point: once its domain or IP address is identified, a hosting company can cut it off, a registrar can suspend the name, a court can order a seizure. A blockchain entry has no such owner. Once validators confirm a transaction, Talos writes, it becomes “a permanent, globally replicated record” that no company or police force has the authority to delete.
Solana is the latest ledger on a list that the article traces back several years. In September 2019, Trend Micro researchers found a variant of the Glupteba botnet that read its server addresses from Bitcoin transactions. EtherHiding, which stores the address in a smart contract on BNB Smart Chain and reads it without leaving any transaction behind, surfaced in October 2023. TRON wallets were reported in the same role in September 2026.
Malware reading Solana memos has been described before. In a write-up dated 18 October 2025, Koi Security described GlassWorm, a worm hidden in extensions of the Open VSX marketplace for code editors, which searched Solana for transactions from a hardcoded wallet and read their memo field to find its next payload. That worm targeted 49 crypto wallet extensions and the infected extensions had been downloaded about 35,800 times, by Koi’s count.
Neither Talos article names an action that Solana’s validators, the Solana Foundation or RPC companies could take against the memos. Infura, QuickNode and Tatum appear only as destinations whose traffic defenders should watch. Talos does expect commercial RPC gateways to tighten their abuse detection, and expects attackers to answer by routing their lookups through decentralised RPC aggregators or private relayers.
What the kit takes from a crypto holder’s computer
Talos found three payloads on the operator’s server. Only one of them, Overlord, uses Solana.
| Tool | What it is | What it does, according to Talos |
|---|---|---|
| Overlord RAT | Modular Windows trojan written in Go, 35 commands | Records keystrokes, streams the webcam, captures microphone and screen, reads and writes files, runs commands, tunnels into the local network; finds its server through Solana memos |
| Good Game stealer, version 1.1.2 | Public Python infostealer by a developer named CirqueiraDev, reused by the operator | Harvests 23 browser variants, Discord tokens, Roblox cookies, session data of 21 crypto wallets and 4 game launchers, Telegram session files, files matching 45 extensions and a keyword list |
| Clipboard hijacker | Small C++ program with no network component | Checks the clipboard every 500 milliseconds and replaces a copied wallet address with one of the attacker’s |
The stealer is the part aimed most directly at wallets. Among the 21 wallet applications whose session data it collects, Talos names Exodus, Electrum, Ledger Live, Trezor Suite, Atomic Wallet, Trust Wallet, Coinbase and Binance. The report does not say what that session data allows an attacker to do with each of them.
It also sweeps the Desktop, Downloads, Documents, Pictures and Videos folders, the OneDrive root and the list of recently opened files. A file is taken when its type is one of 45 extensions and its name matches a keyword, in English, French, Spanish or Portuguese. Talos says the keywords cover two-factor backup codes, mnemonic seed phrases, wallet application names, password files, banking terms and private key labels. A text file or a screenshot holding a recovery phrase and named after it is exactly what the filter is built to find. The stealer adds a screenshot and a single webcam frame, packs everything into a ZIP archive whose name starts with “SK_”, and uploads it.
The clipboard hijacker needs no server at all. The attacker’s addresses are stored inside the program, XOR-encrypted. Twice a second it looks at what the user has copied, recognises the format of a crypto address and overwrites it, so that the address pasted into a wallet or an exchange withdrawal form is no longer the one that was copied. Talos calls it a multi-cryptocurrency tool without listing the coins. The trick is the desktop cousin of the address swapping done through hijacked Optimizely scripts on websites earlier this month.
Overlord is built to stay. Besides a registry entry that restarts it at each logon, it copies itself into the folder that the Windows Recovery Environment reads during a “Reset this PC” operation, so that the trojan is launched again before the system is restored. When it runs with administrator rights, it also flags its own process as critical to Windows: a user or a security tool that kills it triggers a blue screen with the stop code CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED.

Fake PDF shortcuts, a Viber lure and what Talos did not see
The first stage comes in three forms. Windows shortcut files, two of which Talos describes as posing as PDF documents, quietly call signed Microsoft utilities (the Defender command-line tool or certutil) to download the payload; the indicator list names payment-invoice.pdf.lnk, document.lnk and Viber.lnk. An HTA file does the same through mshta.exe. A project file for MSBuild compiles a downloader in memory, with a user agent that imitates Windows background updates.
How those files reach a victim is unknown. “In this campaign, we have not observed how the actor delivers these malicious initial vector files to victims’ machines,” the report says. The lures give the only clues on targets: a decoy financial statement that suggests finance and accounting staff, a trojanised Viber installer, and payloads named after the MicroSIP softphone, used in call centres. From the four languages of the keyword list, Talos infers that the operator is “potentially targeting victims in Europe”. It names no country and no confirmed victim.
Part of what Talos knows comes from a mistake. The operator’s staging server, at 41[.]216[.]188[.]11, left its root folder open to the internet, which exposed the tools, the script used to build the fake shortcuts and the ports assigned to each service. The companion article dates the discovery of the activity to September 2026, about two months before publication.
How much the North Korea label weighs
The sentence that carries the attribution reads: “Talos assesses with low confidence that UAT-12643 is a North Korea-aligned advanced persistent threat (APT) actor”. The basis is an overlap in methods with known North Korean groups, and the report gives two examples. A cluster called UNK_DeadDrop, which Talos describes as “likely a North Korean threat actor”, used Overlord in campaigns reported in June 2026. And the Solana memo technique was, by Talos’s account, first reported in March 2026 in the hands of the Lazarus group, in a Node.js version.
The same section then weakens both links. Talos writes that Overlord and the Solana hosting technique are also used by other threat actors, citing outside research from October 2026. The stealer is a public tool written by someone else. The report cites no government attribution, no indictment and no on-chain trace of stolen funds. Koi Security’s GlassWorm write-up, with its Solana memo lookup, is dated 18 October 2025, five months before the March 2026 report that Talos cites.
North Korean operators are documented users of blockchain dead drops on other chains. Google’s Threat Intelligence Group reported on 16 October 2025 that the North Korean cluster UNC5342 had been using EtherHiding since February 2025, on BNB Smart Chain and Ethereum, the first time Google had seen a state actor adopt the method. That campaign approached developers with fake job interviews. Talos describes no job-interview lure for UAT-12643. For attributions made by a government, see the FBI’s account of the FaceStealer fake video calls.
What Talos tells defenders to do
The recommendations sit in the companion article and are written for company security teams. Domain blocklists and takedowns do not work against a record copied across many nodes, Talos argues, so the effort has to move to the infected machine and its traffic. It lists four measures:
- Monitor or block outbound traffic to public node providers such as Infura, QuickNode and Tatum, and to native chain endpoints, where the business does not need them.
- Establish what normal developer or business activity looks like, then flag automated, high-frequency calls to methods such as eth_call, getTransaction and getSignaturesForAddress.
- Inspect JSON-RPC traffic for unusual base-encoded data and unexpected payload lengths.
- Give priority, in endpoint monitoring, to small in-memory decryption routines, before they can unpack an address and connect to it.
For this campaign, Talos also published 13 ClamAV signatures covering the trojan, the stealer, the clipboard hijacker and the downloaders, along with Snort rules. Neither article contains guidance written for individual wallet holders.
Several facts are still missing: the number of infected machines, the way the shortcuts are delivered, the operator’s Solana wallet and any amount stolen. Talos expects the next step from attackers to be lookups chained across several blockchains, so that blocking one network is not enough.
