Chainflip, the cross-chain blockchain, where users swap tokens directly from their own wallets without handing custody of their funds to a company.">swap protocol, has stopped all deposits, withdrawals and swaps after a single transaction took 520.22 ETH, 3.25 million USDC and 758,141 USDT out of its Ethereum vault at 07:10:59 UTC on Saturday 21 November. Blockchain trackers Onchain Lens and AMLBot put the loss at about $4.86 million, according to crypto.news. The transaction record shows that the vault paid because the request carried a signature that passed the contract’s own check.
Chainflip confirmed an incident two hours later, without a figure or a cause. “We’re aware of a potential exploit affecting Chainflip vaults,” the project wrote on X at 09:14 UTC. It said the protocol was “being put into full safe mode”, with deposits, withdrawals, swaps and quoting disabled, and promised updates as it investigates.
At 12:25 UTC that post was still Chainflip’s only statement. The project has published no incident report, no loss figure and no word on who will bear the shortfall. A notice on its website says services are “temporarily unavailable” and sends users to its Discord.
Every number on the theft therefore comes from the chain and from outside analysts. So does the leading explanation: a leak of the key that Chainflip’s validators share to sign vault transactions. Chainflip has not confirmed it, and nobody has been named as responsible.
Chainflip hack: what the Ethereum vault transaction shows
The contract is the one Chainflip lists as its Ethereum vault in its mainnet address documentation, 0xF5e10380213880111522dd0efD3dbb45b9f62Bcc. In block 26,461,896, an address with no earlier outgoing transaction, 0x78fa4aC270DB14886033e95b9B9E93F887aA2db0, called the vault’s transferBatch function. The function pays out several assets at once and runs only if the call carries a signature made with the validators’ shared key.
The call listed three payments to one recipient, 0x7d14a719072DA80076b4edcec3e3401209d21Eaf: 520.2243 ETH, 3,249,631.41 USDC and 758,141.33 USDT. All three went through. In the same transaction Chainflip’s KeyManager contract, which checks signatures for the vault, logged a “SignatureAccepted” event.
The sender had been funded one minute earlier. At 07:09:59 UTC it received 0.9933 ETH from Tornado Cash’s 1 ETH smart contract holding reserves of two or more tokens, supplied by users, that a decentralized exchange uses to execute trades automatically at a price set by a formula.">pool, enough to pay for gas, from a mixer that hides where money comes from. Solid Intel made the same observation, according to CoinGabbar. The dollar values come from crypto.news, which read them off the transaction record: roughly $850,000 for the ether and just over $4 million for the two stablecoins, about 82% of the total.
| Time (UTC, 21 Nov) | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 07:09:59 | Sender address receives 0.9933 ETH from Tornado Cash’s 1 ETH pool | Ethereum explorer |
| 07:10:59 | Vault pays out 520.22 ETH, 3,249,631 USDC and 758,141 USDT | Ethereum explorer |
| 07:12:59 | USDC swapped on Uniswap for 1,910.01 ETH | Ethereum explorer |
| 07:14:23 | USDT swapped on Uniswap for 457.22 ETH | Ethereum explorer |
| 07:18:23 to 07:19:11 | 2,909 ETH deposited in Tornado Cash in three transactions | Ethereum explorer |
| 08:17:23 | Last transaction processed by the vault | Ethereum explorer |
| 08:53:35 | New aggregate key written to the KeyManager contract | Ethereum explorer |
| 09:14 | Chainflip announces full safe mode | Chainflip on X |
From vault to Tornado Cash in eight minutes
Two minutes after the withdrawal, the recipient sold all the USDC on Uniswap for 1,910.01 ETH, routing it through USDT. At 07:14:23 UTC it sold the USDT, routed through USDC, for 457.22 ETH. Both swaps paid out directly to a third address, 0xfd24197eF8503dd5dd18F30C7B86A77910D3B080.
At 07:15:11 UTC the recipient sent that third address 542.67 ETH. This was the 520.22 ETH from the vault plus 22.45 ETH that an unlabelled contract had paid the recipient in two transfers of 21.14 and 1.31 ETH, in the same blocks as the two swaps.
The third address then pushed 1,102 ETH, 1,003 ETH and 804 ETH through a batching contract in three transactions between 07:18:23 and 07:19:11 UTC. Their event logs show 29 deposits in Tornado Cash’s 100 ETH pool and nine in its 1 ETH pool, 2,909 ETH in all. The last deposit was confirmed 8 minutes and 12 seconds after the vault paid out. Under 1 ETH stayed on the third address.
The count matches the 2,909 ETH that Onchain Lens tracked, worth about $4.75 million at the time of its report, crypto.news writes. It is the same money one step later, not a second loss. “We believe the laundering was scripted and automated end to end,” AMLBot said in a post quoted by the outlet. AMLBot also noted that the stablecoins were converted before their issuers could act: Circle and Tether can freeze USDC and USDT at an address, and ether has no issuer.

A valid signature points analysts to the validators’ key
No company wallet controls a Chainflip vault. According to the project’s vault documentation, every transaction that touches vault funds must carry a Schnorr signature, which the KeyManager contract verifies against an “aggregate key” stored on chain. “Without a valid signature no funds can be accessed,” the document says.
That aggregate key belongs to the validator set as a whole. Chainflip uses a threshold signature scheme called FROST, built for up to 150 validators of which 100 must cooperate to sign. Each holds a share of the secret, and the complete private key “is never explicitly computed”, the FROST page of the documentation says. The idea is close to a multisig wallet, except that the chain sees one ordinary signature instead of a list of signers.
Hence the attention on the accepted signature. Onchain Lens said the withdrawal carried a valid signature for the vault’s aggregate key, which in its words raised the possibility that the key had been compromised, crypto.news reports. A KuCoin news flash citing Foresight News relays two more readings. Defimon Alerts said the signatures were verified on chain with the aggregate key and that key rotation logs looked normal. The security firm Decurity said a leak of the validators’ threshold key was more likely than a flaw in the smart contract.
These are readings of what the chain shows, and the chain does not show how the signature was produced: with key shares taken from enough validators, through the signing software, or some other way. Chainflip has said nothing on that point.
The chain does record a key change after the theft. At 08:53:35 UTC, a transaction on the KeyManager contract replaced the aggregate key with a new one, about 20 minutes before Chainflip’s post. The seven previous key changes on the explorer came three days apart, each between 20:40 and 21:54 UTC, the latest at 21:53:59 UTC on 18 November. Three days after that would be 21:53 UTC on 21 November, so this change came about 13 hours earlier than the interval alone would give. Chainflip’s documentation says that once the key is updated, payloads signed with the previous aggregate key are no longer valid. Chainflip has not commented on the change or given a reason for it.
What safe mode stops for users and liquidity providers
Safe mode is Chainflip’s emergency brake. Its security documentation describes a state in which validators, at the instigation of the governance key, halt most of the protocol’s functions. That key is a 3-of-6 arrangement held by members of the Chainflip Labs Security Council, the same page says.
In full safe mode, according to the document:
- no outgoing transaction is processed, which covers swap payouts, liquidity provider withdrawals and new staking claims;
- deposits not finalised when safe mode began wait until it is lifted, then are rescanned and processed;
- blocks continue, so that runtime upgrades and fixes can be deployed;
- the network leaves safe mode through a governance transaction once the incident is resolved.
Chainflip’s public node reported that state at 12:21 UTC. Its safe mode status call returned swaps, deposits and withdrawals disabled, liquidity provider deposits and withdrawals disabled, FLIP redemptions disabled, and deposit channels switched off on Ethereum, Bitcoin, Solana, Arbitrum, Tron, BNB Chain, Polkadot and Asset Hub.
For a swap that was in flight, the documentation gives one rule: a deposit not yet finalised waits and is processed after safe mode ends. It gives no duration, and Chainflip has announced no restart time.
The harder question concerns the money that was inside the vault. Chainflip’s documentation describes the vaults as holding liquidity providers’ assets, and the project has not said whose balances the missing $4.86 million corresponds to. The explorer also shows that funds kept arriving after the withdrawal: eleven direct swap calls from users reached the vault between 07:16 and 07:54 UTC, the largest for 7.13 ETH, and the vault processed its last transaction at 08:17:23 UTC. At 12:20 UTC it held about 8.66 ETH, 4,343 USDC and 10,816 USDT.
Liquidity providers cannot withdraw until safe mode ends. Chainflip has made no statement on reimbursement.

Other vaults: no outflow reported
The trackers name only the Ethereum vault. Chainflip’s documentation says the same vault design is used on its other EVM-compatible chains, Arbitrum, Tron and BNB Chain. No analyst has reported an outflow from them, and Chainflip’s Arbitrum vault held about 16.3 ETH, 191,600 USDC and 57,750 USDT at 12:21 UTC. Chainflip has not said whether other vaults were exposed. Our guide on how cross-chain bridges and swap networks work covers the trust placed in the signers behind such a protocol.
Third security incident since August, second loss of funds
Chainflip’s own posts record two earlier incidents in the past three months. In an update dated 24 August, the project said it had detected an attempted exploit of its cross-chain messaging and refund logic on Ethereum, paused deposits and quoting on Ethereum, then on Arbitrum and Tron as a precaution, and fixed the flaw in about 24 hours. “No user funds were lost,” it wrote.
On 12 September, an attacker took 736,442.17 USDT from the Tron vault. Chainflip’s report of 13 September called it “the first significant critical security event resulting in the loss of funds from Chainflip vaults”, as quoted by Unchained. The cause was specific to Tron: the attacker attached a memo to a transfer the validators had already signed, and the protocol read it as a failed swap and refunded it. Version 2.2.13, published on 15 September, restricted Tron vault swaps to direct transfers. Tron liquidity providers saw their USDT balance set to zero and replaced by a record of what they were owed.
Validators then approved Proposal 008, which Chainflip announced on 18 September: affected providers get whatever Tron USDT can be recovered, and USDC at one for one for the rest. The post puts the shortfall at $748,935.16 and lists a surplus of 1,087,028 USDC in the Ethereum vault at that date. Saturday’s reported loss is about 6.5 times the September shortfall. Chainflip has not said whether any surplus or reserve can absorb it.
September’s flaw lay in how the protocol read a transaction. If the analysts are right, Saturday’s withdrawal involves the signing key itself, a risk Chainflip’s security page spells out: “Validator private keys could be compromised, seriously undermining the security of the system as a whole if enough keys are compromised.”
Thieves have tried to use Chainflip too. On 22 February 2025 the project detected the Bybit hacker trying to swap USDC through its protocol, put its swap front end in maintenance mode and planned an upgrade letting brokers reject deposits, The Block reported three days later. THORChain, another cross-chain swap network, paused its own swaps on 1 November after a double refund, and its router has received ether this month from wallets tied to the Binance hacker.
FLIP fell about 42% at its low on KuCoin
The FLIP token reacted with a delay. On KuCoin’s FLIP-USDT pair, the 15-minute candle that opened at 07:45 UTC closed at $0.4825, where the price had stood before the withdrawal. It slipped from 08:00 UTC and fell faster after Chainflip’s post: the candle that opened at 09:30 UTC closed at $0.371, and the one that opened at 10:15 UTC touched $0.2804, about 42% below the 07:45 level.
FLIP traded at $0.33 on KuCoin at 12:22 UTC, about 32% below that level. The whole market was weak: total crypto capitalisation was down 7.84% over 24 hours at 12:00 UTC, with ether at $1,652, so the fall cannot all be assigned to the incident. CoinGabbar, citing CoinGecko data at 10:30 UTC, put FLIP’s market capitalisation near $24.8 million; the reported loss is about a fifth of that figure.
What Chainflip has not yet said
How a valid signature was produced is the first open point, and it decides whether the remedy is a software patch or new validator keys. Chainflip has not said whether its vaults on other chains were at risk, put a number on the loss, or said who covers it. No date has been given for leaving safe mode.
The ether sits in Tornado Cash, which pools deposits so that later withdrawals are hard to connect to them. AMLBot said it was continuing to monitor the funds, according to crypto.news. Chainflip said it will share updates on its X account.
