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LUKSO hack: email recovery is shut down after about 300 Universal Profiles lose 1.4 million LYX

LUKSO says a flaw in its email recovery backend let an attacker add a key to about 300 Universal Profiles. What users must remove, and what is unknown.

11 min read

Abstract key and wallet beside a software bug and a warning sign
Table of contents
  1. LUKSO hack: what the project says happened
  2. A Universal Profile is an account with several keys
  3. On paper, the recovery profile could only add a controller
  4. 1.4 million LYX fetched about $95,000
  5. What LUKSO tells affected users to do
  6. Refunds are promised, without an amount or a date
  7. What is still unknown

LUKSO has switched off its email-based account recovery service for good after an attacker used it to take over about 300 Universal Profiles and move around 1.4 million LYX out of them overnight from 17 to 18 November. The project gave those figures in a post-mortem published on 18 November, at about 12:30 UTC. It blames a security hole in the backend of the recovery system, says the stolen tokens were sold for about 50 ETH (about $95,000 by its own estimate) and promises a reimbursement plan with no amount and no date so far.

The LUKSO hack did not break the blockchain or the account contracts, according to the project. It went through a door that users had opened themselves when they signed up for recovery by email: a second key on their account, held by a service. Whoever took that service took the accounts.

One thing remains urgent for anyone who used the feature. The attacker’s key may still sit on their profile, and LUKSO warns that it can still move the tokens and collectibles that are left.

LUKSO hack: what the project says happened

LUKSO’s account is short. Overnight from 17 to 18 November, an attacker found a flaw in the backend of the email recovery system, a service meant to help people regain access to a profile after losing a device. Through it, the attacker took control of the service’s own “recovery” Universal Profiles and used them to add one address, 0xa2f8Fd85366d1B4A3B13C33A48CD959F6D1Ba3a7, as a controller on about 300 user profiles. That key then moved the assets out.

The first public warning came at 07:26 UTC on 18 November, in an urgent alert on LUKSO’s X account. It said an attacker had used a malicious recovery profile to add a controller key to “some profiles” and told holders to remove it at once. The post-mortem followed about five hours later.

LUKSO gives no exact count and no timeline beyond “overnight”. The only detailed figures come from one post on OKX’s Orbit platform, by a user writing as flyawei, and rest on that post alone. The post puts LUKSO’s alert at 15:26 Beijing time, which matches the 07:26 UTC of the X post. By 15:52 on the same clock (07:52 UTC), it says, 279 profiles had granted non-zero permissions to the attacker key, 276 of them with rights such as transferring assets or adding controllers. The earliest grant it reports was recorded at 7:40 that day, and grants with transfer rights were still being added until 15:37, eleven minutes after the alert. These are profiles carrying the key, not a tally of drained accounts.

The team found the issue quickly and stopped the attack by switching the recovery system off, the post-mortem says. The service is now being decommissioned while the investigation continues. The post-mortem does not describe the flaw itself.

It does list what was not touched. The LUKSO blockchain runs as normal. The Universal Profile standards and smart contracts “worked exactly as designed”. No private keys or recovery phrases leaked. Profiles that never used email recovery were never at risk, and the other backup methods, a file backup or the device keychain, are described as secure.

A Universal Profile is an account with several keys

To see why a recovery service could empty accounts, start with what a Universal Profile is. An ordinary wallet is one secret: whoever holds the private key owns the address, as our guide to private and public keys explains. A Universal Profile is a smart contract that acts as the account. It holds the LYX, the tokens, the collectibles and the public profile, and it obeys a list of “controllers”.

A controller is any address the owner has given permissions to: the browser extension on a laptop, the app on a phone, another contract. LUKSO’s documentation for its Key Manager standard (LSP6) lists the permissions one by one. Some let a controller transfer value or call other contracts. One, ADDCONTROLLER, lets it grant permissions to an address that had none before.

The design has real advantages. A lost phone does not mean a lost account if another controller exists, and a compromised key can be removed without changing address. LUKSO leans on this in its post-mortem: “With a regular wallet, these 300 accounts would be gone for good,” it writes, whereas here the owner removes the intruder and keeps the name, the history and whatever assets remain.

The cost is that every controller is a way in. Each one is a key to the same account, and the account is only as safe as the least protected of them. That applies to any setup of this kind, as our overview of wallet types and custody sets out.

Abstract key beside a signed document, a smartphone and a laptop
A Universal Profile is a contract that obeys several controllers, such as a phone app and a browser extension.

On paper, the recovery profile could only add a controller

Email recovery was opt-in. How it was built is described in a blog post by Tangany, a German custody technology company, dated 16 January 2024. Ten “Recovery Universal Profiles” were deployed. A user who chose the option added one of them as a controller of their own profile. Each recovery profile was in turn controlled by a Safe, a multisig contract that needs several signatures, with guardian keys kept by Tangany on hardware security modules in Germany and additional keys spread over several cloud environments. Tangany wrote at the time that it could not access the stored keys or “trigger a recovery transaction”.

In normal use, someone locked out of their profile logged in with their email address and a second factor. LUKSO’s backend then requested the Safe signatures, according to the blog post, and the recovery profile added a fresh controller key for the user. The same post says the recovery profile had permission “only to add a new controller” and could not transfer funds or sign transactions.

Set side by side, the documents describe the same path. LUKSO’s post-mortem says the attacker used the recovery profiles to add a controller key, then used that key to move assets. The LSP6 documentation says ADDCONTROLLER grants permissions to an address that had none, and the Orbit post reports transfer rights for the new key on 276 profiles. So the recovery profile, as described in 2024, never had to move a token itself. LUKSO has not published the transactions, the permissions the key received, or whether the 2024 setup was still the one in use.

The failing component has not been disclosed. LUKSO speaks of “the backend of our email-based recovery system” and does not name Tangany or any other supplier in its post-mortem. Neither document says whether the weakness sat in the login step, in the request for signatures or somewhere else, and nothing published points to Tangany. The incident checker linked in the post-mortem refers to ten recovery profiles used in the attack, the same number as were deployed in 2024.

A login service standing between users and their keys was also at the centre of an earlier case this month: Coindaro covered the Keplr wallet breach and its social login on 7 November.

1.4 million LYX fetched about $95,000

The attacker took around 1.4 million LYX, bridged all of it to Ethereum and swapped it on decentralised exchanges such as Uniswap, according to LUKSO, “ending with about 50 ETH (about $95k)”. The project says the ETH sits at the Ethereum address 0x4d2BFb7Ca38Cb3Ea136845a9dd0FBEACe2Cd365C.

Set against the market price, that is a poor sale. CoinMarketCap showed LYX at $0.2312 at about 05:45 UTC on 19 November, down 28.4% in 24 hours. At that price 1.4 million LYX would be worth roughly $324,000. Dividing LUKSO’s $95,000 by its 1.4 million LYX gives under 7 cents per token, less than a third of that price.

The thin market explains part of it. CoinMarketCap counted 30.53 million LYX in circulation at the same time, for a market value of about $7.06 million. The stolen tokens were therefore close to 4.6% of the circulating supply, pushed through a bridge and a few pools within hours.

FigureValueSource
Profiles affectedabout 300LUKSO post-mortem, 18 Nov
Profiles carrying the attacker key279, of which 276 with transfer or add-controller rightsflyawei on OKX Orbit, 07:52 UTC on 18 Nov
LYX takenaround 1.4 millionLUKSO post-mortem
Proceeds after bridging and swappingabout 50 ETH, about $95,000LUKSO post-mortem
LYX price$0.2312, down 28.4% in 24 hoursCoinMarketCap, about 05:45 UTC on 19 Nov
Same LYX at that priceabout $324,000arithmetic: 1.4 million LYX at $0.2312
Addresses covered by the incident checker11: the attacker key and ten recovery profilesincident-check.lukso.tools

LUKSO draws one conclusion for holders of the token. “The stolen LYX are already sold, so there is no further market pressure,” it wrote on X. That statement covers the attacker’s selling only. It says nothing about what other holders do after a security incident.

Abstract hooded figure near a bridge, stacks of coins and a falling line
LUKSO says the 1.4 million LYX were bridged to Ethereum and swapped for about 50 ETH.

What LUKSO tells affected users to do

No new profile can be hit now that the service is off, LUKSO says. But the keys the attacker installed still work until each owner removes them. The post-mortem gives these steps, in this order, and they are LUKSO’s instructions:

  1. Remove the attacker’s controller key. In the UP Authorize app, paste the address 0xa2f8Fd85366d1B4A3B13C33A48CD959F6D1Ba3a7 into the “Authorize controller” field, connect the profile with the browser extension or the mobile app, then scroll down and remove it. LUKSO adds that the key may not show in the controller list and should be removed anyway.
  2. Remove the “recovery-UP” controller in the Controllers screen of the app or extension, or remove its “Add Permission” permission. An error message in the mobile app at this step can be ignored, according to LUKSO.
  3. Create a file backup of the profile in the app or the extension.
  4. Follow LUKSO’s official channels for the reimbursement details.

The second step changed during the day. The morning alert said that removing permissions was “NOT enough” and that both controllers had to be removed completely. The post-mortem accepts either removing the recovery controller or taking away its permission to add controllers.

The post-mortem also links to an incident checker where a holder pastes a profile address. The page reads the profile on the chain and reports whether the attacker key or any of the ten recovery profiles still has permissions. It is read-only and states that it never asks to connect a wallet, sign anything or share a key or a 2FA code.

That page is stricter than the post-mortem on one point. It says the permission value for each address must end up empty, and describes a common mistake: unticking permissions in an interface can leave three “super” permissions in place, which still allow the address to move LYX and tokens. “Several profiles were left like this,” it notes. Where its advice differs from LUKSO’s channels, the page itself says to follow LUKSO.

It carries other warnings too. Removing the recovery controller ends 2FA recovery for that profile, so another backup is needed first. Importing a profile or adding a device can register the recovery controller again. And removing a controller does not bring back funds already taken.

LUKSO ends its post-mortem with a warning: it will never ask for a recovery phrase, and anyone who does is not LUKSO. The reimbursement details will come on its official channels only. Our guide on what works and what does not when crypto is stolen covers the fake recovery offers that target victims of a theft.

Refunds are promised, without an amount or a date

“We are sorry this happened to the people whose profiles and funds were taken,” the post-mortem says. LUKSO states that it is “working on a solution to reimburse affected users’ funds” and will give details on its official channels “in the coming weeks”.

It asks for patience because “multiple parties need to be involved in this process”, without naming them. The text does not say whether reimbursement would be in LYX or in another asset, at which price, or whether collectibles and other tokens taken from profiles are covered.

What is still unknown

The post-mortem appeared within a day of the attack and leaves several points open. It calls the flaw a security hole in the backend and gives no technical description, so teams running similar recovery services cannot yet check their own systems against it.

The figures are rounded. “About 300” profiles and “around 1.4M” LYX come with no list of affected addresses and no total for tokens other than LYX or for collectibles.

LUKSO has not said how many owners have removed the attacker key. Until they do, what remains in those profiles is exposed.

The next step is LUKSO’s promised update on reimbursement, due “in the coming weeks” with no date set. The email recovery service will not return: users who relied on it now need a file backup or a device keychain backup instead.

Sources

  1. LUKSO, Post Mortem: Security incident in the email-based recovery system, 18 November 2026 medium.com
  2. X post by @LUKSO_io, urgent security alert, 18 November 2026 x.com
  3. UP Incident Check, the checker linked in LUKSO's post-mortem incident-check.lukso.tools
  4. Tangany blog, account recovery for LUKSO Universal Profiles, 16 January 2024 tangany.com
  5. flyawei on OKX Orbit, count of profiles carrying the attacker key, 18 November 2026 okx.com
  6. CoinMarketCap, LUKSO (LYX) price page, read 19 November 2026 coinmarketcap.com

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