THORChain (RUNE): native cross-chain swaps, bonded nodes and a record of hacks

Update, 1 November 2026, 19:35 UTC: THORChain swaps are still paused on 10 of its 13 connected chains, Bitcoin and Ethereum among them, according to the network’s own node data. Only Avalanche, Base and the XRP Ledger are open. Swaps stopped on 31 October after an Ethereum reorganisation reportedly led the protocol to refund one 10 ETH deposit twice, according to Crypto Briefing and to The Block, which cites Chainalysis. We found no THORChain statement confirming it. No restart date has been published. The stop also closed a route that on-chain analysts say was carrying money stolen from Binance, a theft the FBI blames on North Korea, and the FBI has asked THORNode operators to block addresses tied to it. Figures on this page now date from 1 November; v3.21, the Zcash reopening and the governance votes are corrected below.

THORChain is a decentralized exchange with its own blockchain that swaps native coins between separate networks: real bitcoin for real ether, or dogecoin for USDC on Ethereum, with no wrapped token, no bridge and no account to open. Its token, RUNE, sits on one side of every pool, so each THORChain swap is two trades through RUNE that the user sees as one transaction.

That design makes THORChain one of the few working routes out of Bitcoin that need no custodian. It has also drawn attackers and thieves. The protocol lost funds to exploits in July 2021 and again in May 2026, turned about $206 million of lending and savings debt into a fee-share token in 2025, and has been used to swap money stolen from Bybit, Kelp DAO and Bitget. On 1 November 2026 it was running in a restricted state, with trading halted on 10 of 13 chains, new liquidity deposits paused on 15 of 36 pools and node rotation switched off. DefiLlama put its total value locked at $61.8 million that day, about 89% below the April 2022 record.

What is THORChain: a DEX that runs its own Layer 1

THORChain’s documentation calls it “a decentralized exchange (DEX) enabling native cross-chain swaps without wrapped assets or bridges”. The chain is built with the Cosmos SDK and the CometBFT consensus engine. There is no order book: as in any automated market maker, the price comes from the ratio of the two assets in a pool.

What sets it apart from a typical decentralized exchange (DEX) such as Uniswap is where the coins sit. Uniswap trades tokens that already live on one chain. THORChain holds real BTC on the Bitcoin network, real ETH on Ethereum and real XRP on the XRP Ledger, in vaults its node operators control together. The user sends coins from an ordinary wallet and receives the other coin in another ordinary wallet. Nothing is minted on the way, which is the difference with cross-chain bridges, where a coin is locked on one side and a wrapped copy is issued on the other.

The network’s API listed 13 connected chains when we read it on the evening of 1 November 2026: Bitcoin, Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain, Base, Avalanche, Bitcoin Cash, Litecoin, Dogecoin, the XRP Ledger, Tron, the Cosmos Hub, Solana and Zcash. Only Avalanche, Base and the XRP Ledger were open for trading.

Nobody signs up or proves who they are. The protocol holds a user’s coins only between the inbound deposit and the outbound payment.

Smart contracts arrived with version 3.3 in 2025, which brought CosmWasm to mainnet. The application layer built on it, Rujira, grew out of a merger with the Kujira team that opened in April 2025, and has its own token, RUJI. Under the docs, revenue from that layer is shared 50/50 between THORChain and Rujira.

How THORChain works: RUNE pools, bonded nodes and shared keys

A bitcoin to ether swap, step by step

Every pool pairs one asset with RUNE: BTC/RUNE, ETH/RUNE, USDC/RUNE and so on. A swap from BTC to ETH crosses two of them.

1. The user sends BTC to the vault address the network publishes for Bitcoin, with a memo naming the target coin and the destination address.
2. Nodes watching the Bitcoin chain see the deposit and record it in a THORChain block.
3. The BTC goes into the BTC/RUNE pool and RUNE comes out; that RUNE goes straight into the ETH/RUNE pool and ETH comes out.
4. The nodes jointly sign an Ethereum transaction and send the ETH, minus fees, to the user’s address.

Bifrost is the software in each node that watches outside chains and broadcasts outgoing payments. Large orders can use streaming swaps, which cut the trade into smaller pieces executed over time to reduce price impact.

THORChain swap fees and liquidity pools

Anyone can add coins to a liquidity pool and earn a share of its fees. The fee a swapper pays to the pool depends on the size of the trade against the pool’s depth. A bigger order relative to the pool pays a higher rate, so slippage and fee rise together, with a floor set by a network parameter.

Other costs come on top. The user pays the source chain’s gas when sending. An outbound fee covers gas on the destination chain, multiplied by a factor the docs put between about 1x and 3x. A front end may add an affiliate fee of 0 to 10,000 basis points. A plain RUNE transfer on THORChain costs 0.02 RUNE.

Liquidity providers used to have impermanent loss protection, a promise to cover part of the loss when a pool’s price ratio moves. ADR-005 removed it for all providers, who now carry that risk in full.

THORNodes, Asgard vaults and churning

The coins in the vaults are guarded by node operators who bond RUNE. The docs put the minimum bond at “currently over 300,000 RUNE”. On 1 November 2026 the THORNode API showed 111 active nodes and 65 on standby; the smallest active bond was 301,354 RUNE and the median about 971,000.

No node holds a whole private key. The main vaults, called Asgard vaults, use a threshold signature scheme (TSS), GG20 in THORChain’s case. Each member keeps a fragment of the key, and a supermajority, about two thirds, must sign before coins leave. The node set is split across several such vaults, by default about 20 nodes each, according to the docs.

Churning rotates the set. Every three days, in the docs’ description, the oldest, slowest and lowest-bonded nodes are pushed out and funds move to freshly generated vaults. Churning was switched off by a network setting on 19 October and was still off on 1 November.

Automatic halts and the solvency checker

Several layers are meant to catch a theft before it spreads. Outbound payments are throttled, and large ones are spread over up to 720 blocks, a little over an hour, which gives operators time to react. A solvency checker compares what each vault should hold with what it holds; once at least a third of active nodes report a vault as insolvent, that chain halts on its own.

Any single node can pause the network for 720 blocks, and another node can add 720 more while the pause runs. The emergency procedures put 720 blocks at about 1.5 hours; at the pace we measured on 1 November, about 6.3 seconds a block, it is closer to 75 minutes. Halts can also be narrow: signing, liquidity actions, trading or a whole chain. The docs add that nodes behind an unauthorised transaction are slashed by more than the amount taken. The May 2026 attack, below, tested what that rule is worth when the thief is one of the signers.

RUNE tokenomics: a 360 million cap, fee income and the 2:1 bond target

RUNE settles every swap, forms one side of every pool, makes up the bond that secures the vaults and pays the rewards. All of it was created at genesis and split as below, according to the economic model in the docs, which state that “all vesting has been completed”.

Genesis allocation	Share of supply
Seed sale	5%
Initial DEX offering	16%
Early developers (working since 2018)	10%
Users who took part in bootstrapping the network	24%
Protocol reserve (rewards for nodes and liquidity providers)	44%

The cap has since shrunk. ADR-023, the “RUNE Supply Restructure”, proposed burning about 64.9 million RUNE from the protocol reserve and cutting the maximum supply from 500 million to 360 million. THORChain’s Q2 2026 quarterly report says the burn was carried out with version 3.17 in April 2026 and removed roughly 65 million RUNE. On 1 November 2026 the network parameter for maximum supply stood at about 359.78 million RUNE, and the chain’s bank module counted about 353.9 million RUNE in existence. How much is left in the reserve is unclear: the ADR’s projection and the figure the network API reports do not match, so we give neither. The share of network income that is burned was cut from 5% to 1% in mid-September 2026.

Hardly any new RUNE is issued. Proposal 6, approved in February 2025, cut block emissions from about 25,000 RUNE a day to 2 RUNE a day, and the docs now describe block rewards “on the order of hundreds of RUNE per year”. Nodes and liquidity providers are paid from swap fees. The docs page on RUNE and TCY tokenomics splits network income like this.

Destination of network income	Share
Nodes and liquidity providers	59%
Protocol-owned liquidity	20%
TCY holders	10%
Developer fund	5%
Marketing	5%
Burned	1%

The 59% is divided by a mechanism called the incentive pendulum, which shifts rewards toward whichever side is short. Its target is a 2:1 ratio: bonded RUNE worth about twice the non-RUNE assets in the pools, so that stealing the pooled coins would cost the nodes more than they could take. Our own sum of active bonds on 1 November came to about 100.5 million RUNE, against pools holding about 48.4 million RUNE on their RUNE side, which puts bond and total pooled value close to 1:1. That is our arithmetic from the API, not a figure THORChain publishes.

THORFi collapse: $206 million of debt turned into the TCY token

THORFi was THORChain’s savings and lending arm. Savers deposited a single asset such as BTC and earned a yield; Lending let users borrow against BTC or ETH.

On 9 January 2025 an admin key paused both products at 08:27 UTC. Node operators overturned the pause at 15:07 UTC the same day, and development of THORNode 3.2.0, which removed all admin keys, was sped up, according to the team’s THORFi Unwind post. Fifteen days later the nodes themselves stopped both products, Lending at 01:51 UTC and Savers at 01:52 UTC on 24 January 2025, and every claim was frozen in dollar terms.

The liabilities came to about $200 million at the pause, or about $206 million counting synthetic assets not attached to Savers deposits. Savers were owed $96.22 million: $55.66 million in BTC, $16.11 million in ETH, $9.94 million in stablecoins and $14.49 million in other assets. Lending accounted for $105.66 million, of which $84.96 million in BTC and $20.7 million in ETH.

Eight proposals went to a node vote. Proposal 6 passed at 08:45 UTC on 3 February 2025 with 67% of node operators. It created TCY, one token per dollar owed, with 10% of network revenue paid to holders every day in RUNE. It also retired Lending, Savers, protocol-owned liquidity and RUNEPool, and set the emission cut.

TCY has a total supply of 210 million, according to the TCY launch post of 5 May 2025, which sets no claim deadline. The docs say it gives no voting rights. People who had deposited bitcoin did not get bitcoin back. They got a claim on future fees, worth whatever the network earns.

THORChain hacks: the 2021 router exploits and the May 2026 vault drain

July 2021: two exploits and a premature restart

Attackers hit THORChain’s Ethereum router twice in July 2021. In the first exploit, which DefiLlama dates to 15 July, a contract placed in front of the router faked ETH deposits, because Bifrost read the transaction’s value instead of the deposit event. The attacker took about 4,200 ETH, some $8 million by the team’s count. Trading was then restarted too early after an upgrade: the system believed it held 13,000 ETH when it held 700, and arbitrageurs drained more.

The second exploit, reported by CoinDesk on 23 July 2021, used a fake router and took about $8 million more, including 1,672,794 USDC and 990,137 USDT.

THORChain’s post-mortem of 30 July 2021 put the insolvency at about $16 million and planned to close it in thirds: $5.3 million from treasury assets, $5.3 million borrowed from Iron Bank against RUNE and $5.3 million recovered through arbitrage. “The THORChain treasury will cover all losses to LPs. Nodes are not affected,” the team wrote, while admitting the Ethereum Bifrost code had been unaudited. Trail of Bits dated its report 23 August 2021, and Halborn finished two reviews in September, of the state machine, router and Bifrost and of the TSS library. DefiLlama marks the protocol as resumed on 16 September 2021.

15 May 2026: a GG20 flaw opens one Asgard vault

The second large loss went through the signing layer itself. The Q2 2026 report describes “a cryptographic zero-day in THORChain’s GG20 threshold signing protocol” that led to unauthorised outbound transactions from one of its five Asgard vaults. Losses were first estimated at $7.4 million, then revised to about $10.7 million. Chains secured by EdDSA signatures, Solana among them, were never exposed, and the solvency checker halted the affected chains within the hour.

In THORChain’s post-mortem, as reported by Cointelegraph on 22 May 2026, a malicious node operator used the flaw to rebuild a vault’s full private key through what the team called “progressive key material leakage”. Rekt reported that the node had churned into the active set on 13 May, two days before the attack, with about 635,000 RUNE bonded, and that THORChain ran its own fork of the tss-lib library. DefiLlama lists four chains in the loss: Bitcoin, Ethereum, Base and BNB Chain. TRM Labs, quoted by Rekt, counted at least nine and put the total above $11 million.

The network stayed offline until 22 June, roughly five weeks. In the meantime nodes approved ADR-028, the recovery plan described by crypto.news. Protocol-owned liquidity absorbs the loss first and any shortfall is shared across holders of synthetic assets; no RUNE is minted or sold, and part of future income rebuilds protocol-owned liquidity. The attacker’s node is to be fully slashed while honest nodes in the same vault are protected, and a bounty was offered for the funds, with the plan rolled back in proportion to any return.

Co-founder Chad Barraford defended keeping the scheme. “We are staying with GG20 for now, because if we move to another standard, it could have vulnerabilities too,” he told Cointelegraph. The Q2 report, published on 17 July, says “the financial recovery itself remains unresolved”. The Q3 report of 23 October says “v3.20 completed the residual remediation under ADR-028”, a migration that removed phantom depth from 26 pools and reset four seed pools. It gives no figure for coins recovered from the attacker, and we found none published elsewhere.

Laundering controversy: Bybit, Kelp DAO and Bitget funds

THORChain has no admin key and no company that can freeze an address. For a thief holding stolen ether, that makes it one of the fastest ways into bitcoin.

After the Bybit theft of 21 February 2025, about $1.46 billion, the analytics account Lookonchain counted about 270,000 ETH sent into THORChain by the hacker, which it put at 54% of the stolen funds, ForkLog reported on 28 February 2025. A node vote to halt the chain was cancelled within minutes. Pluto, a developer from the Nine Realms team, announced on 27 February that he would no longer contribute to THORChain.

It happened again in 2026. After the $292 million Kelp DAO exploit of 21 April, The Block reported on-chain estimates by EmberCN that about $80 million of ETH had been laundered, mostly into BTC through THORChain. The protocol’s 24-hour volume reached $394 million that day, against a usual $10 million to $35 million. THORChain’s answer, quoted by the outlet: “THORChain is neutral because the code is neutral, and the nodes enforce it.”

Bitget followed. After the theft of about $387.5 million on 24 September 2026, independent researcher Andrey Sergeenkov calculated that THORChain liquidity providers earned $573,226 in fees on swaps of the stolen funds, and that seven affiliate addresses with links to the wallets involved received $259,718, on data up to 2 October, crypto.news reported on 6 October. Bitget had asked THORChain to refuse service to the linked addresses; THORChain replied that its halt mechanisms protect network operations and offer no selective freeze.

Then came Binance. The FBI put the theft of 29 October at more than $6 billion in a notice of 31 October that named North Korea’s TraderTraitor group and urged firms to block addresses tied to it. THORNode operators head its list, as our piece on the FBI request reports. The FBI’s own page refused our connection on 1 November, so we rely on CoinDesk and The Block for its content. It is a request, not a sanctions listing. The Block counts 608 Ethereum addresses, 19 Bitcoin addresses and one Solana address on the list, and none on Tron, where the flows below began.

Analysts’ counts of what crossed THORChain differ. Elliptic put about $31 million into THORChain on a page updated at 22:41 UTC on 31 October, the largest route it had traced from one Tron wallet, ahead of SunSwap at $5.3 million. The Block reported on 1 November, citing the on-chain analyst SomaXBT, that about $44 million of the money left Tron through THORChain, second only to Relay at $48 million: 185.1 million TRX and 3.83 million USDT in 2,697 deposits, paid out as 17,019 ETH and 53.25 BTC.

The network’s own data shows the jump, though not who was behind it. Midgard counted 209,557 swaps on 29 October and more than 1.07 million on each of the next two days. Swaps touching the TRX pool went from 3,350 to 377,997 on 31 October. The Block put affiliate fees earned by front ends on the attackers’ flows at about 145,800 RUNE, roughly $95,000.

Co-founder Chad Barraford wrote on X that THORNode operators hold “zero information that isn’t already public”, The Block reported. He did not say whether they would block the listed addresses, and we found no node vote on the question. The pause itself also stopped the hackers from swapping through most of THORChain’s routes, The Block reported, citing Chainalysis. Crypto Briefing stresses that this was a side effect of the refund error, not a move against the stolen funds.

Two consequences for ordinary users. Swapping without KYC is not private: every swap is public on the source chain, on THORChain and on the destination chain, which is how these flows were traced within days. And part of the fee income earned by liquidity providers and TCY holders has come from stolen money, a sanctions and enforcement exposure for the front ends that route to THORChain.

THORChain data on 1 November 2026: TVL, volume, fees and nodes

The figures below come from DefiLlama (TVL at 17:36 UTC, volume and fees) and from the THORNode and Midgard APIs, read on the evening of 1 November 2026.

Metric	Value	Source
Total value locked	$61.8 million	DefiLlama
Record TVL	$546.4 million on 2 April 2022	DefiLlama
TVL one year earlier	$117.5 million	DefiLlama
Swap volume, last 30 days	$1.57 billion	DefiLlama
Swap volume, last 12 months	$12.93 billion	DefiLlama
Swap volume, all time	$128.9 billion	DefiLlama
Fees, last 30 days	$1.94 million	DefiLlama
Fees, last 12 months	$20.08 million	DefiLlama
Active nodes	111 (65 on standby)	THORNode API
Available pools	36 (8 more staged)	THORNode API
Swaps, all time	93,843,257	Midgard

DefiLlama counts $29.59 million of the TVL on THORChain itself, mostly the RUNE side of the pools, then $15.06 million on Bitcoin and $10.06 million on Ethereum. The BTC pool is by far the deepest, with about 21.9 million RUNE on its RUNE side against 6.5 million for ETH.

Over the last 30 days fees came to about 0.12% of volume, by our calculation from DefiLlama. For the third quarter of 2026, THORChain reported about $3.82 billion of volume and $5.77 million of swap fees, nearly double the volume of the second quarter ($2.06 billion, with five offline weeks). September alone made up about $2.4 billion of that, and the network’s own September report ties the late-month spike to funds from the Bitget exploit.

Who runs THORChain: node votes, Mimir and no official channels

THORChain “aims to have as little governance baked into the system as possible”, the docs say. What there is sits with node operators, who vote on network settings called Mimir. Three active nodes voting the same value are enough for an operational setting, such as a halt; economic settings need a two-thirds supermajority of active nodes, and so do protocol upgrades. New pools compete for listing, and the asset with the deepest RUNE commitment gets in first. Larger changes are written up as architecture decision records (ADRs) on dev.thorchain.org.

The project started in 2018 with a largely pseudonymous team. Its contributors page names one person, co-founder Chad Barraford, and says the people working on THORChain “are just as decentralized as the network”. The founder, John-Paul Thorbjornsen, known as JP Thor, had built the protocol for the better part of six years under the pseudonym “Leena” before revealing it that March, Cointelegraph Magazine reported in July 2024.

The docs state that every resource they list is community-run and that there are no “official” channels. The links on this page are the ones the docs give.

In practice nodes run software written by a small group of developers, and the upgrade path is not always public. Version 3.19.0, the restart release after the May attack, shipped TSS patches the team said it would disclose only once the chain had recovered, and v3.21, live since 23 October, is again a private binary with extra security patches.

Funding: a 2019 DEX offering and no venture round on record

No venture round with named investors is on record, and DefiLlama lists no raises. A THORChain blog post of 3 December 2019 gives the early history: a start in 2018 on “a modest amount of seed investment”, an Interchain grant in the second quarter of 2019, $1.5 million raised in an initial DEX offering on Binance Chain in July 2019, and an over-the-counter sale of 3.25 million RUNE at the trailing market price to investors who planned to run nodes or provide liquidity. Neither the seed amount nor the grant amount was disclosed.

THORChain swaps paused on 10 chains: the November stop and the double refund

Swaps stopped on 31 October 2026. Midgard, the network’s data service, shows the last ETH pool swap at 12:13 UTC, and pools on other chains fall silent during the next two hours. Tron’s trading flag carries a block height produced at 16:20 UTC. The Defiant, Crypto Briefing and TokenPost reported that swaps were paused on 12 chains while outbound signing stayed on for most of them, so payments could leave while new swaps were refused.

The count has fallen since. Our news report found 11 chains halted at 05:50 UTC on 1 November, and the network settings show 10 at 19:35 UTC. XRP Ledger and Avalanche pools show no swaps from 14:00 to 20:59 UTC on 31 October, then trade again from 21:00. Base came back during the 08:00 UTC hour on 1 November. That explains the higher count in Saturday’s press reports.

State at 19:35 UTC, 1 November 2026	Chains	Count
Trading halted, outbound signing open	Bitcoin, Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain, Bitcoin Cash, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Tron, Zcash	8
Trading and outbound signing halted	Solana, Cosmos Hub	2
Open	Avalanche, Base, XRP Ledger	3

Solana and the Cosmos Hub belong to an older problem. Midgard’s last swap in the SOL pool is dated 15 September and in the ATOM pool 18 October, so the weekend stop did not cause those two. Eight chains stopped this time and have stayed stopped.

The reported cause is an Ethereum reorganisation, when a chain replaces its latest blocks with a competing version. Crypto Briefing wrote that THORChain then refunded one 10 ETH deposit twice and that the duplicate set off the emergency pause; The Block gives the same account and attributes it to Chainalysis. Neither links a primary record: we could not find that statement on a Chainalysis page, and we found no incident post on THORChain’s blog or Telegram channel. The transaction hash, the vault involved and whether the extra 10 ETH has been recovered are all unknown. So is what keeps swaps shut now: the global node pause ended at a block produced at 15:35 UTC on 31 October, and per-chain switches hold the rest. The solvency checker’s flags for these chains read 0. Our guide to how cross-chain systems work explains why a change in one chain’s history can reach a protocol watching it from outside.

A double payment has happened before. In September 2023, by THORChain’s own account, a gas spike exposed an edge case in which two vaults signed the same ETH payments twice; trading returned about eight hours later. This stop passed 30 hours on 1 November. A restart would show as the per-chain trading flags going back to 0.

October brought a smaller repair job. The ZEC pool opened on 2 October, then trading halted after an outbound matching bug led to a slash across 18 node accounts, The Defiant reported. Version 3.21 went live at block 28,366,100 on 23 October, and all active nodes run it. ZEC swaps came back the same day, with more than 33,000 on 28 October by Midgard’s count, until the 31 October stop shut Zcash again. The same release shipped the Solana fixes after a change in transaction format broke fee sampling, but Solana trading had not reopened by 1 November. The release also reversed a historical bond slash for 218 bond providers and restored the ETH.THOR pool.

Is THORChain safe? What to check before a swap

Coindaro rates THORChain’s risk at 4 out of 5. The rating covers the protocol, not any single swap. It weighs two losses through core design, a lending product that ended with $206 million of debt converted into a revenue token, repeated use by thieves with no way to freeze, the halts and paused deposits of autumn 2026, including the stop on 10 chains in November, and the absence of any public audit of the TSS code newer than September 2021 in THORChain’s audit repository. Against that, the automatic halts worked in May 2026, 111 nodes bond large sums, the code is open and losses were absorbed without minting RUNE.

• Check that both chains of your swap are live. A halted chain shows in the network’s inbound addresses and in most front ends.
• Compare the quoted output with the market rate, because the slip fee grows fast on a shallow pool; streaming swaps reduce it for large orders.
• Expect waits: large outbound payments are spread over up to an hour, and Bitcoin confirmations add more.
• Paste the receiving address carefully. A payment sent to a wrong address cannot be reversed.
• Before adding liquidity, remember that impermanent loss is not covered and that new deposits were paused on 15 of 36 pools on 1 November 2026.

None of this is investment advice. It describes how the protocol behaves and what has gone wrong before.

How to use THORChain: interfaces, wallets and the explorer

Few users touch THORChain directly. They go through front ends that build the transaction and add their own affiliate fee. By affiliate volume in the second quarter of 2026, the Q2 report ranks THORChain Swap first ($262 million), then Asgardex ($170 million), SwapKit ($94 million), ShapeShift ($74 million) and Trust Wallet ($27 million). The docs list swap.thorchain.org as a swap interface, and the RuneScan explorer (runescan.io) shows transactions, pools and nodes.

1. Open a front end and connect a wallet that holds the coin you want to sell.
2. Pick the coin you want and paste a receiving address on its chain.
3. Read the quote: expected output, total fees and estimated time.
4. Confirm, and the wallet sends your coins to the vault address with the memo the interface built.
5. Follow the swap on RuneScan with its transaction ID until the outbound payment arrives.

Roadmap: Monero after v3.21.1, TAO and the move away from GG20

Monero is next, and it is late. The Q3 report says Least Authority audited the integration and delivered findings in late August, and calls the fixes “the main gate before Monero goes live on mainnet”. Those fixes shipped in v3.21, but the release post says activation “remains gated and requires a follow-up v3.21.1 release”, followed by a soft launch with limited liquidity. On 1 November the network listed no Monero chain and no date had been set. Bittensor’s TAO is expected about six weeks after Monero, with DASH and Zano in the pipeline.

GG20 stays for now. The Q3 report plans DKLS signing for ECDSA chains and FROST for Schnorr chains in the medium term, with no delivery date; Rekt reported that THORChain had hired Silence Labs for this in November 2025. Most of the open votes have closed: ADR-024 was executed with v3.20, ADR-029 on affiliate revenue sharing passed in August, and ADR-031 on Rujira was executed with Option 1. ADR-030 on delegated node permissions had about 37% support in early September, short of the two thirds it needs. Base-layer limit orders are also under discussion. No date is fixed for anything on this list, and the first step is the restart of swaps.